Narrative:

Philadelphia controllers were busy that night. We couldn't get through ground control for a taxi clearance for a good 10 mins, then finally, I got through. The controller read the taxi clearance very fast and I read it back, but not completely. He read, 'cleared to 9L, via alpha and uniform, hold short of romeo.' I read back, ' cleared to 9L, alpha, uniform...' then I stopped. Ground didn't complete with 'hold short of romeo', but I did, to my captain. We always go to runway 27L (rarely to runway 9L) and I'd never been told about romeo. I asked the captain if he knew where romeo was and he said that they probably want us to hold short of whiskey. I answered, 'no I said romeo.' captain acted and looked like he knew what we we're supposed to do, so I didn't clarify or verify with ground control. I said, 'as long as you know what were supposed to do...' (whiskey and romeo are next to each other). So, as I started the before takeoff checklist, he stopped short of runway 9L on whiskey like we were going to cross it to go to runway 27L. It didn't occur to me that we were going to wrong runway because we'd been going this way for months. Ground controller said that we were to follow a heavy transport to our right, and that we were to proceed straight ahead to get behind him. Well, 'straight ahead', the way we were pointing, meant 'cross the runway.' and so the captain proceeded straight ahead across the runway. As we did that, we saw an aircraft in position for takeoff and his lights were on. Then it hit us at the same time, we had completed the checklist by then and were on tower frequency. There was confusion in the controllers voice and he directed us to contact ground and make a 180 degree turn. Ground inquired why we just xed the active. Captain answered he'd been told to go straight ahead on whiskey. We were told to cross again to the other side and follow the heavy transport. We took off in sequence on runway 9L. Supplemental information from acn 169760. When we finally got through to the controller he told us to taxi to runway 9L or 9R, 'I'm not sure.' at that time he gave instructions to other aircraft, and we could not call him back to verify the taxi clearance. I feel there was a number of contributing factors that caused this incident to happen. After this had occurred, I asked the first officer what she heard the controller say? She said she heard the controller say taxi to runway 9L via alpha and taxiway uniform to hold short of taxiway romeo. When I asked the first officer why she did not say anything when I was at taxiway whiskey waiting to cross runway 9L, she said she thought we were at taxiway romeo. Although she had never warned me that we lined up to cross the active runway 9L. A number of capts have had problems with this first officer. Also the WX was not very good at the time. It was night the taxiway signs were very hard to see. I had been off duty 2 days then had ground school for 2 days. I had been sick with the flu so the four days before I was to fly I took a large amount of cold medicine to try to get rid of this flu before reporting to fly. When I showed up to fly that night I was very weak and my head was cloudy from the existing cold medicine that I had taken over the past four days. I could not call in sick because there was not enough time before the flight to call out sick. A main contributing factor was the flu and the existing cold medicine which had made my judgement very poor. This realy affected my performance. Also a main contributor was the lack of crew coordination and crew communication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH UNCOORD RWY CROSSING ENTRY.

