Narrative:

Myself and student were on an IFR flight plan [in a] PA-28-181. Weather was VFR; +10SM visibility. Student was under view limiting device and had just flown the ILS with a missed approach. Our climb out instructions were to turn heading 310 and climb 2;000 feet and return to approach. We executed the missed approach instructions and had just leveled off at 2;000 feet MSL on the 310 heading when approach gave instructions to climb and maintain 5;000. Upon applying power for cruise climb 90 knots; the engine immediately began making a very loud banging/pinging noise accompanied by strong vibrations through the airframe. At this point we were approximately 2;400 feet MSL and I took the controls from the student. Utilizing CRM; I had my student start running emergency checklist for engine roughness; while I contacted approach. We were approximately 15-20 miles from [the airport] and only 2;400 feet MSL. I was able to identify an alternate airport straight ahead with a 6;000 foot runway. After quickly troubleshooting with no positive results; but feeling confident in the potential to get back to [departure airport]; I opted to request a return and coordinated that with approach. Approach gave us direct to the field; cleared to land. I removed some power due to the thought of over stressing the engine with the amount of noise and vibration that was being felt and heard. At this point I was at around 1800 RPM and able to hold altitude but not able to gain altitude. At 1800 RPM the vibration and noise was still present but not as loud and violent. Any increase in throttle immediately caused the sound and vibration to double. We were questioned on souls onboard (2) and fuel quantity onboard (30 gallons). They asked if we would like emergency services waiting and I advised that I felt as if we could make the field without incident. Approach responded and stated that they would have emergency services waiting regardless.at this point I was still maintaining 2;400 feet MSL and 1800 RPM as I turned toward the field. Once the runway was in sight and we were lined up; I began to reduce throttle to allow for a descent (approximately 1500 RPM). At this point we were able to see fire and rescue equipment lined up at every intersection along the runway. I was attempting to maintain 4 white lights on the PAPI in order to ensure making the runway. At some point we had 3 white and 1 red and I slowly added power back to around 1800 to catch the glide path. Upon adding power the noise and vibration dramatically increased and we continued to descend. The power change seemed to have no effect on ability to slow the descent to the runway.as we descended; I was comfortable that regardless of power loss and the potential for engine to shut down; that I would be able to make the runway and safely land. As we touched down we were escorted off the runway by emergency vehicles. We were able to taxi to [FBO] under minimal power and shut down. Upon exiting the plane we were immediately met by the fire department and asked to give a brief description of the incident as well as my name as pilot of aircraft. Once fire and rescue had looked the aircraft over and determined that it was safe and no hotspots on the engine or airframe they left.I then contacted maintenance to seek advice of where they wanted the aircraft to be parked. While on the phone; I checked the oil level (7.5 quarts) and visually inspected the engine and saw no signs of major damage. [Maintenance] asked a few questions about symptoms and what items we checked to diagnose prior to making it to the runway. Maintenance [later discovered] loss of engine compression and cylinder failure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA-28 instructor pilot reported returning to departure airport after experiencing a power loss and roughness that was later found to be a cylinder failure.

Narrative: Myself and student were on an IFR flight plan [in a] PA-28-181. Weather was VFR; +10SM visibility. Student was under view limiting device and had just flown the ILS with a missed approach. Our climb out instructions were to turn heading 310 and climb 2;000 feet and return to Approach. We executed the missed approach instructions and had just leveled off at 2;000 feet MSL on the 310 heading when Approach gave instructions to climb and maintain 5;000. Upon applying power for cruise climb 90 knots; the engine immediately began making a very loud banging/pinging noise accompanied by strong vibrations through the airframe. At this point we were approximately 2;400 feet MSL and I took the controls from the student. Utilizing CRM; I had my student start running emergency checklist for engine roughness; while I contacted Approach. We were approximately 15-20 miles from [the airport] and only 2;400 feet MSL. I was able to identify an alternate airport straight ahead with a 6;000 foot runway. After quickly troubleshooting with no positive results; but feeling confident in the potential to get back to [departure airport]; I opted to request a return and coordinated that with Approach. Approach gave us direct to the field; cleared to land. I removed some power due to the thought of over stressing the engine with the amount of noise and vibration that was being felt and heard. At this point I was at around 1800 RPM and able to hold altitude but not able to gain altitude. At 1800 RPM the vibration and noise was still present but not as loud and violent. Any increase in throttle immediately caused the sound and vibration to double. We were questioned on souls onboard (2) and fuel quantity onboard (30 gallons). They asked if we would like emergency services waiting and I advised that I felt as if we could make the field without incident. Approach responded and stated that they would have emergency services waiting regardless.At this point I was still maintaining 2;400 feet MSL and 1800 RPM as I turned toward the field. Once the runway was in sight and we were lined up; I began to reduce throttle to allow for a descent (approximately 1500 RPM). At this point we were able to see Fire and Rescue equipment lined up at every intersection along the runway. I was attempting to maintain 4 white lights on the PAPI in order to ensure making the runway. At some point we had 3 white and 1 red and I slowly added power back to around 1800 to catch the glide path. Upon adding power the noise and vibration dramatically increased and we continued to descend. The power change seemed to have no effect on ability to slow the descent to the runway.As we descended; I was comfortable that regardless of power loss and the potential for engine to shut down; that I would be able to make the runway and safely land. As we touched down we were escorted off the runway by emergency vehicles. We were able to taxi to [FBO] under minimal power and shut down. Upon exiting the plane we were immediately met by the Fire Department and asked to give a brief description of the incident as well as my name as pilot of aircraft. Once Fire and Rescue had looked the aircraft over and determined that it was safe and no hotspots on the engine or airframe they left.I then contacted Maintenance to seek advice of where they wanted the aircraft to be parked. While on the phone; I checked the oil level (7.5 quarts) and visually inspected the engine and saw no signs of major damage. [Maintenance] asked a few questions about symptoms and what items we checked to diagnose prior to making it to the runway. Maintenance [later discovered] loss of engine compression and cylinder failure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.