Narrative:

We were cleared for takeoff at xa:43L runway 30 at lgb. Takeoff clearance was, 'cleared to 3000', at 1500' left to 270.' it was my leg to fly and first officer was handling the communications. After takeoff we were directed to change to lax departure control, (127.2) at approximately 1500'. We switched immediately and as we rolled out on the 270 degree heading, climbing through approximately 2000+'; lax departure came on the radio before we were able to contact him and said, 'traffic at 12 O'clock, climb immediately to 5000' or it may have been 15000'.' we are unsure what the new cleared altitude was. First officer spotted the traffic almost instantaneously with lax's callout and I also saw the traffic immediately following the warning. In-flight visibility was approximately 3 mi in haze, with visibility somewhat restr into the sun. Our altitude by this time was approximately 2500'. I ignored the climb recommended by lax, and immediately initiated evasive action by reducing power and nosing the aircraft over into a shallow descent. We probably reached 2600' and then descended to about 2400' when we passed directly under the light single engine airplane that was in the VFR flyway approximately 2-3 mi northwest of lgb. On sighting the traffic I felt that attempting to climb over the traffic was the wrong thing to do and would have probably resulted in a collision, this opinion is shared by first officer. Secondly we would have lost sight of the traffic had I pulled the nose up to increase the climb. We were probably 300-400' directly under the light aircraft when we passed. We asked lax who was controling the light aircraft and he replied that the aircraft was VFR squawking 1200 and was at 2800' climbing at the time of the incident. We were then given further climb clearance and proceeded to sfo. There were no injuries: however, some passengers did inquire about the abrupt maneuver that was made in stopping the climb. Some thought that we had experienced an engine failure. Due to the questions of the passengers, I made a brief PA announcement telling them only that we had to stop our climb unexpectedly due to conflicting traffic. I have filed a near midair collision preliminary report with lgb, control tower. I have also talked with ldb air traffic manager and ax, TRACON, supervisor. All parties have been very cooperative and receptive to suggestions. I have suggested to all parties that a change I departure communication procedures by instructing departing aircraft to contact departure control immediately when airborne would eliminate the time lost in waiting for lgb tower to initiate the change-over. This change would make immediately available traffic advisories which could possibly avert a mid-air in the future. It is my opinion that the climb rate and speeds of our modern day jets require quicker communication procedures especially in the high density areas like lgb and lax. This suggestion would be one way of speeding up communication during initial climb out. In this incident, it is my opinion that no one did anything wrong and the lax departure controller is to be commended for his quick traffic advisory west/O waiting for our check-in. I do hope that an improvement in communication procedures or departure procedures will be forthcoming as a result of this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRAFFIC ADVISORY GIVEN DELAY CALL TO DEP CTL. NMAC.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AT XA:43L RWY 30 AT LGB. TKOF CLRNC WAS, 'CLRED TO 3000', AT 1500' L TO 270.' IT WAS MY LEG TO FLY AND F/O WAS HANDLING THE COMS. AFTER TKOF WE WERE DIRECTED TO CHANGE TO LAX DEP CTL, (127.2) AT APPROX 1500'. WE SWITCHED IMMEDIATELY AND AS WE ROLLED OUT ON THE 270 DEG HDG, CLBING THROUGH APPROX 2000+'; LAX DEP CAME ON THE RADIO BEFORE WE WERE ABLE TO CONTACT HIM AND SAID, 'TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK, CLB IMMEDIATELY TO 5000' OR IT MAY HAVE BEEN 15000'.' WE ARE UNSURE WHAT THE NEW CLRED ALT WAS. F/O SPOTTED THE TFC ALMOST INSTANTANEOUSLY WITH LAX'S CALLOUT AND I ALSO SAW THE TFC IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE WARNING. INFLT VISIBILITY WAS APPROX 3 MI IN HAZE, WITH VISIBILITY SOMEWHAT RESTR INTO THE SUN. OUR ALT BY THIS TIME WAS APPROX 2500'. I IGNORED THE CLB RECOMMENDED BY LAX, AND IMMEDIATELY INITIATED EVASIVE ACTION BY REDUCING PWR AND NOSING THE ACFT OVER INTO A SHALLOW DSNT. WE PROBABLY REACHED 2600' AND THEN DSNDED TO ABOUT 2400' WHEN WE PASSED DIRECTLY UNDER THE LIGHT SINGLE ENG AIRPLANE THAT WAS IN THE VFR FLYWAY APPROX 2-3 MI NW OF LGB. ON SIGHTING THE TFC I FELT THAT ATTEMPTING TO CLB OVER THE TFC WAS THE WRONG THING TO DO AND WOULD HAVE PROBABLY RESULTED IN A COLLISION, THIS OPINION IS SHARED BY F/O. SECONDLY WE WOULD HAVE LOST SIGHT OF THE TFC HAD I PULLED THE NOSE UP TO INCREASE THE CLB. WE WERE PROBABLY 300-400' DIRECTLY UNDER THE LIGHT ACFT WHEN WE PASSED. WE ASKED LAX WHO WAS CTLING THE LIGHT ACFT AND HE REPLIED THAT THE ACFT WAS VFR SQUAWKING 1200 AND WAS AT 2800' CLBING AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. WE WERE THEN GIVEN FURTHER CLB CLRNC AND PROCEEDED TO SFO. THERE WERE NO INJURIES: HOWEVER, SOME PAXS DID INQUIRE ABOUT THE ABRUPT MANEUVER THAT WAS MADE IN STOPPING THE CLB. SOME THOUGHT THAT WE HAD EXPERIENCED AN ENG FAILURE. DUE TO THE QUESTIONS OF THE PAXS, I MADE A BRIEF PA ANNOUNCEMENT TELLING THEM ONLY THAT WE HAD TO STOP OUR CLB UNEXPECTEDLY DUE TO CONFLICTING TFC. I HAVE FILED A NMAC PRELIMINARY RPT WITH LGB, CTL TWR. I HAVE ALSO TALKED WITH LDB AIR TFC MGR AND AX, TRACON, SUPVR. ALL PARTIES HAVE BEEN VERY COOPERATIVE AND RECEPTIVE TO SUGGESTIONS. I HAVE SUGGESTED TO ALL PARTIES THAT A CHANGE I DEP COM PROCS BY INSTRUCTING DEPARTING ACFT TO CONTACT DEP CTL IMMEDIATELY WHEN AIRBORNE WOULD ELIMINATE THE TIME LOST IN WAITING FOR LGB TWR TO INITIATE THE CHANGE-OVER. THIS CHANGE WOULD MAKE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TFC ADVISORIES WHICH COULD POSSIBLY AVERT A MID-AIR IN THE FUTURE. IT IS MY OPINION THAT THE CLB RATE AND SPDS OF OUR MODERN DAY JETS REQUIRE QUICKER COM PROCS ESPECIALLY IN THE HIGH DENSITY AREAS LIKE LGB AND LAX. THIS SUGGESTION WOULD BE ONE WAY OF SPDING UP COM DURING INITIAL CLBOUT. IN THIS INCIDENT, IT IS MY OPINION THAT NO ONE DID ANYTHING WRONG AND THE LAX DEP CTLR IS TO BE COMMENDED FOR HIS QUICK TFC ADVISORY W/O WAITING FOR OUR CHK-IN. I DO HOPE THAT AN IMPROVEMENT IN COM PROCS OR DEP PROCS WILL BE FORTHCOMING AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.