Narrative:

Our clearance was lga 3 whitestone climb, runway 13, radar vector elliott, etc. The captain and I had been discussing an area of stress developing between us (which has been increasing). It seems he has little or no respect for first officer's in general and that we are here to do the captain's wishes. I had pointed out the immaturity of this attitude and how easily threatened a 24 yr captain could be, and my perception of the absurdity of this. Apparently no one had ever challenged him before and I could see truth and logic having their effect in a positive way. He appeared to be shaken to a degree,, but not distracted from his responsibility as captain. I read our clearance to him, not stating 'whitestone climb,' but choosing to read the actual whitestone climb requirement. I read this as we started to run aircraft checklist. All checklists were then completed. We pushed and started engines and taxied for takeoff. As we waited our turn, I again read '175 degree turn on takeoff, left to 040 degrees at 1500'.' apparently the captain never realized what I was saying, and still had his mind on our discussion of his cockpit demeanor. As I climbed on 175 degree heading, reaching 1500', I began a 30 degree bank turn left to 040 degrees and he suddenly asked, 'what are you doing? You must turn right to 275 degrees (coney climb).' he asked me to stop my turn until he could clarify our clearance. I assured him of the correctness of my actions. By that point, however, we had entered jfk's airspace as pointed out by lga departure ATC. We quickly maneuvered back on course and no problems were created. Moral: keep it all business, regardless of personality clashes until in the crew room or parking lot. Good coming from this: this captain has been a joy to work with since this occurrence and now seems to realize that a first officer makes a far better asset to him as a teammate, rather than as a royal subject! Supplemental information from acn 156737: at different time in the course of the taxi to runway 13, the first officer and I read out loud the departure procedure, but neglected to use the departure procedures proper name (whitestone climb on the lga 3 departure). Being a busy time of day, we failed to detect we had read similar but different procedures, until after takeoff. We began our turns out of lga when I (captain) stopped first officer (PF) from making the turns and continued straight until we sorted out the problem. In the meantime departure control was telling us that we were leaving his airspace, asking us our rate of climb and if the tower had giving us the whitestone climb in 3 different xmissions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG TRACK DEVIATION ON SID FROM LGA RESULTS FROM PERSONALITY CONFLICT IN THE COCKPIT.

Narrative: OUR CLRNC WAS LGA 3 WHITESTONE CLB, RWY 13, RADAR VECTOR ELLIOTT, ETC. THE CAPT AND I HAD BEEN DISCUSSING AN AREA OF STRESS DEVELOPING BTWN US (WHICH HAS BEEN INCREASING). IT SEEMS HE HAS LITTLE OR NO RESPECT FOR F/O'S IN GENERAL AND THAT WE ARE HERE TO DO THE CAPT'S WISHES. I HAD POINTED OUT THE IMMATURITY OF THIS ATTITUDE AND HOW EASILY THREATENED A 24 YR CAPT COULD BE, AND MY PERCEPTION OF THE ABSURDITY OF THIS. APPARENTLY NO ONE HAD EVER CHALLENGED HIM BEFORE AND I COULD SEE TRUTH AND LOGIC HAVING THEIR EFFECT IN A POSITIVE WAY. HE APPEARED TO BE SHAKEN TO A DEGREE,, BUT NOT DISTRACTED FROM HIS RESPONSIBILITY AS CAPT. I READ OUR CLRNC TO HIM, NOT STATING 'WHITESTONE CLB,' BUT CHOOSING TO READ THE ACTUAL WHITESTONE CLB REQUIREMENT. I READ THIS AS WE STARTED TO RUN ACFT CHKLIST. ALL CHKLISTS WERE THEN COMPLETED. WE PUSHED AND STARTED ENGS AND TAXIED FOR TKOF. AS WE WAITED OUR TURN, I AGAIN READ '175 DEG TURN ON TKOF, LEFT TO 040 DEGS AT 1500'.' APPARENTLY THE CAPT NEVER REALIZED WHAT I WAS SAYING, AND STILL HAD HIS MIND ON OUR DISCUSSION OF HIS COCKPIT DEMEANOR. AS I CLBED ON 175 DEG HDG, REACHING 1500', I BEGAN A 30 DEG BANK TURN LEFT TO 040 DEGS AND HE SUDDENLY ASKED, 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING? YOU MUST TURN RIGHT TO 275 DEGS (CONEY CLB).' HE ASKED ME TO STOP MY TURN UNTIL HE COULD CLARIFY OUR CLRNC. I ASSURED HIM OF THE CORRECTNESS OF MY ACTIONS. BY THAT POINT, HOWEVER, WE HAD ENTERED JFK'S AIRSPACE AS POINTED OUT BY LGA DEP ATC. WE QUICKLY MANEUVERED BACK ON COURSE AND NO PROBS WERE CREATED. MORAL: KEEP IT ALL BUSINESS, REGARDLESS OF PERSONALITY CLASHES UNTIL IN THE CREW ROOM OR PARKING LOT. GOOD COMING FROM THIS: THIS CAPT HAS BEEN A JOY TO WORK WITH SINCE THIS OCCURRENCE AND NOW SEEMS TO REALIZE THAT A F/O MAKES A FAR BETTER ASSET TO HIM AS A TEAMMATE, RATHER THAN AS A ROYAL SUBJECT! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 156737: AT DIFFERENT TIME IN THE COURSE OF THE TAXI TO RWY 13, THE F/O AND I READ OUT LOUD THE DEP PROC, BUT NEGLECTED TO USE THE DEP PROCS PROPER NAME (WHITESTONE CLB ON THE LGA 3 DEP). BEING A BUSY TIME OF DAY, WE FAILED TO DETECT WE HAD READ SIMILAR BUT DIFFERENT PROCS, UNTIL AFTER TKOF. WE BEGAN OUR TURNS OUT OF LGA WHEN I (CAPT) STOPPED F/O (PF) FROM MAKING THE TURNS AND CONTINUED STRAIGHT UNTIL WE SORTED OUT THE PROB. IN THE MEANTIME DEP CTL WAS TELLING US THAT WE WERE LEAVING HIS AIRSPACE, ASKING US OUR RATE OF CLB AND IF THE TWR HAD GIVING US THE WHITESTONE CLB IN 3 DIFFERENT XMISSIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.