Narrative:

I was the first officer on flight to ZZZ. Prior to departure the captain and I noticed a cas miscomp status message. Maintenance was called and we performed an fim reset to clear the message. In the process we detected a second status message for inbd ground splr fault. Maintenance had us perform a second fim reset. During the climb out in IMC; the captain's airspeed indicator malfunctioned. We received stall fail; stabilizer trim and mach trim caution messages. My pfd displayed an amber boxed IAS message. The captain disengaged the autopilot and transferred the controls to me. My airspeed and the standby airspeed indicator seemed to be functioning properly. We ran the unreliable airspeed iac and QRH. During this process ATC quarried our position and we determined that the FMS was not functioning properly. The captain [advised ATC] and we asked for radar vectors and to stop the climb at FL300. Because the aircraft was dispatched with an meled ACARS we had to utilize arinc to contact company dispatch and maintenance. Contrary to the QRH which states; 'land at the nearest suitable airport;' company advised that we could continue to ZZZ because we had two remaining airspeed indicators. All information on both mfd's was inaccurate and unusable; flying at high altitude with no stall protection. ATC offered any and all assistance available. ATC vectored us to the final approach course and we flew the ILS and landed without incident. Following the safety briefing with operations control we were informed that we would ferry the aircraft for maintenance. We were not questioned if we were fit-for-flight. Following this emergency; we were not. Captain called fatigued.following this incident; I have become very concerned about the safety of operations here at our company. It is my impression that the company is more concerned with performance numbers; and cost savings. I believe the primary cause of this incident is directly related to maintenance and dispatch procedure. My understanding is that an fim reset is allowed once before maintenance needs to inspect. A cas miscomp is a serious issue. I don't believe dispatching an aircraft without a functioning ACARS is smart or safe but it happens all the time. The ACARS is our primary means of communication with company. We as a pilot group are noticing an increase in MEL's on the aging fleet. Automatically expecting the flight crew who safely managed multiple system failures in a serious emergency to ferry the aircraft for maintenance is not smart or safe. Please take these concerns seriously.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 First Officer reported receiving multiple EICAS messages while in cruise.

Narrative: I was the FO on flight to ZZZ. Prior to departure the Captain and I noticed a CAS Miscomp status message. Maintenance was called and we performed an FIM reset to clear the message. In the process we detected a second status message for INBD GND SPLR FAULT. Maintenance had us perform a second FIM reset. During the climb out in IMC; the Captain's airspeed indicator malfunctioned. We received STALL FAIL; STAB TRIM and MACH TRIM caution messages. My PFD displayed an amber boxed IAS message. The Captain disengaged the autopilot and transferred the controls to me. My airspeed and the standby airspeed indicator seemed to be functioning properly. We ran the Unreliable Airspeed IAC and QRH. During this process ATC quarried our position and we determined that the FMS was not functioning properly. The Captain [advised ATC] and we asked for radar vectors and to stop the climb at FL300. Because the aircraft was dispatched with an MELed ACARS we had to utilize ARINC to contact Company Dispatch and Maintenance. Contrary to the QRH which states; 'land at the nearest suitable airport;' Company advised that we could continue to ZZZ because we had two remaining airspeed indicators. All information on both MFD's was inaccurate and unusable; flying at high altitude with no stall protection. ATC offered any and all assistance available. ATC vectored us to the final approach course and we flew the ILS and landed without incident. Following the safety briefing with Operations Control we were informed that we would ferry the aircraft for Maintenance. We were not questioned if we were fit-for-flight. Following this emergency; we were not. Captain called fatigued.Following this incident; I have become very concerned about the safety of operations here at our company. It is my impression that the company is more concerned with performance numbers; and cost savings. I believe the primary cause of this incident is directly related to Maintenance and Dispatch procedure. My understanding is that an FIM reset is allowed once before Maintenance needs to inspect. A CAS miscomp is a serious issue. I don't believe dispatching an aircraft without a functioning ACARS is smart or safe but it happens all the time. The ACARS is our primary means of communication with company. We as a pilot group are noticing an increase in MEL's on the aging fleet. Automatically expecting the flight crew who safely managed multiple system failures in a serious emergency to ferry the aircraft for Maintenance is not smart or safe. Please take these concerns seriously.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.