Narrative:

On 3/sat/89 a fellow cfii and I decided to carry out some practice instrument approachs at alb in order to maintain instrument currency. A detailed IFR WX briefing was obtained from burlington FSS which in my judgement allowed such a flight. A SIGMET was in force from boston center advising of moderate mixed icing below 8000', but the briefer also gave me a PIREP from an aircraft over alb giving a temperature of +10 degrees C at 3500'. With no other reports of icing I decided that the flight was possible--a mistake was made herein that I did not consider the possibility of multiple freezing levels. On departure, despite a good preflight ground check, we discovered one radio to be intermittent and continued the flight on the remaining one. On approaching alb we entered the overcast at about 2500' and the remainder of the flight was conducted in IMC conditions. Compared with the briefing and the terminal forecast, such solid overcast came as a surprise. Mistake #2 was made when we neglected to switch on the pitot tube heat. By this state we were being vectored for the VOR 28 approach to alb. I was acting as safety pilot/instrument for my fellow cfii who was flying this first approach. The OAT was +5 degrees C in the clouds and there was no sign of structural icing occurring. The first approach was uneventful and I took the controls on the climb out to fly exactly the same approach. On the climb out I started to identify the VOR for the approach an in doing so must have inadvertently knocked the automatic switch on the communication control panel to the off position. In any event we lost contact with the controller for about 2 mins until we noticed the long silence and the switch position. On regaining contact, the controller was obviously displeased and I accept totally that this was a stupid mistake to make, however accidentally it was made. Vectoring was continued at 3000'. I was cleared for the VOR 28 approach and was just intercepting the final approach course when I noticed structural icing. This was my first encounter with icing and totally distracted me. I had already started to descend on the approach, 2400' being the MDA for the intermediate approach segment prior to the FAF at langy intersection. I requested a lower altitude due icing but do not believe that the controller heard this request. Meanwhile we were further distracted by a low airspeed despite a high descent rate and low power setting. We realized that the pitot tube must be iced over, switched the heat on and the asi jumped 20 KTS as the ice melted. In the distraction I descended below the MDA and when the controller queried us we were at 1700'. This had put us in to close proximity to a tower rising to 1381' in solid IMC and the controller was obviously concerned at this, as were we when we realized the mistake. Again telling him of the ice build up, the controller immediately cancelled the VOR approach clearance and commenced an ASR approach to runway 28. Meantime, I had stopped the descent and was able to initiate a slow climb although the ice made it marginal. Breaking out at about 1000' we made a safe landing on 28 at alb. I never declared an emergency, although I was on the verge of doing so because the controller in effect gave us priority west/O ever saying so once he realized the icing situation. The controller asked us to contact him on the ground, which I did and discussed the situation with the supervisor. Obviously I apologized for the whole situation and thanked him for his help. On the ground the aircraft had up to an inch of mixed icing on it. The whole situation scared me a lot. Both myself and the other cfii had under 10 hours IMC between us and neither of us had encountered icing before. A combination of inexperience, poor judgement concerning the WX, basic errors such as forgetting pitot heat, and distraction when the OAT suddenly dropped and allowed ice build up, led to a frightening and potentially fatal situation. I am glad to be here to learn from the experience.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE PRACTICING IMC APCHS REPORTER ACFT ENCOUNTERED ICING CONDITIONS. DUE TO AIRFRAME ICING AND FAILURE TO TURN ON PITOT HEAT REPORTER HAD DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING ALT AND THUS DESCENDED BELOW AUTH ALT PRIOR TO REACHING FINAL APCH FIX.

