Narrative:

About 20 mi northeast of mcb, it became apparent that the WX was deteriorating rapidly. Because I was unsure of the actual conditions between her and vks (since I had not been able to establish contact with FSS or flight watch), and because darkness would soon be approaching (the time was now xx:55-xx:00Z, with normal sunset at about xx:30Z), I decided it would be better to return T mcb, land under VFR, and wait until the WX cleared in the morning to proceed on to vks. I turned back towards the south and tracked in the general direction of the mcb VOR for orientation. My intent was to look up the coords for mcb airport, punch them into the LORAN, and proceed direct to the airport. WX was still VFR about 3500-4000' and 5-7 mi visibility. North looking up the coordinates north the flight guide, my eye caught the 122.95 unicom frequency printed in bold letters just under the coordinates. I completely overlooked the FSS frequency. Tried to raise someone on 122.95 to no avail. At the same time I turned to proceed direct to the airport using LORAN. About 8 mi northeast of the airport, I saw an airplane ahead and slightly to my right, moving in a northerly direction. I assumed that he was either on downwind or setting up for downwind at mccomb, since they should have been using runway 15 based on forecast winds. I continued towards the airport, while keeping the other aircraft in sight. At about 1 1/2-2 mi from the airport, visibility rapidly diminished to about 1-2 mi due to a rainshower that moved in between me and the airport. This, coupled with the almost dark conditions, caused some anxiety on my part. I made a call in the blind on unicom to announce entering a standard downwind for runway 15. Approach and landing. On downwind, I could see the other aircraft on short final. I extended my pattern slightly, to allow him plenty of time to land and clear the runway. On long final, I could see that the other aircraft had gone beyond the taxiway cutoff and was back taxiing, so I made a 360 degree turn to allow him time clear. At about the same time, he established contact with me on 122.95 and we both confirmed our intentions. This was the only communication I had with that aircraft. I proceeded to reestablish final approach and landed west/O incident at about xx:20Z. After shutdown, the FBO received a call asking me to come next door to FSS. I was told I had violated the control zone, which took me completely by surprise. Further conversations with the FSS personnel indicated that the control zone had gone IFR (based on visibility, not ceiling) just mins before I landed. Special WX amendment #1 was issued at xx:18Z. I explained the sequence of events, as stated above, but could not argue the fact that I had technically and literally violated a control zone. This was almost a case of D if you do, and D if you don't; since I was already in the control zone when it changed from VFR to IFR and conditions were rapidly deteriorating, I felt I had little choice (from an overall safety point of view) but to continue on my selected course of action. My major mistake was in not contacting FSS (I could have gotten a special VFR and everything would have been okay). Once again, I totally overlooked (partly because of anxiety, the conditions, and picking up perhaps the least desirable publication) the FSS frequency, even though it was there. Aftermath. Lost a lot of sleep that night, worrying about getting a violation for doing something so dumb after making a good decision to land and wait the WX out. I have always considered myself to be a good, safe, professional aviator (both military and civilian), with no history of incidents or violations. Went back to FSS the next day (after WX cleared) to brief for continuation of flight. The persons on duty were the same ones as the night before. They told me they had talked to their jackson office and that given the circumstances, speed with which WX turned IFR because of visibility, my maintaining sep from other aircraft, and no prior history of incidents, they were not going to cite me for a violation. However, I would receive a call from the counselor in the jackson office to discuss the incident. I was very relieved, and felt this was a very appropriate and professional way to handle the situation. The lesson was burned into my memory, and I now have a reference card with key frequencys for any situation taped to my instrument panel.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF SMA ENROUTE VKS ENCOUNTERED WX AND APCHING DARKNESS LANDED MCB. ADVISED BY FSS THAT ARPT HAD GONE IFR AND REPORTER HAD ENTERED CLT ZONE WITHOUT AUTH.

