Narrative:

On the day prior to our aborted takeoff; we experience the following faults during takeoff:automatic flight a/thr off & automatic rudder travel limiter system fault. During our subsequent push and after engine start; we again received an automatic flight a/thr off ECAM (electronic centralized aircraft monitor). We called maintenance control; pulled back to the gate and deferred the auto thrust system. We also deferred an F/control and fuel class ii message. We pushed and taxied to the runway. During our takeoff attempt we did not get the expected fmas (flight mode annunciators) after setting takeoff thrust. The backup speed system activated; changing the speed tape red and 'speed lmt' flashed red on our pfds (primary flight displays). Numerous ecams were also triggered. We aborted the takeoff and returned to the gate. It was determined that the aircraft's pitot static system was clogged with insect debris.the next day; we returned to the aircraft and prepared to depart. While waiting for pushback; another automatic flight a/thr off was triggered. Maintenance control was called and testing produced no faults even with the ECAM present. The auto thrust was again deferred using MEL 22-xx-xx.we complied with the requirements of MEL 22-xx-xx. We then did a low speed abort; out of an abundance of caution and because of the numerous issues encountered earlier; when we did not receive a man flex or man toga FMA. Our thinking was that these would be displayed; as they are manual power settings and not autothrust settings.while we knew we would not have an autothrust indication on the FMA. We thought that we would still have the man toga or man flx fmas. Vol ii specifically makes a note that the runway FMA may be absent; but does not mention the possible absence of man flx or man toga fmas.I called maintenance control. Maintenance control was not sure if the fmas should be displayed and told us to return to the gate. I called the duty phone. The base chief pilot I spoke to did not know either. The mechanics on the aircraft were not sure and asked to speak to the MEL subject matter expert. I then called [another captain]. [The] captain informed me that we would not get the fmas with an inoperative a/thr system. He also took the time; and I am grateful that he did; to explain some other pitfalls that a pilot can expect with an inoperative a/thr system.the mechanics also included in their corrective action that the MEL was unclear and stated that it needed to be addressed. During climbout we received an engine GA soft fault. After landing maintenance control did not believe this to be associated with our a/thr deferral and asked me to enter it into the logbook for tracking and crew awareness.in summary; our takeoff was aborted after numerous issues were experienced during our previous two flights. This including a previously aborted takeoff due to an adiru (air data inertial reference unit) 1+2+3 miscompare. This resulted in the loss of all airspeed information and numerous ECAM warnings during takeoff. Two pitot tubes had to be removed and replaced. This abort was also due to unclear guidance contained in MEL 23-xx-xx.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain reported that an aborted takeoff.

Narrative: On the day prior to our aborted takeoff; we experience the following faults during takeoff:AUTO FLIGHT A/THR OFF & AUTO RUDDER TRAVEL LIMITER SYS FAULT. During our subsequent push and after engine start; we again received an AUTO FLIGHT A/THR OFF ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor). We called Maintenance Control; pulled back to the gate and deferred the Auto thrust system. We also deferred an F/CTL and FUEL Class II MSG. We pushed and taxied to the runway. During our takeoff attempt we did not get the expected FMAs (flight mode annunciators) after setting takeoff thrust. The backup speed system activated; changing the speed tape red and 'SPD LMT' flashed red on our PFDs (primary flight displays). Numerous ECAMs were also triggered. We aborted the takeoff and returned to the gate. It was determined that the aircraft's pitot static system was clogged with insect debris.The next day; we returned to the aircraft and prepared to depart. While waiting for pushback; another AUTO FLIGHT A/THR OFF was triggered. Maintenance Control was called and testing produced no faults even with the ECAM present. The Auto Thrust was again deferred using MEL 22-XX-XX.We complied with the requirements of MEL 22-XX-XX. We then did a low speed abort; out of an abundance of caution and because of the numerous issues encountered earlier; when we did not receive a MAN FLEX or MAN TOGA FMA. Our thinking was that these would be displayed; as they are manual power settings and not autothrust settings.While we knew we would not have an autothrust indication on the FMA. We thought that we would still have the MAN TOGA or MAN FLX FMAs. VOL II specifically makes a note that the RWY FMA may be absent; but does not mention the possible absence of MAN FLX or MAN TOGA FMAs.I called Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control was not sure if the FMAs should be displayed and told us to return to the gate. I called the duty phone. The base Chief Pilot I spoke to did not know either. The mechanics on the aircraft were not sure and asked to speak to the MEL subject matter expert. I then called [another Captain]. [The] Captain informed me that we would not get the FMAs with an inoperative A/THR system. He also took the time; and I am grateful that he did; to explain some other pitfalls that a pilot can expect with an inoperative A/THR system.The mechanics also included in their corrective action that the MEL was unclear and stated that it needed to be addressed. During climbout we received an ENG GA SOFT FAULT. After landing Maintenance Control did not believe this to be associated with our A/THR deferral and asked me to enter it into the logbook for tracking and crew awareness.In Summary; our takeoff was aborted after numerous issues were experienced during our previous two flights. This including a previously aborted takeoff due to an ADIRU (Air Data Inertial Reference Unit) 1+2+3 miscompare. This resulted in the loss of all airspeed information and numerous ECAM warnings during takeoff. Two pitot tubes had to be removed and replaced. This abort was also due to unclear guidance contained in MEL 23-XX-XX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.