Narrative:

I was in my company's light transport as first officer with a 'borrowed' captain from the los angeles area (we are based at rancho murieta, riu, ca) we were taking the owner of the light transport to santa ana to pick up a passenger, refuel, and proceed to dfw., tx, for a very important meeting. We departed fiu for our first destination, fat, ca for our first passenger pickup, then to sna. We noticed that we were unable to pick up czq VOR until approximately 30 mi out. Being rather experienced in flying this area, I knew that was not normal. Besides, czq was a much stronger VOR than that. Being unfamiliar with this captain, I asked him about that and he replied that we would maintain our current heading (provided by our LORAN) and since it was severe clear, we were 'ok'. He didn't seem to me to be too concerned about our navigation radios being weak. We proceeded to fat, picked up our passenger and departed to sna. En route to sna we experienced occasional 'navigation flags' on both HSI indicators but proceeded to the los angeles area at FL310 west/O much problem. (The captain was unfamiliar with our model LORAN and didn't like my reaching over the throttle quadrant to enter the data, so he insisted on turning it off... He seemed to be an uptight sort of fellow). As we descended to vectoring altitude, I began to set up the frequencys for the ILS 19R to sna. The ATIS informed us that the localizer frequency had been changed from 108.3 to 111.75. I tuned that into both navigation 1 and navigation 2 and proceeded to identify them both. I was surprised to find the identify was not correct...not 'isna.' we queried center and coast approach and they confirmed we had the right frequency and the identify had not been changed. We set up the rest of the navaids and confirmed all switches were in the correct position. Coast approach began giving us vectors for the final approach course. The WX was approximately 1000' brn 8 mi. We saw the tops of the marine layer were about 3000'. The captain had me dial in sli VOR the the x-radials to identify the intxns. We were now IMC and approach notified us we had just flown through the final approach course and gave us a lh radar vector to reintercept. The capts HSI showed we were still left of course. I dialed 111.75 in my navigation and it showed an occasional flag and right of course. Approach then notified us we had again flown through the course and gave us a rh vector to reintercept and told us to contact tower. By this time the captain was getting panicky. His HSI still showed left of course and mine showed right (both full scale deflection). Before I had a chance to call tower, the captain ordered me to redial sli VOR, establish where we were on the approach with x-radials, and establish what altitude we should be at. This was, of course, hard for me to do since I had no information showing us on the final approach course at all (the captain still had the LORAN off). But I did my best to figure out that, assuming we were on the final approach course, we were at about 'dyers' intersection and should be less than 760' MSL. We were at a little less than 2000' MSL and descending fast. The captain was essentially proceeding direct 'maagg' LOM but not heading 194 degree (the inbound course). He was heading closer to 160 degree. Tower called us just as we were breaking out of the clouds and instructed us to overshoot, climb to 8000' and contact coast approach (about 1 min had lapsed since we were instructed to contact the tower). The captain and I both had the airport in sight at our 10-11 O'clock and he insisted on talking to the tower as we banked left to establish ourselves on the approach course. He stated we had the airport in sight and wished to continue to land. They cleared us to land and we landed west/O further problems. We told our passengers we couldn't continue to dallas and put them on a chartered same model light transport to continue their trip. We had the navigation radios checked at sna and the technician found them to be extremely weak in all VOR frequencys, which would explain why we couldn't pick the signal up until we were very close. Further, he told us we couldn't receive any ILS frequencys, in the '.05 band' (ie 108.75, 109.15, and 111.75) because the old aircraft radios weren't built to accept those ILS frequencys (this still surprises us!) in the future, I will not be 'chicken' to voice my reservations about what a captain may be doing, no matter who he is! I should have exercised my control as first officer and told the captain I didn't like what I saw and 'go around.' further, I will not allow myself to get so busy with the tasks given me by the captain that my priorities slip and this allow the flight to continue in an unsafe manner. We were IMC west/O a navigation signal! The thought of this scares me now even more than then. We could have hit an obstruction, mountain or another aircraft west/O even knowing what 'hit us'. We could have easily tried the NDB 19R approach or gone to a VFR airport. Being a copilot means speaking your mind when you see something that you feel isn't right or safe. I learned a valuable lesson...luckily I learned it west/O anyone getting hurt. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Mechanic knew immediately that this model radio could not receive the 'hundredths' place decimal frequencys. Surprisingly aircraft had not been assigned such frequency previously and not even the chief pilot was aware. Captain's problem with LORAN programming was that reporter had to reach across the control quadrant and captain was afraid that something would be bumped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LTT MAKES ILS APCH IN IMC WITH MALFUNCTIONING NAV AID EQUIPMENT.