Narrative: ABOUT 20 MI NE OF MCB, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE WX WAS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY. BECAUSE I WAS UNSURE OF THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS BTWN HER AND VKS (SINCE I HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH FSS OR FLT WATCH), AND BECAUSE DARKNESS WOULD SOON BE APCHING (THE TIME WAS NOW XX:55-XX:00Z, WITH NORMAL SUNSET AT ABOUT XX:30Z), I DECIDED IT WOULD BE BETTER TO RETURN T MCB, LAND UNDER VFR, AND WAIT UNTIL THE WX CLRED IN THE MORNING TO PROCEED ON TO VKS. I TURNED BACK TOWARDS THE S AND TRACKED IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE MCB VOR FOR ORIENTATION. MY INTENT WAS TO LOOK UP THE COORDS FOR MCB ARPT, PUNCH THEM INTO THE LORAN, AND PROCEED DIRECT TO THE ARPT. WX WAS STILL VFR ABOUT 3500-4000' AND 5-7 MI VISIBILITY. N LOOKING UP THE COORDINATES N THE FLT GUIDE, MY EYE CAUGHT THE 122.95 UNICOM FREQ PRINTED IN BOLD LETTERS JUST UNDER THE COORDINATES. I COMPLETELY OVERLOOKED THE FSS FREQ. TRIED TO RAISE SOMEONE ON 122.95 TO NO AVAIL. AT THE SAME TIME I TURNED TO PROCEED DIRECT TO THE ARPT USING LORAN. ABOUT 8 MI NE OF THE ARPT, I SAW AN AIRPLANE AHEAD AND SLIGHTLY TO MY R, MOVING IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION. I ASSUMED THAT HE WAS EITHER ON DOWNWIND OR SETTING UP FOR DOWNWIND AT MCCOMB, SINCE THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN USING RWY 15 BASED ON FORECAST WINDS. I CONTINUED TOWARDS THE ARPT, WHILE KEEPING THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT. AT ABOUT 1 1/2-2 MI FROM THE ARPT, VISIBILITY RAPIDLY DIMINISHED TO ABOUT 1-2 MI DUE TO A RAINSHOWER THAT MOVED IN BTWN ME AND THE ARPT. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE ALMOST DARK CONDITIONS, CAUSED SOME ANXIETY ON MY PART. I MADE A CALL IN THE BLIND ON UNICOM TO ANNOUNCE ENTERING A STANDARD DOWNWIND FOR RWY 15. APCH AND LNDG. ON DOWNWIND, I COULD SEE THE OTHER ACFT ON SHORT FINAL. I EXTENDED MY PATTERN SLIGHTLY, TO ALLOW HIM PLENTY OF TIME TO LAND AND CLR THE RWY. ON LONG FINAL, I COULD SEE THAT THE OTHER ACFT HAD GONE BEYOND THE TXWY CUTOFF AND WAS BACK TAXIING, SO I MADE A 360 DEG TURN TO ALLOW HIM TIME CLR. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, HE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH ME ON 122.95 AND WE BOTH CONFIRMED OUR INTENTIONS. THIS WAS THE ONLY COM I HAD WITH THAT ACFT. I PROCEEDED TO REESTABLISH FINAL APCH AND LANDED W/O INCIDENT AT ABOUT XX:20Z. AFTER SHUTDOWN, THE FBO RECEIVED A CALL ASKING ME TO COME NEXT DOOR TO FSS. I WAS TOLD I HAD VIOLATED THE CTL ZONE, WHICH TOOK ME COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE. FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FSS PERSONNEL INDICATED THAT THE CTL ZONE HAD GONE IFR (BASED ON VISIBILITY, NOT CEILING) JUST MINS BEFORE I LANDED. SPECIAL WX AMENDMENT #1 WAS ISSUED AT XX:18Z. I EXPLAINED THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, AS STATED ABOVE, BUT COULD NOT ARGUE THE FACT THAT I HAD TECHNICALLY AND LITERALLY VIOLATED A CTL ZONE. THIS WAS ALMOST A CASE OF D IF YOU DO, AND D IF YOU DON'T; SINCE I WAS ALREADY IN THE CTL ZONE WHEN IT CHANGED FROM VFR TO IFR AND CONDITIONS WERE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING, I FELT I HAD LITTLE CHOICE (FROM AN OVERALL SAFETY POINT OF VIEW) BUT TO CONTINUE ON MY SELECTED COURSE OF ACTION. MY MAJOR MISTAKE WAS IN NOT CONTACTING FSS (I COULD HAVE GOTTEN A SPECIAL VFR AND EVERYTHING WOULD HAVE BEEN OKAY). ONCE AGAIN, I TOTALLY OVERLOOKED (PARTLY BECAUSE OF ANXIETY, THE CONDITIONS, AND PICKING UP PERHAPS THE LEAST DESIRABLE PUBLICATION) THE FSS FREQ, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS THERE. AFTERMATH. LOST A LOT OF SLEEP THAT NIGHT, WORRYING ABOUT GETTING A VIOLATION FOR DOING SOMETHING SO DUMB AFTER MAKING A GOOD DECISION TO LAND AND WAIT THE WX OUT. I HAVE ALWAYS CONSIDERED MYSELF TO BE A GOOD, SAFE, PROFESSIONAL AVIATOR (BOTH MIL AND CIVILIAN), WITH NO HISTORY OF INCIDENTS OR VIOLATIONS. WENT BACK TO FSS THE NEXT DAY (AFTER WX CLRED) TO BRIEF FOR CONTINUATION OF FLT. THE PERSONS ON DUTY WERE THE SAME ONES AS THE NIGHT BEFORE. THEY TOLD ME THEY HAD TALKED TO THEIR JACKSON OFFICE AND THAT GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SPD WITH WHICH WX TURNED IFR BECAUSE OF VISIBILITY, MY MAINTAINING SEP FROM OTHER ACFT, AND NO PRIOR HISTORY OF INCIDENTS, THEY WERE NOT GOING TO CITE ME FOR A VIOLATION. HOWEVER, I WOULD RECEIVE A CALL FROM THE COUNSELOR IN THE JACKSON OFFICE TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT. I WAS VERY RELIEVED, AND FELT THIS WAS A VERY APPROPRIATE AND PROFESSIONAL WAY TO HANDLE THE SITUATION. THE LESSON WAS BURNED INTO MY MEMORY, AND I NOW HAVE A REFERENCE CARD WITH KEY FREQS FOR ANY SITUATION TAPED TO MY INSTRUMENT PANEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.