Narrative: ON 3/SAT/89 A FELLOW CFII AND I DECIDED TO CARRY OUT SOME PRACTICE INSTRUMENT APCHS AT ALB IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN INSTRUMENT CURRENCY. A DETAILED IFR WX BRIEFING WAS OBTAINED FROM BURLINGTON FSS WHICH IN MY JUDGEMENT ALLOWED SUCH A FLT. A SIGMET WAS IN FORCE FROM BOSTON CENTER ADVISING OF MODERATE MIXED ICING BELOW 8000', BUT THE BRIEFER ALSO GAVE ME A PIREP FROM AN ACFT OVER ALB GIVING A TEMP OF +10 DEGS C AT 3500'. WITH NO OTHER RPTS OF ICING I DECIDED THAT THE FLT WAS POSSIBLE--A MISTAKE WAS MADE HEREIN THAT I DID NOT CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF MULTIPLE FREEZING LEVELS. ON DEP, DESPITE A GOOD PREFLT GND CHK, WE DISCOVERED ONE RADIO TO BE INTERMITTENT AND CONTINUED THE FLT ON THE REMAINING ONE. ON APCHING ALB WE ENTERED THE OVCST AT ABOUT 2500' AND THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED IN IMC CONDITIONS. COMPARED WITH THE BRIEFING AND THE TERMINAL FORECAST, SUCH SOLID OVCST CAME AS A SURPRISE. MISTAKE #2 WAS MADE WHEN WE NEGLECTED TO SWITCH ON THE PITOT TUBE HEAT. BY THIS STATE WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE VOR 28 APCH TO ALB. I WAS ACTING AS SAFETY PLT/INSTR FOR MY FELLOW CFII WHO WAS FLYING THIS FIRST APCH. THE OAT WAS +5 DEGS C IN THE CLOUDS AND THERE WAS NO SIGN OF STRUCTURAL ICING OCCURRING. THE FIRST APCH WAS UNEVENTFUL AND I TOOK THE CONTROLS ON THE CLB OUT TO FLY EXACTLY THE SAME APCH. ON THE CLB OUT I STARTED TO IDENT THE VOR FOR THE APCH AN IN DOING SO MUST HAVE INADVERTENTLY KNOCKED THE AUTO SWITCH ON THE COM CONTROL PANEL TO THE OFF POS. IN ANY EVENT WE LOST CONTACT WITH THE CTLR FOR ABOUT 2 MINS UNTIL WE NOTICED THE LONG SILENCE AND THE SWITCH POS. ON REGAINING CONTACT, THE CTLR WAS OBVIOUSLY DISPLEASED AND I ACCEPT TOTALLY THAT THIS WAS A STUPID MISTAKE TO MAKE, HOWEVER ACCIDENTALLY IT WAS MADE. VECTORING WAS CONTINUED AT 3000'. I WAS CLRED FOR THE VOR 28 APCH AND WAS JUST INTERCEPTING THE FINAL APCH COURSE WHEN I NOTICED STRUCTURAL ICING. THIS WAS MY FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH ICING AND TOTALLY DISTRACTED ME. I HAD ALREADY STARTED TO DSND ON THE APCH, 2400' BEING THE MDA FOR THE INTERMEDIATE APCH SEGMENT PRIOR TO THE FAF AT LANGY INTXN. I REQUESTED A LOWER ALT DUE ICING BUT DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CTLR HEARD THIS REQUEST. MEANWHILE WE WERE FURTHER DISTRACTED BY A LOW AIRSPD DESPITE A HIGH DSCNT RATE AND LOW PWR SETTING. WE REALIZED THAT THE PITOT TUBE MUST BE ICED OVER, SWITCHED THE HEAT ON AND THE ASI JUMPED 20 KTS AS THE ICE MELTED. IN THE DISTR I DSNDED BELOW THE MDA AND WHEN THE CTLR QUERIED US WE WERE AT 1700'. THIS HAD PUT US IN TO CLOSE PROX TO A TWR RISING TO 1381' IN SOLID IMC AND THE CTLR WAS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED AT THIS, AS WERE WE WHEN WE REALIZED THE MISTAKE. AGAIN TELLING HIM OF THE ICE BUILD UP, THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY CANCELLED THE VOR APCH CLRNC AND COMMENCED AN ASR APCH TO RWY 28. MEANTIME, I HAD STOPPED THE DSCNT AND WAS ABLE TO INITIATE A SLOW CLB ALTHOUGH THE ICE MADE IT MARGINAL. BREAKING OUT AT ABOUT 1000' WE MADE A SAFE LNDG ON 28 AT ALB. I NEVER DECLARED AN EMER, ALTHOUGH I WAS ON THE VERGE OF DOING SO BECAUSE THE CTLR IN EFFECT GAVE US PRIORITY W/O EVER SAYING SO ONCE HE REALIZED THE ICING SITUATION. THE CTLR ASKED US TO CONTACT HIM ON THE GND, WHICH I DID AND DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH THE SUPVR. OBVIOUSLY I APOLOGIZED FOR THE WHOLE SITUATION AND THANKED HIM FOR HIS HELP. ON THE GND THE ACFT HAD UP TO AN INCH OF MIXED ICING ON IT. THE WHOLE SITUATION SCARED ME A LOT. BOTH MYSELF AND THE OTHER CFII HAD UNDER 10 HRS IMC BTWN US AND NEITHER OF US HAD ENCOUNTERED ICING BEFORE. A COMBINATION OF INEXPERIENCE, POOR JUDGEMENT CONCERNING THE WX, BASIC ERRORS SUCH AS FORGETTING PITOT HEAT, AND DISTR WHEN THE OAT SUDDENLY DROPPED AND ALLOWED ICE BUILD UP, LED TO A FRIGHTENING AND POTENTIALLY FATAL SITUATION. I AM GLAD TO BE HERE TO LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.