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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 165425 |
Time | |
Date | 199012 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : atl |
State Reference | GA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 1026 msl bound upper : 1026 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : atl tower : atl |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing other |
Route In Use | approach : visual |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 9000 flight time type : 900 |
ASRS Report | 165425 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 250 flight time total : 14000 flight time type : 800 |
ASRS Report | 164895 |
Events | |
Anomaly | incursion : landing without clearance non adherence : far non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
The copilot did the flying. Everything the copilot did was wrong; e.g., I gave him an approach briefing for ILS 28L for atl. This was wrong as it was obviously VMC with a visibility approach. East.g., to read the charts I had the map light on. This was wrong as it obviously interfered with the captain's vision. East.g., I copied the atl ATIS and wrote it out very neatly for the captain. This was wrong, as obviously the letters 'clear' are not the correct way to indicate a cloudless sky. The captain went to great effort and took his valuable time to draw for me the correct symbol, for which I am deeply indebted, etc, etc. We were cleared to cross canuk (atl 128 degree right/D 40) intersection at 12000' at 250 KIAS. I elected to stay at cruise as long as possible and I calculated an appropriate beginning of descent point for an idle 280 KT descent. At about 44 NM we were level at 12000' at 250 KTS with engines respooled (approximately 1.3 EPR). The captain obviously felt that I should have come down much sooner and was agitated and showed it. There was a lull in traffic and we were leading the pack. The captain was nagging me about something else. At about 80 NM we could see the airport. Before canuk I could see the depot. At canuk we were given a vector directly toward depot and also a descent. I planned the approach to maximize fuel savings and still be fully configured and spooled up at 1000' AGL. The approach was textbook, followed by a smooth T/D at the 1000' point on the centerline, idle reverse, and at 70 KTS a gentle feel of the brakes and we comfortably made the second high speed. All the way down I was being nagged about being too high, too fast, left, right. The ILS needles were centered all the way down, but obviously they were wrong because the captain interpreted them his own way. I was very upset with this and being occupied flying the aircraft and listening to this needling I did not notice that the captain failed to do his job, that is change to tower and get a landing clearance. As soon as we cleared the captain ordered me to get a clearance to cross the other runway. At this time I noticed that the tower frequency was not in any of the 4 selector heads on the pedestal. I looked overhead and the company frequency (129.02) was selected in the #3 radio. The altitude selector read ...000'. Atl airport: the copilot requested a discussion with the captain. The copilot pointed out clearly and unambiguously that he was very unhappy with the captain's performance for the following reasons: 1) the captain failed to set up crew coordination--in fact, his behavior was such as to inhibit cockpit resource management. 2) the captain was so busy making life miserable for a scab that he caused a major violation of federal aviation regulations. 3) the captain had by his actions endangered flight's crew, passenger, and by extension, the continuing existence of the airline. The captain muttered something about taking me off the trip, but he then changed his mind and promised to be civil to me for the rest of the trip.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC.
Narrative: THE COPLT DID THE FLYING. EVERYTHING THE COPLT DID WAS WRONG; E.G., I GAVE HIM AN APCH BRIEFING FOR ILS 28L FOR ATL. THIS WAS WRONG AS IT WAS OBVIOUSLY VMC WITH A VIS APCH. E.G., TO READ THE CHARTS I HAD THE MAP LIGHT ON. THIS WAS WRONG AS IT OBVIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH THE CAPT'S VISION. E.G., I COPIED THE ATL ATIS AND WROTE IT OUT VERY NEATLY FOR THE CAPT. THIS WAS WRONG, AS OBVIOUSLY THE LETTERS 'CLR' ARE NOT THE CORRECT WAY TO INDICATE A CLOUDLESS SKY. THE CAPT WENT TO GREAT EFFORT AND TOOK HIS VALUABLE TIME TO DRAW FOR ME THE CORRECT SYMBOL, FOR WHICH I AM DEEPLY INDEBTED, ETC, ETC. WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS CANUK (ATL 128 DEG R/D 40) INTXN AT 12000' AT 250 KIAS. I ELECTED TO STAY AT CRUISE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND I CALCULATED AN APPROPRIATE BEGINNING OF DSNT POINT FOR AN IDLE 280 KT DSNT. AT ABOUT 44 NM WE WERE LEVEL AT 12000' AT 250 KTS WITH ENGS RESPOOLED (APPROX 1.3 EPR). THE CAPT OBVIOUSLY FELT THAT I SHOULD HAVE COME DOWN MUCH SOONER AND WAS AGITATED AND SHOWED IT. THERE WAS A LULL IN TFC AND WE WERE LEADING THE PACK. THE CAPT WAS NAGGING ME ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE. AT ABOUT 80 NM WE COULD SEE THE ARPT. BEFORE CANUK I COULD SEE THE DEPOT. AT CANUK WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR DIRECTLY TOWARD DEPOT AND ALSO A DSNT. I PLANNED THE APCH TO MAXIMIZE FUEL SAVINGS AND STILL BE FULLY CONFIGURED AND SPOOLED UP AT 1000' AGL. THE APCH WAS TEXTBOOK, FOLLOWED BY A SMOOTH T/D AT THE 1000' POINT ON THE CENTERLINE, IDLE REVERSE, AND AT 70 KTS A GENTLE FEEL OF THE BRAKES AND WE COMFORTABLY MADE THE SECOND HIGH SPD. ALL THE WAY DOWN I WAS BEING NAGGED ABOUT BEING TOO HIGH, TOO FAST, LEFT, RIGHT. THE ILS NEEDLES WERE CENTERED ALL THE WAY DOWN, BUT OBVIOUSLY THEY WERE WRONG BECAUSE THE CAPT INTERPRETED THEM HIS OWN WAY. I WAS VERY UPSET WITH THIS AND BEING OCCUPIED FLYING THE ACFT AND LISTENING TO THIS NEEDLING I DID NOT NOTICE THAT THE CAPT FAILED TO DO HIS JOB, THAT IS CHANGE TO TWR AND GET A LNDG CLRNC. AS SOON AS WE CLRED THE CAPT ORDERED ME TO GET A CLRNC TO CROSS THE OTHER RWY. AT THIS TIME I NOTICED THAT THE TWR FREQ WAS NOT IN ANY OF THE 4 SELECTOR HEADS ON THE PEDESTAL. I LOOKED OVERHEAD AND THE COMPANY FREQ (129.02) WAS SELECTED IN THE #3 RADIO. THE ALT SELECTOR READ ...000'. ATL ARPT: THE COPLT REQUESTED A DISCUSSION WITH THE CAPT. THE COPLT POINTED OUT CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT HE WAS VERY UNHAPPY WITH THE CAPT'S PERFORMANCE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) THE CAPT FAILED TO SET UP CREW COORD--IN FACT, HIS BEHAVIOR WAS SUCH AS TO INHIBIT COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT. 2) THE CAPT WAS SO BUSY MAKING LIFE MISERABLE FOR A SCAB THAT HE CAUSED A MAJOR VIOLATION OF FEDERAL AVIATION REGS. 3) THE CAPT HAD BY HIS ACTIONS ENDANGERED FLT'S CREW, PAX, AND BY EXTENSION, THE CONTINUING EXISTENCE OF THE AIRLINE. THE CAPT MUTTERED SOMETHING ABOUT TAKING ME OFF THE TRIP, BUT HE THEN CHANGED HIS MIND AND PROMISED TO BE CIVIL TO ME FOR THE REST OF THE TRIP.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.