Narrative: I WAS IN MY COMPANY'S LTT AS F/O WITH A 'BORROWED' CAPT FROM THE LOS ANGELES AREA (WE ARE BASED AT RANCHO MURIETA, RIU, CA) WE WERE TAKING THE OWNER OF THE LTT TO SANTA ANA TO PICK UP A PAX, REFUEL, AND PROCEED TO DFW., TX, FOR A VERY IMPORTANT MEETING. WE DEPARTED FIU FOR OUR FIRST DEST, FAT, CA FOR OUR FIRST PAX PICKUP, THEN TO SNA. WE NOTICED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO PICK UP CZQ VOR UNTIL APPROX 30 MI OUT. BEING RATHER EXPERIENCED IN FLYING THIS AREA, I KNEW THAT WAS NOT NORMAL. BESIDES, CZQ WAS A MUCH STRONGER VOR THAN THAT. BEING UNFAMILIAR WITH THIS CAPT, I ASKED HIM ABOUT THAT AND HE REPLIED THAT WE WOULD MAINTAIN OUR CURRENT HDG (PROVIDED BY OUR LORAN) AND SINCE IT WAS SEVERE CLR, WE WERE 'OK'. HE DIDN'T SEEM TO ME TO BE TOO CONCERNED ABOUT OUR NAV RADIOS BEING WEAK. WE PROCEEDED TO FAT, PICKED UP OUR PAX AND DEPARTED TO SNA. ENRTE TO SNA WE EXPERIENCED OCCASIONAL 'NAV FLAGS' ON BOTH HSI INDICATORS BUT PROCEEDED TO THE LOS ANGELES AREA AT FL310 W/O MUCH PROB. (THE CAPT WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH OUR MODEL LORAN AND DIDN'T LIKE MY REACHING OVER THE THROTTLE QUADRANT TO ENTER THE DATA, SO HE INSISTED ON TURNING IT OFF... HE SEEMED TO BE AN UPTIGHT SORT OF FELLOW). AS WE DSNDED TO VECTORING ALT, I BEGAN TO SET UP THE FREQS FOR THE ILS 19R TO SNA. THE ATIS INFORMED US THAT THE LOC FREQ HAD BEEN CHANGED FROM 108.3 TO 111.75. I TUNED THAT INTO BOTH NAV 1 AND NAV 2 AND PROCEEDED TO IDENT THEM BOTH. I WAS SURPRISED TO FIND THE IDENT WAS NOT CORRECT...NOT 'ISNA.' WE QUERIED CTR AND COAST APCH AND THEY CONFIRMED WE HAD THE R FREQ AND THE IDENT HAD NOT BEEN CHANGED. WE SET UP THE REST OF THE NAVAIDS AND CONFIRMED ALL SWITCHES WERE IN THE CORRECT POS. COAST APCH BEGAN GIVING US VECTORS FOR THE FINAL APCH COURSE. THE WX WAS APPROX 1000' BRN 8 MI. WE SAW THE TOPS OF THE MARINE LAYER WERE ABOUT 3000'. THE CAPT HAD ME DIAL IN SLI VOR THE THE X-RADIALS TO IDENT THE INTXNS. WE WERE NOW IMC AND APCH NOTIFIED US WE HAD JUST FLOWN THROUGH THE FINAL APCH COURSE AND GAVE US A LH RADAR VECTOR TO REINTERCEPT. THE CAPTS HSI SHOWED WE WERE STILL L OF COURSE. I DIALED 111.75 IN MY NAV AND IT SHOWED AN OCCASIONAL FLAG AND R OF COURSE. APCH THEN NOTIFIED US WE HAD AGAIN FLOWN THROUGH THE COURSE AND GAVE US A RH VECTOR TO REINTERCEPT AND TOLD US TO CONTACT TWR. BY THIS TIME THE CAPT WAS GETTING PANICKY. HIS HSI STILL SHOWED L OF COURSE AND MINE SHOWED R (BOTH FULL SCALE DEFLECTION). BEFORE I HAD A CHANCE TO CALL TWR, THE CAPT ORDERED ME TO REDIAL SLI VOR, ESTABLISH WHERE WE WERE ON THE APCH WITH X-RADIALS, AND ESTABLISH WHAT ALT WE SHOULD BE AT. