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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1534669 |
Time | |
Date | 201804 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | HOU.Airport |
State Reference | TX |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT |
Narrative:
Had diverted to hou after an unusually long flight. Vectored onto final approach course just north of avvos; cleared the approach; maintain 2;000 until established. As we intercepted inbound course in LNAV; tower issued a 'low altitude alert.' we had descended below the 1;600 foot crossing altitude at avoss. It was then I recognized that we were not in VNAV path. I acknowledged the tower's transmission. First officer (first officer) disconnected autopilot and checked our descent. We were in VMC conditions and I advised the tower when we had the runway in sight and had been cleared to land. We intercepted the VASI; configured; and landed normally. No other transmissions from the tower other than taxi instructions were received. No GPWS warnings during event.fatigue; stress; and high task saturation in a short period of time degraded my functioning as pilot monitoring (pm) during the approach. We were at the end of a second consecutive day flying into the early hours of home base time; had just had an arduous trip and the diversion was my first as a captain. The divert decision was made in close proximity to hou; so time to prepare was compressed. All reports to company; flight attendants (flight attendant) and passengers had been made and all checklists completed. First officer had handled PF duties well; and I had turned to reference the approach plate when the alert was issued. I should have been more cognizant of our position and proper selection of modes on the FMC beforehand as the pm should.recognizing how insidious fatigue can be; it must also be known that flying the aircraft is the first and foremost task. Adherence to SOP and good crew coordination make it possible; and every effort should be made to ensure so.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air Carrier flight crew reported low altitude alert during approach to HOU airport.
Narrative: Had diverted to HOU after an unusually long flight. Vectored onto final approach course just north of AVVOS; cleared the approach; maintain 2;000 until established. As we intercepted inbound course in LNAV; tower issued a 'low altitude alert.' We had descended below the 1;600 foot crossing altitude at AVOSS. It was then I recognized that we were not in VNAV Path. I acknowledged the tower's transmission. First Officer (FO) disconnected autopilot and checked our descent. We were in VMC conditions and I advised the tower when we had the runway in sight and had been cleared to land. We intercepted the VASI; configured; and landed normally. No other transmissions from the tower other than taxi instructions were received. No GPWS warnings during event.Fatigue; stress; and high task saturation in a short period of time degraded my functioning as Pilot Monitoring (PM) during the approach. We were at the end of a second consecutive day flying into the early hours of Home Base time; had just had an arduous trip and the diversion was my first as a Captain. The divert decision was made in close proximity to HOU; so time to prepare was compressed. All reports to Company; Flight Attendants (FA) and passengers had been made and all checklists completed. FO had handled PF duties well; and I had turned to reference the approach plate when the alert was issued. I should have been more cognizant of our position and proper selection of modes on the FMC beforehand as the PM should.Recognizing how insidious fatigue can be; it must also be known that flying the aircraft is the first and foremost task. Adherence to SOP and good crew coordination make it possible; and every effort should be made to ensure so.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.