Narrative:

Departing ZZZ on the takeoff roll at approximately 100 knots; we had a bird strike in the vicinity of the nose gear. All engine indications were normal and there was no smell present.subsequently we noticed the hydraulic system a quantity decreasing slowly. All other indications were normal. We contacted dispatch and the [chief pilot] regarding both the bird strike and the decreasing hydraulic quantity. The [chief pilot] on duty was an airbus pilot who recommended we divert. I asked for a pilot familiar with 737 systems and operation to contact us. (Name) was not scheduled to be on duty but made himself available and was an excellent resource. We discussed diverting or continuing. Due to the rate of system a fluid loss at the time; we anticipated a total loss of system a before we arrived at any alternate. Since we were in a heavy 900 with extra fuel; and we would be performing the same procedure regardless of where we landed; we elected to continue to ZZZ1 and monitor the hydraulic system. Approximately half way through the flight at 20 percent quantity remaining; the engine 1 hydraulic low pressure light illuminated and we accomplished the appropriate QRH.[as we neared our destination]; the hydraulic system a quantity dropped to 0 percent; and [notified ATC] and requested crash fire rescue equipment (crash fire rescue) as a precaution for the landing in ZZZ1. Even though the system a quantity was zero; we didn't have the low pressure light for the system a electric pump or associated flight control annunciator light. We elected to wait to perform the loss of system a QRH until we had all three of annunciator lights associated with the condition statement in the QRH. We asked for a 20 mile final to allow time for manual gear extension if it became necessary. We selected gear down approximately 20 miles out and the gear extended normally. We configured the aircraft normally; however as we slowed and configured the remaining annunciator illuminated. We completed the loss of system a QRH and accomplished a normal flaps 30 landing on xxl in ZZZ1. After clearing the runway; ground notified us that crash fire rescue equipment recommend we stop at our present position for possible smoke coming from the nose gear. I checked the status of hydraulic system B and noted it was at 58 percent. I suspected that what crash fire rescue equipment thought was smoke and put the nose wheel steering switch back to normal (to remove system B pressure from the nose wheel actuator) and the smoke or haze subsided.we then requested a tow to the gate which was coordinated by ZZZ1 ops and maintenance. To facilitate the tow; we started the APU; however we didn't open the APU bleed in case hydraulic fluid was in the vicinity of the APU inlet. (Name) had suggested caution on using the APU due to possible hydraulic fluid ingestion. I'm not sure if we would have been as aware of that possibility if not for his insight. Once the engines were shut down and [company] maintenance was at the side of the aircraft; I asked if they would check for hydraulic fluid near the APU inlet; and they indicated there was fluid around the inlet. Because of this; I elected to keep the APU bleed off; however the cabin temperatures did become rather warm by the time all passengers were off. One note; the tow team did a fantastic job considering the presence of hydraulic fluid and mist in the nose wheel area; however they did not have a headset available for communication with the flight crew. We were able to communicate by opening the window and shouting and using hand signals; but this was not ideal.once parked; we deplaned from the left rear exit to keep passengers away from any hydraulic fluid present in the vicinity of the nose of the aircraft.the entire crew debriefed the event on the aircraft once all passengers had deplaned. Recommend having a fleet specific expert available at all times. A [chief pilot] from another fleet is not as helpful during this type of event. Recommend the tow team for these types ofevents have an operating headset for communications.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-900 fight crew reported a bird strike during takeoff which caused damage to hydraulic lines; resulting in a subsequent loss of fluid in Hydraulic System A.

Narrative: Departing ZZZ on the takeoff roll at approximately 100 knots; we had a bird strike in the vicinity of the nose gear. All Engine Indications were normal and there was no smell present.Subsequently we noticed the Hydraulic system A quantity decreasing slowly. All other indications were normal. We contacted dispatch and the [Chief Pilot] regarding both the bird strike and the decreasing hydraulic quantity. The [Chief Pilot] on duty was an Airbus pilot who recommended we divert. I asked for a pilot familiar with 737 systems and operation to contact us. (Name) was not scheduled to be on duty but made himself available and was an excellent resource. We discussed diverting or continuing. Due to the rate of system A fluid loss at the time; we anticipated a total loss of system A before we arrived at any alternate. Since we were in a heavy 900 with extra fuel; and we would be performing the same procedure regardless of where we landed; we elected to continue to ZZZ1 and monitor the hydraulic system. Approximately half way through the flight at 20 percent quantity remaining; the ENG 1 Hydraulic Low pressure light illuminated and we accomplished the appropriate QRH.[As we neared our destination]; the hydraulic system A quantity dropped to 0 percent; and [notified ATC] and requested CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) as a precaution for the landing in ZZZ1. Even though the system A quantity was zero; we didn't have the low pressure light for the system A electric pump or associated Flight Control annunciator light. We elected to wait to perform the Loss of System A QRH until we had all three of annunciator lights associated with the condition statement in the QRH. We asked for a 20 mile final to allow time for manual gear extension if it became necessary. We selected gear down approximately 20 miles out and the gear extended normally. We configured the aircraft normally; however as we slowed and configured the remaining annunciator illuminated. We completed the Loss of System A QRH and accomplished a normal flaps 30 landing on XXL in ZZZ1. After clearing the runway; ground notified us that CFR recommend we stop at our present position for possible smoke coming from the nose gear. I checked the status of hydraulic system B and noted it was at 58 percent. I suspected that what CFR thought was smoke and put the Nose Wheel Steering switch back to Normal (to remove system B pressure from the nose wheel actuator) and the smoke or haze subsided.We then requested a tow to the gate which was coordinated by ZZZ1 Ops and Maintenance. To facilitate the Tow; we started the APU; however we didn't open the APU bleed in case hydraulic fluid was in the vicinity of the APU inlet. (Name) had suggested caution on using the APU due to possible hydraulic fluid ingestion. I'm not sure if we would have been as aware of that possibility if not for his insight. Once the engines were shut down and [Company] Maintenance was at the side of the aircraft; I asked if they would check for hydraulic fluid near the APU inlet; and they indicated there was fluid around the inlet. Because of this; I elected to keep the APU Bleed off; however the cabin temperatures did become rather warm by the time all passengers were off. One note; the tow team did a fantastic job considering the presence of hydraulic fluid and mist in the nose wheel area; however they did not have a headset available for communication with the flight crew. We were able to communicate by opening the window and shouting and using hand signals; but this was not ideal.Once parked; we deplaned from the left rear exit to keep passengers away from any hydraulic fluid present in the vicinity of the nose of the aircraft.The entire crew debriefed the event on the aircraft once all passengers had deplaned. Recommend having a fleet specific expert available at all times. A [Chief Pilot] from another fleet is not as helpful during this type of event. Recommend the tow team for these types ofevents have an operating headset for communications.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.