Narrative: PHILADELPHIA CTLRS WERE BUSY THAT NIGHT. WE COULDN'T GET THROUGH GND CTL FOR A TAXI CLRNC FOR A GOOD 10 MINS, THEN FINALLY, I GOT THROUGH. THE CTLR READ THE TAXI CLRNC VERY FAST AND I READ IT BACK, BUT NOT COMPLETELY. HE READ, 'CLRED TO 9L, VIA ALPHA AND UNIFORM, HOLD SHORT OF ROMEO.' I READ BACK, ' CLRED TO 9L, ALPHA, UNIFORM...' THEN I STOPPED. GND DIDN'T COMPLETE WITH 'HOLD SHORT OF ROMEO', BUT I DID, TO MY CAPT. WE ALWAYS GO TO RWY 27L (RARELY TO RWY 9L) AND I'D NEVER BEEN TOLD ABOUT ROMEO. I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE KNEW WHERE ROMEO WAS AND HE SAID THAT THEY PROBABLY WANT US TO HOLD SHORT OF WHISKEY. I ANSWERED, 'NO I SAID ROMEO.' CAPT ACTED AND LOOKED LIKE HE KNEW WHAT WE WE'RE SUPPOSED TO DO, SO I DIDN'T CLARIFY OR VERIFY WITH GND CTL. I SAID, 'AS LONG AS YOU KNOW WHAT WERE SUPPOSED TO DO...' (WHISKEY AND ROMEO ARE NEXT TO EACH OTHER). SO, AS I STARTED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, HE STOPPED SHORT OF RWY 9L ON WHISKEY LIKE WE WERE GOING TO CROSS IT TO GO TO RWY 27L. IT DIDN'T OCCUR TO ME THAT WE WERE GOING TO WRONG RWY BECAUSE WE'D BEEN GOING THIS WAY FOR MONTHS. GND CTLR SAID THAT WE WERE TO FOLLOW A HVT TO OUR R, AND THAT WE WERE TO PROCEED STRAIGHT AHEAD TO GET BEHIND HIM. WELL, 'STRAIGHT AHEAD', THE WAY WE WERE POINTING, MEANT 'CROSS THE RWY.' AND SO THE CAPT PROCEEDED STRAIGHT AHEAD ACROSS THE RWY. AS WE DID THAT, WE SAW AN ACFT IN POS FOR TKOF AND HIS LIGHTS WERE ON. THEN IT HIT US AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAD COMPLETED THE CHKLIST BY THEN AND WERE ON TWR FREQ. THERE WAS CONFUSION IN THE CTLRS VOICE AND HE DIRECTED US TO CONTACT GND AND MAKE A 180 DEG TURN. GND INQUIRED WHY WE JUST XED THE ACTIVE. CAPT ANSWERED HE'D BEEN TOLD TO GO STRAIGHT AHEAD ON WHISKEY. WE WERE TOLD TO CROSS AGAIN TO THE OTHER SIDE AND FOLLOW THE HVT. WE TOOK OFF IN SEQUENCE ON RWY 9L. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 169760. WHEN WE FINALLY GOT THROUGH TO THE CTLR HE TOLD US TO TAXI TO RWY 9L OR 9R, 'I'M NOT SURE.' AT THAT TIME HE GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO OTHER ACFT, AND WE COULD NOT CALL HIM BACK TO VERIFY THE TAXI CLRNC. I FEEL THERE WAS A NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT CAUSED THIS INCIDENT TO HAPPEN. AFTER THIS HAD OCCURRED, I ASKED THE F/O WHAT SHE HEARD THE CTLR SAY? SHE SAID SHE HEARD THE CTLR SAY TAXI TO RWY 9L VIA ALPHA AND TXWY UNIFORM TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY ROMEO. WHEN I ASKED THE F/O WHY SHE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING WHEN I WAS AT TXWY WHISKEY WAITING TO CROSS RWY 9L, SHE SAID SHE THOUGHT WE WERE AT TXWY ROMEO. ALTHOUGH SHE HAD NEVER WARNED ME THAT WE LINED UP TO CROSS THE ACTIVE RWY 9L. A NUMBER OF CAPTS HAVE HAD PROBS WITH THIS F/O. ALSO THE WX WAS NOT VERY GOOD AT THE TIME. IT WAS NIGHT THE TXWY SIGNS WERE VERY HARD TO SEE. I HAD BEEN OFF DUTY 2 DAYS THEN HAD GND SCHOOL FOR 2 DAYS. I HAD BEEN SICK WITH THE FLU SO THE FOUR DAYS BEFORE I WAS TO FLY I TOOK A LARGE AMOUNT OF COLD MEDICINE TO TRY TO GET RID OF THIS FLU BEFORE RPTING TO FLY. WHEN I SHOWED UP TO FLY THAT NIGHT I WAS VERY WEAK AND MY HEAD WAS CLOUDY FROM THE EXISTING COLD MEDICINE THAT I HAD TAKEN OVER THE PAST FOUR DAYS. I COULD NOT CALL IN SICK BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME BEFORE THE FLT TO CALL OUT SICK. A MAIN CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE FLU AND THE EXISTING COLD MEDICINE WHICH HAD MADE MY JUDGEMENT VERY POOR. THIS REALY AFFECTED MY PERFORMANCE. ALSO A MAIN CONTRIBUTOR WAS THE LACK OF CREW COORD AND CREW COM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.