Narrative:

Flight scheduled to depart at PM55 EST. Inbound portion of the flight didn't operate, so the fact that our aircraft was not parked at the usual departure gate was unremarkable under the circumstances. The crew boarded the aircraft and shortly afterward the passenger were boarded (some of whom had been attempting to get to bos since PM00 EST). The PM00Z WX indicated that the storm had not yet reached bos, but was moving in that direction albeit slower than forecast. Upon receiving our clearance, we were informed that we had a PM40 EST wheels-up time. I felt that this delay would have us arriving at bos at least 1 hour or more after the storms arrival. I was concerned about potential en route delays and the continuing viability of the alternates. At approximately PM50 EST, clearance delivery called and told us that if we could be underway in 9 mins, there would be no gate hold. This was too good an opportunity to pass up! I left the cockpit, went up the jetway and told the agent that we could get out if we got underway as soon as possible. She said that we had all the passenger, including the one she was checking in. I told her that we had the fuel and were all set. On the way back to the aircraft I picked up a checked valet bag and a crew bag that were on the jetway. I brought them to the aircraft. I didn't want to wait for them to be stowed in the cargo compartment. I gave the valet to the F/a's for stowage and placed the crew bag with the crew luggage. The agent had a count of 77, the F/a's 75. The agent confirmed the fuel and no gsi's. She mentioned something about ACARS, and I assumed she meant corrections to the passenger count. We were pushed back and taxi was direct to the departure runway. A check of the WX revealed that the storm had reached pvd, but not bos or hya (PM00Z EST). When we reached the V speed portion of the flight, the first officer asked, 'what do we weigh?' (we each thought the other had the manifest). A cursory search of the cockpit didn't turn it up. As we were now #2 for takeoff, I said, 'I'll make some computations and we'll find it later.' I then computed: 1) landing weight, 2) runway limit weight. 3) bow + fuel and passenger/bag weight (I used 80 passenger for ease of computation on a little pad). We used the lowest of the 3 and I was confident that we were at least 1500 pounds below that. En route we found out that: 1) we had no paperwork. 2) the gate and the aircraft had been changed. 3) no bags or cargo had been loaded. A lot of errors took place. I didn't catch any of them, and in my haste to beat the WX, I compounded some of them. The 1:40 gate hold increased my concerns as to destination WX and alternates. The reprieve on the gate hold alleviated part of the problem, but created another. By leaving the cockpit I broke the flow and engaged in activities (bags) which aren't normally mine. Both crew members thought the other had the paperwork. Because we were a bit behind the 9 min stipulation, I didn't want ATC to pull the plug, as the ensuing delay could have been in excess of the original.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG FLT CREW DEPARTED ARPT WITHOUT RECEIVING AN ACCURATE WEIGHT MANIFEST TO INDICATE THE CORRECT ACFT GROSS WEIGHT.

Narrative: FLT SCHEDULED TO DEPART AT PM55 EST. INBND PORTION OF THE FLT DIDN'T OPERATE, SO THE FACT THAT OUR ACFT WAS NOT PARKED AT THE USUAL DEP GATE WAS UNREMARKABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE CREW BOARDED THE ACFT AND SHORTLY AFTERWARD THE PAX WERE BOARDED (SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO GET TO BOS SINCE PM00 EST). THE PM00Z WX INDICATED THAT THE STORM HAD NOT YET REACHED BOS, BUT WAS MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION ALBEIT SLOWER THAN FORECAST. UPON RECEIVING OUR CLRNC, WE WERE INFORMED THAT WE HAD A PM40 EST WHEELS-UP TIME. I FELT THAT THIS DELAY WOULD HAVE US ARRIVING AT BOS AT LEAST 1 HR OR MORE AFTER THE STORMS ARR. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL ENRTE DELAYS AND THE CONTINUING VIABILITY OF THE ALTERNATES. AT APPROX PM50 EST, CLRNC DELIVERY CALLED AND TOLD US THAT IF WE COULD BE UNDERWAY IN 9 MINS, THERE WOULD BE NO GATE HOLD. THIS WAS TOO GOOD AN OPPORTUNITY TO PASS UP! I LEFT THE COCKPIT, WENT UP THE JETWAY AND TOLD THE AGENT THAT WE COULD GET OUT IF WE GOT UNDERWAY ASAP. SHE SAID THAT WE HAD ALL THE PAX, INCLUDING THE ONE SHE WAS CHKING IN. I TOLD HER THAT WE HAD THE FUEL AND WERE ALL SET. ON THE WAY BACK TO THE ACFT I PICKED UP A CHKED VALET BAG AND A CREW BAG THAT WERE ON THE JETWAY. I BROUGHT THEM TO THE ACFT. I DIDN'T WANT TO WAIT FOR THEM TO BE STOWED IN THE CARGO COMPARTMENT. I GAVE THE VALET TO THE F/A'S FOR STOWAGE AND PLACED THE CREW BAG WITH THE CREW LUGGAGE. THE AGENT HAD A COUNT OF 77, THE F/A'S 75. THE AGENT CONFIRMED THE FUEL AND NO GSI'S. SHE MENTIONED SOMETHING ABOUT ACARS, AND I ASSUMED SHE MEANT CORRECTIONS TO THE PAX COUNT. WE WERE PUSHED BACK AND TAXI WAS DIRECT TO THE DEP RWY. A CHK OF THE WX REVEALED THAT THE STORM HAD REACHED PVD, BUT NOT BOS OR HYA (PM00Z EST). WHEN WE REACHED THE V SPD PORTION OF THE FLT, THE F/O ASKED, 'WHAT DO WE WEIGH?' (WE EACH THOUGHT THE OTHER HAD THE MANIFEST). A CURSORY SEARCH OF THE COCKPIT DIDN'T TURN IT UP. AS WE WERE NOW #2 FOR TKOF, I SAID, 'I'LL MAKE SOME COMPUTATIONS AND WE'LL FIND IT LATER.' I THEN COMPUTED: 1) LNDG WT, 2) RWY LIMIT WT. 3) BOW + FUEL AND PAX/BAG WT (I USED 80 PAX FOR EASE OF COMPUTATION ON A LITTLE PAD). WE USED THE LOWEST OF THE 3 AND I WAS CONFIDENT THAT WE WERE AT LEAST 1500 LBS BELOW THAT. ENRTE WE FOUND OUT THAT: 1) WE HAD NO PAPERWORK. 2) THE GATE AND THE ACFT HAD BEEN CHANGED. 3) NO BAGS OR CARGO HAD BEEN LOADED. A LOT OF ERRORS TOOK PLACE. I DIDN'T CATCH ANY OF THEM, AND IN MY HASTE TO BEAT THE WX, I COMPOUNDED SOME OF THEM. THE 1:40 GATE HOLD INCREASED MY CONCERNS AS TO DEST WX AND ALTERNATES. THE REPRIEVE ON THE GATE HOLD ALLEVIATED PART OF THE PROB, BUT CREATED ANOTHER. BY LEAVING THE COCKPIT I BROKE THE FLOW AND ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES (BAGS) WHICH AREN'T NORMALLY MINE. BOTH CREW MEMBERS THOUGHT THE OTHER HAD THE PAPERWORK. BECAUSE WE WERE A BIT BEHIND THE 9 MIN STIPULATION, I DIDN'T WANT ATC TO PULL THE PLUG, AS THE ENSUING DELAY COULD HAVE BEEN IN EXCESS OF THE ORIGINAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.