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, HARD FOR ME TO DO SINCE I HAD NO INFO SHOWING US ON THE FINAL APCH COURSE AT ALL (THE CAPT STILL HAD THE LORAN OFF). BUT I DID MY BEST TO FIGURE OUT THAT, ASSUMING WE WERE ON THE FINAL APCH COURSE, WE WERE AT ABOUT 'DYERS' INTXN AND SHOULD BE LESS THAN 760' MSL. WE WERE AT A LITTLE LESS THAN 2000' MSL AND DSNDING FAST. THE CAPT WAS ESSENTIALLY PROCEEDING DIRECT 'MAAGG' LOM BUT NOT HDG 194 DEG (THE INBND COURSE). HE WAS HDG CLOSER TO 160 DEG. TWR CALLED US JUST AS WE WERE BREAKING OUT OF THE CLOUDS AND INSTRUCTED US TO OVERSHOOT, CLB TO 8000' AND CONTACT COAST APCH (ABOUT 1 MIN HAD LAPSED SINCE WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT THE TWR). THE CAPT AND I BOTH HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AT OUR 10-11 O'CLOCK AND HE INSISTED ON TALKING TO THE TWR AS WE BANKED L TO ESTABLISH OURSELVES ON THE APCH COURSE. HE STATED WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND WISHED TO CONTINUE TO LAND. THEY CLRED US TO LAND AND WE LANDED W/O FURTHER PROBS. WE TOLD OUR PAXS WE COULDN'T CONTINUE TO DALLAS AND PUT THEM ON A CHARTERED SAME MODEL LTT TO CONTINUE THEIR TRIP. WE HAD THE NAV RADIOS CHKED AT SNA AND THE TECHNICIAN FOUND THEM TO BE EXTREMELY WEAK IN ALL VOR FREQS, WHICH WOULD EXPLAIN WHY WE COULDN'T PICK THE SIGNAL UP UNTIL WE WERE VERY CLOSE. FURTHER, HE TOLD US WE COULDN'T RECEIVE ANY ILS FREQS, IN THE '.05 BAND' (IE 108.75, 109.15, AND 111.75) BECAUSE THE OLD ACFT RADIOS WEREN'T BUILT TO ACCEPT THOSE ILS FREQS (THIS STILL SURPRISES US!) IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT BE 'CHICKEN' TO VOICE MY RESERVATIONS ABOUT WHAT A CAPT MAY BE DOING, NO MATTER WHO HE IS! I SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED MY CTL AS F/O AND TOLD THE CAPT I DIDN'T LIKE WHAT I SAW AND 'GO AROUND.' FURTHER, I WILL NOT ALLOW MYSELF TO GET SO BUSY WITH THE TASKS GIVEN ME BY THE CAPT THAT MY PRIORITIES SLIP AND THIS ALLOW THE FLT TO CONTINUE IN AN UNSAFE MANNER. WE WERE IMC W/O A NAV SIGNAL! THE THOUGHT OF THIS SCARES ME NOW EVEN MORE THAN THEN. WE COULD HAVE HIT AN OBSTRUCTION, MOUNTAIN OR ANOTHER ACFT W/O EVEN KNOWING WHAT 'HIT US'. WE COULD HAVE EASILY TRIED THE NDB 19R APCH OR GONE TO A VFR ARPT. BEING A COPLT MEANS SPEAKING YOUR MIND WHEN YOU SEE SOMETHING THAT YOU FEEL ISN'T RIGHT OR SAFE. I LEARNED A VALUABLE LESSON...LUCKILY I LEARNED IT W/O ANYONE GETTING HURT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. MECH KNEW IMMEDIATELY THAT THIS MODEL RADIO COULD NOT RECEIVE THE 'HUNDREDTHS' PLACE DECIMAL FREQS. SURPRISINGLY ACFT HAD NOT BEEN ASSIGNED SUCH FREQ PREVIOUSLY AND NOT EVEN THE CHIEF PLT WAS AWARE. CAPT'S PROB WITH LORAN PROGRAMMING WAS THAT RPTR HAD TO REACH ACROSS THE CTL QUADRANT AND CAPT WAS AFRAID THAT SOMETHING WOULD BE BUMPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.