Narrative:

During preflight (last 5 mins before push back) first officer was extremely busy with weight and balance problem due to an excessive amount of changes in cargo weights and passenger count. Captain completed through flight (before push back checklist). He missed fuel on board checklist item, during his completing of the checklists there was an excessive number of interruptions, changes, and disturbances. The effect of all this was the aircraft took off with only 1 hour fuel rather than required far 121 domestic fuel for a flight from phl to mdw. I think that if the weight and balance was done off the aircraft by ground personnel that the first officer could then participate in the cockpit preparation for departure and be a viable check and balance. I also think by not doing the weight and balance in the cockpit it would significantly decrease the interruptions to normal crew operations. I also think required IFR fuel should be located not only on a before start checklist but also on an after start or taxi checklist. Both captain and first officer should respond to fuel on board. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. This is the fourth time this airline has had an air turnback because of insufficient fuel. The reporter who was just a cockpit rider discovered the error and brought it to the flight crew's attention. They returned to phl for more fuel. The reporter was very critical of the airline's director of training. The procedure for working the weight and balance in the cockpit is his baby and he does not see that it causes any problems. The association is trying to build a case against this procedure. The principle operating inspector is a good friend of the director of training so the flight crews cannot get any relief through this part of the FAA. Another procedure developed by the dir of medium large transport training and approved by this same operating inspector is to have only one pilot read and respond to the checklist if they stay on the same aircraft through a stop over and this removes the xchk factor. The airline had a new chief pilot and there is hope he will be more responsive to flight crew's recommendation. The director of training is ex-military and is influential in the hiring of new pilots. He has many of his old 'buddies' in supervisor positions. The company is very economy minded and this had cut any extra help to the point that it is always a scramble to get 'out on time' and this is an important factor in the operation. The company policy is to accept any passenger up to the time the gate is closed and sometimes even after the aircraft door is secured thus increasing the cockpit workload to the point that it is a one man show with the first officer distraction by last min weight and balance changes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG DEPARTED PHL FOR ORD WITHOUT THE REQUIRED FUEL LOAD.

Narrative: DURING PREFLT (LAST 5 MINS BEFORE PUSH BACK) F/O WAS EXTREMELY BUSY WITH WEIGHT AND BALANCE PROB DUE TO AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF CHANGES IN CARGO WEIGHTS AND PAX COUNT. CAPT COMPLETED THROUGH FLT (BEFORE PUSH BACK CHKLIST). HE MISSED FUEL ON BOARD CHKLIST ITEM, DURING HIS COMPLETING OF THE CHKLISTS THERE WAS AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF INTERRUPTIONS, CHANGES, AND DISTURBANCES. THE EFFECT OF ALL THIS WAS THE ACFT TOOK OFF WITH ONLY 1 HR FUEL RATHER THAN REQUIRED FAR 121 DOMESTIC FUEL FOR A FLT FROM PHL TO MDW. I THINK THAT IF THE WEIGHT AND BALANCE WAS DONE OFF THE ACFT BY GND PERSONNEL THAT THE F/O COULD THEN PARTICIPATE IN THE COCKPIT PREPARATION FOR DEP AND BE A VIABLE CHK AND BALANCE. I ALSO THINK BY NOT DOING THE WEIGHT AND BALANCE IN THE COCKPIT IT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASE THE INTERRUPTIONS TO NORMAL CREW OPS. I ALSO THINK REQUIRED IFR FUEL SHOULD BE LOCATED NOT ONLY ON A BEFORE START CHKLIST BUT ALSO ON AN AFTER START OR TAXI CHKLIST. BOTH CAPT AND F/O SHOULD RESPOND TO FUEL ON BOARD. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. THIS IS THE FOURTH TIME THIS AIRLINE HAS HAD AN AIR TURNBACK BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT FUEL. THE RPTR WHO WAS JUST A COCKPIT RIDER DISCOVERED THE ERROR AND BROUGHT IT TO THE FLT CREW'S ATTN. THEY RETURNED TO PHL FOR MORE FUEL. THE RPTR WAS VERY CRITICAL OF THE AIRLINE'S DIRECTOR OF TRNING. THE PROC FOR WORKING THE WEIGHT AND BALANCE IN THE COCKPIT IS HIS BABY AND HE DOES NOT SEE THAT IT CAUSES ANY PROBS. THE ASSOCIATION IS TRYING TO BUILD A CASE AGAINST THIS PROC. THE PRINCIPLE OPERATING INSPECTOR IS A GOOD FRIEND OF THE DIRECTOR OF TRNING SO THE FLT CREWS CANNOT GET ANY RELIEF THROUGH THIS PART OF THE FAA. ANOTHER PROC DEVELOPED BY THE DIR OF MLG TRNING AND APPROVED BY THIS SAME OPERATING INSPECTOR IS TO HAVE ONLY ONE PLT READ AND RESPOND TO THE CHKLIST IF THEY STAY ON THE SAME ACFT THROUGH A STOP OVER AND THIS REMOVES THE XCHK FACTOR. THE AIRLINE HAD A NEW CHIEF PLT AND THERE IS HOPE HE WILL BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO FLT CREW'S RECOMMENDATION. THE DIRECTOR OF TRNING IS EX-MIL AND IS INFLUENTIAL IN THE HIRING OF NEW PLTS. HE HAS MANY OF HIS OLD 'BUDDIES' IN SUPVR POSITIONS. THE COMPANY IS VERY ECONOMY MINDED AND THIS HAD CUT ANY EXTRA HELP TO THE POINT THAT IT IS ALWAYS A SCRAMBLE TO GET 'OUT ON TIME' AND THIS IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE OPERATION. THE COMPANY POLICY IS TO ACCEPT ANY PAX UP TO THE TIME THE GATE IS CLOSED AND SOMETIMES EVEN AFTER THE ACFT DOOR IS SECURED THUS INCREASING THE COCKPIT WORKLOAD TO THE POINT THAT IT IS A ONE MAN SHOW WITH THE F/O DISTR BY LAST MIN WEIGHT AND BALANCE CHANGES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.