Narrative:

I was the pilot monitoring while conducting the final operational leg from zzzzto ZZZZ1. We experienced an left hydraulic system emergency; which resulted in the rapid depletion of all hydraulic fluid and gladly; a safe full stop landing.weather was cavok with favorable winds down the runway. We were visual and completing the final descent to landing well inside the final approach fix (with final landing clearance) on the ILS xxl ZZZZ1. Passing 1500' with gear down; flaps 20 and speed brakes armed; we began final configuration from flaps 20-25. At this time (not necessarily coincident with flap movement) we began to see intermittent EICAS cautionary messages appear. These included left hydraulic system press; left hydraulic qty; and rudder ratio; and the auto pilot disconnected. As the PF announced manual flight; I announced the messages and selected the status page to check hydraulic pressure. The left qty was indicating 0 and the magenta RF was also visible. The trailing edge flap disagree light illuminated and we noted that we were passing 800'. We immediately declared an emergency with tower and given the indications; the fact that we were configured to land and not knowing the nature of the immediate failure; determined as a crew that landing on the 10;000' runway right in front of us was the safest option over executing a full go around low to the ground with possible degradation in flight control response and full drag. The PF called for the QRH checklist and then quickly; and I think correctly; determined that there was a not enough time; asking me to focus outside and back him up. In doing so; we quickly discussed aircraft systems from memory that would be impacted by a complete left hydraulic loss and tried to accomplish what we could in the short time remaining. Ultimately; we choose to place the flap lever back in the flap 20 detent to match the flap indicator position. Additionally; we selected the ground prox flap override switch to override and used aps to quickly reference and set the correct flap 20 airspeed. The landing was very smooth and placed inside touchdown zone ensuring adequate roll out and stopping distance was available. We quickly made verbal reminders regarding auto brakes and nose wheel steering. We completed the roll out without issue and elected to stop on runway xxl abeam charlie taxi way. At this point we pulled out the QRH again and ran the procedure for left hydraulic system press (to the extent that we could on deck) and also reviewed the considerations listed for rejected takeoff. The latter leading us to communicate further with tower and emergency services that we would need to shut down in position and would require a tow to our parking position. From here we started the APU and conducted the normal checklist for shutdown. Emergency services began placing oil absorbent material and maintained a fire watch on the left hand side due to the left side being covered with expended hydraulic fluid. Having received an approximation for the towing services; we used the next ten minutes to communicate with the do and goc dispatcher. We were then towed into parking and conducted normal post flight duties and met with the [foreign country] transportation safety representative. After discussing the correct procedures with do; we completed a short summary of events and provided our credentials for their records. At this point we transferred the security of the aircraft over to ground personnel and departed. In conclusion; I think we were very fortunate to have been in a full landing configuration and flying in VMC conditions. More time would be the only thing we could have asked for; but that said; we took the most conservative option available to us and had the aircraft safely on deck in less than 2 minutes. I thought [the] captain did an excellent job swiftly transitioning to manual flight and executing a flawless flaps 20 landing and manual roll out. His demeanor was such that we were able to quickly share ideas and work together as team all week; no doubt setting us up for success during this emergency situation. He did a great job managing this event both; during the flight and after; while professionally representing [company] with multiple host nation agencies.the maintenance report indicated that the lh medium large transport down lock line had been found as the cause of the leak.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Pilot reported a L HYD System failure and what it took to land safely.

Narrative: I was the Pilot Monitoring while conducting the final operational leg from ZZZZto ZZZZ1. We experienced an L HYD SYS emergency; which resulted in the rapid depletion of all hydraulic fluid and gladly; a safe full stop landing.Weather was CAVOK with favorable winds down the runway. We were visual and completing the final descent to landing well inside the final approach fix (with final landing clearance) on the ILS XXL ZZZZ1. Passing 1500' with gear down; flaps 20 and speed brakes armed; we began final configuration from flaps 20-25. At this time (not necessarily coincident with flap movement) we began to see intermittent EICAS cautionary messages appear. These included L HYD SYS PRESS; L HYD QTY; and Rudder Ratio; and the auto pilot disconnected. As the PF announced manual flight; I announced the messages and selected the status page to check HYD Pressure. The L QTY was indicating 0 and the magenta RF was also visible. The Trailing Edge Flap disagree light illuminated and we noted that we were passing 800'. We immediately declared an emergency with tower and given the indications; the fact that we were configured to land and not knowing the nature of the immediate failure; determined as a crew that landing on the 10;000' runway right in front of us was the safest option over executing a full go around low to the ground with possible degradation in flight control response and full drag. The PF called for the QRH checklist and then quickly; and I think correctly; determined that there was a not enough time; asking me to focus outside and back him up. In doing so; we quickly discussed aircraft systems from memory that would be impacted by a complete L hydraulic loss and tried to accomplish what we could in the short time remaining. Ultimately; we choose to place the flap lever back in the flap 20 detent to match the flap indicator position. Additionally; we selected the ground prox flap override switch to override and used APS to quickly reference and set the correct flap 20 airspeed. The landing was very smooth and placed inside touchdown zone ensuring adequate roll out and stopping distance was available. We quickly made verbal reminders regarding auto brakes and nose wheel steering. We completed the roll out without issue and elected to stop on runway XXL abeam Charlie taxi way. At this point we pulled out the QRH again and ran the procedure for L HYD SYS Press (to the extent that we could on deck) and also reviewed the considerations listed for RTO. The latter leading us to communicate further with tower and emergency services that we would need to shut down in position and would require a tow to our parking position. From here we started the APU and conducted the normal checklist for shutdown. Emergency services began placing oil absorbent material and maintained a fire watch on the left hand side due to the left side being covered with expended hydraulic fluid. Having received an approximation for the towing services; we used the next ten minutes to communicate with the DO and GOC dispatcher. We were then towed into parking and conducted normal post flight duties and met with the [foreign country] Transportation Safety representative. After discussing the correct procedures with DO; we completed a short summary of events and provided our credentials for their records. At this point we transferred the security of the aircraft over to ground personnel and departed. In conclusion; I think we were very fortunate to have been in a full landing configuration and flying in VMC conditions. More time would be the only thing we could have asked for; but that said; we took the most conservative option available to us and had the aircraft safely on deck in less than 2 minutes. I thought [the] Captain did an excellent job swiftly transitioning to manual flight and executing a flawless flaps 20 landing and manual roll out. His demeanor was such that we were able to quickly share ideas and work together as team all week; no doubt setting us up for success during this emergency situation. He did a great job managing this event both; during the flight and after; while professionally representing [company] with multiple host nation agencies.The maintenance report indicated that the LH MLG down lock line had been found as the cause of the leak.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.