Narrative:

Approaching waterloo VOR on V1, I asked dover approach for the active runway at sby and was advised that 32 was in use. WX conditions were reported to be VMC at the time, with only scattered clouds in the immediate vicinity. Shortly thereafter, I was switched to patuxent approach on 127.95 and was asked whether I would like a visibility approach to sby. Instead I requested the ILS runway 32. Approaching spy VOR at approximately X20 local time, I was instructed to descend from 6000 to 3000' and was cleared to shoot the ILS runway 32, to cross sby VOR at 3000', to descent to 2000' once established outbnd from the VOR, to report colbe (the LOM/IAF) outbnd at 2000', and to again report colbe inbound, maintaining 2000' until established on the G/south (i.e., at colbe). The ILS runway 32 approach at sby (a copy of which is attached) is a slightly busy approach when initiated from the sby VOR, in that it entails a modified procedure turn within a published 1 min holding pattern. However, the approach proceeded uneventfully--at least as far as I could tell--until shortly after I reported colbe inbound and was instructed by patuxent approach to switch to 123.6, the CTAF frequency. (Anticipating that frequency change, I had tuned my #2 communication radio to 123.6 before initiating the approach, but was not monitoring it since doing so made listening to patuxent approach on my #1 communication radio very difficult.) after switching to 123.6, I advised salisbury traffic of my position (just inside colbe), and that I was inbound on the ILS to runway 32. I was immediately called by another pilot who rather aggressively stated that I should have been giving position reports on 123.6 throughout the approach, that it was my responsibility to look for traffic even when flying on an IFR flight plan (of which responsibility I am aware), that we had just had a near miss (he said 50', although I cannot confirm this because I never saw the other aircraft), that local procedure was to fly the approach on 123.6--'because patuxent approach never tells anybody they have aircraft on the approach,' and again reiterated that I should know enough to shoot the approach using the CTAF frequency. Since I was by now in the final stages of an approach to a strange field, I ultimately asked the other pilot to be quiet so that I could get an advisory as to pattern traffic. Salisbury FSS immediately stated that there was 1 other aircraft (an small aircraft) on downwind, which I had previously spotted. My landing at sby was uneventful.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: REPORTER IN SMA ON IFR PLAN WITH APCH CLRNC TO SBY HAD NMAC WITH SMA NO FLT PLAN, NOT IN COM WITH SBY.

Narrative: APCHING WATERLOO VOR ON V1, I ASKED DOVER APCH FOR THE ACTIVE RWY AT SBY AND WAS ADVISED THAT 32 WAS IN USE. WX CONDITIONS WERE RPTED TO BE VMC AT THE TIME, WITH ONLY SCATTERED CLOUDS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I WAS SWITCHED TO PATUXENT APCH ON 127.95 AND WAS ASKED WHETHER I WOULD LIKE A VIS APCH TO SBY. INSTEAD I REQUESTED THE ILS RWY 32. APCHING SPY VOR AT APPROX X20 LCL TIME, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO DSND FROM 6000 TO 3000' AND WAS CLRED TO SHOOT THE ILS RWY 32, TO CROSS SBY VOR AT 3000', TO DSNT TO 2000' ONCE ESTABLISHED OUTBND FROM THE VOR, TO RPT COLBE (THE LOM/IAF) OUTBND AT 2000', AND TO AGAIN RPT COLBE INBND, MAINTAINING 2000' UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE G/S (I.E., AT COLBE). THE ILS RWY 32 APCH AT SBY (A COPY OF WHICH IS ATTACHED) IS A SLIGHTLY BUSY APCH WHEN INITIATED FROM THE SBY VOR, IN THAT IT ENTAILS A MODIFIED PROC TURN WITHIN A PUBLISHED 1 MIN HOLDING PATTERN. HOWEVER, THE APCH PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY--AT LEAST AS FAR AS I COULD TELL--UNTIL SHORTLY AFTER I RPTED COLBE INBND AND WAS INSTRUCTED BY PATUXENT APCH TO SWITCH TO 123.6, THE CTAF FREQ. (ANTICIPATING THAT FREQ CHANGE, I HAD TUNED MY #2 COM RADIO TO 123.6 BEFORE INITIATING THE APCH, BUT WAS NOT MONITORING IT SINCE DOING SO MADE LISTENING TO PATUXENT APCH ON MY #1 COM RADIO VERY DIFFICULT.) AFTER SWITCHING TO 123.6, I ADVISED SALISBURY TFC OF MY POS (JUST INSIDE COLBE), AND THAT I WAS INBND ON THE ILS TO RWY 32. I WAS IMMEDIATELY CALLED BY ANOTHER PLT WHO RATHER AGGRESSIVELY STATED THAT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVING POS RPTS ON 123.6 THROUGHOUT THE APCH, THAT IT WAS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO LOOK FOR TFC EVEN WHEN FLYING ON AN IFR FLT PLAN (OF WHICH RESPONSIBILITY I AM AWARE), THAT WE HAD JUST HAD A NEAR MISS (HE SAID 50', ALTHOUGH I CANNOT CONFIRM THIS BECAUSE I NEVER SAW THE OTHER ACFT), THAT LCL PROC WAS TO FLY THE APCH ON 123.6--'BECAUSE PATUXENT APCH NEVER TELLS ANYBODY THEY HAVE ACFT ON THE APCH,' AND AGAIN REITERATED THAT I SHOULD KNOW ENOUGH TO SHOOT THE APCH USING THE CTAF FREQ. SINCE I WAS BY NOW IN THE FINAL STAGES OF AN APCH TO A STRANGE FIELD, I ULTIMATELY ASKED THE OTHER PLT TO BE QUIET SO THAT I COULD GET AN ADVISORY AS TO PATTERN TFC. SALISBURY FSS IMMEDIATELY STATED THAT THERE WAS 1 OTHER ACFT (AN SMA) ON DOWNWIND, WHICH I HAD PREVIOUSLY SPOTTED. MY LNDG AT SBY WAS UNEVENTFUL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.