Narrative:

While returning to bradley field, ct, from greensboro, nc, in my small transport at 23000', approximately 30 mi south of long island. I smelled smoke, then saw the eruption of fire on the inside of the coplts front windshield. The smoke was heavy and the fire approximately 8-10' high and 12-15' wide. I started a rapid descent, announced to center that I was declaring an emergency and asked for vectors to the nearest airport. I got my oxy mask on and told center that and my communication to them may be delayed. The center xferred me to my approach who have me a heading of approximately 230 for islip airport and 2000'. On approaching 2000' the fire had subsided and smoke reduced to the point where I was able to remove the mask. At 2000', I was in IFR conditions. After a few seconds of silence from my approach, I tested the radios and realized I had lost radio contact. All radios were inoperable, apparently effected by the fire or smoke. I switched to a code of 7700 and then to 7600. I decided to climb back up to 7500' (over the ny TCA) and continue towards bradley, since I figured 20 mins or so in route, fire under control, and better WX (I had checked ATIS before the incident) in case I lose navigation as well. Another coordination for the decision to continue to bradley was that my ny approach plates were in a flight bag in a rear seat and it would have been too distraction to get them, find islip and make the approach. At 2000' and the autoplt cutting in and out this did not seem to be a safe thing to do. While proceeding towards bradley, I retrieved my hand held transceiver and tried to reach the ny approach controller I had lost communication with, figuring that if I can reestablish communication I can get vectors and frequencys needed to land at islip. This being unsuccessful, I tried bradley approach, but they also could not receive my xmissions. After approximately 5 mins on heading towards bradley, I heard on the transceiver bradley approach calling me and asking me to respond by squawk identification if I could hear them. From then on, headings altitude and other clrncs were accomplished by this communication. Landing at bradley was uneventful as far as the airplane was concerned. The fire as of this writing, seems to have been caused by a short in the windshield heating element, igniting the insulation around the windshield. The fire burned the radio harness, disabling the radios. Thinking about the incident afterwards, I cannot perceive anything significantly I would have and should have done differently; however, the following emergency steps I should have done and didn't do: there is a fire extinguisher on board. I did not know it nor it's location. When I started down, I should have put the gear out for more rapid descent and depressurization the cabin to vent the smoke. I still question whether squawk 7600 or 7700 is right for this emergency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA SMT HAD AN INFLT FIRE AND DECLARED AN EMERGENCY WITH ATC. VECTORS WERE GIVEN TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT BUT WHEN FIRE WENT OUT THE PLT ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO DESTINATION BECAUSE DESTINATION WX WAS VFR.

Narrative: WHILE RETURNING TO BRADLEY FIELD, CT, FROM GREENSBORO, NC, IN MY SMT AT 23000', APPROX 30 MI S OF LONG ISLAND. I SMELLED SMOKE, THEN SAW THE ERUPTION OF FIRE ON THE INSIDE OF THE COPLTS FRONT WINDSHIELD. THE SMOKE WAS HVY AND THE FIRE APPROX 8-10' HIGH AND 12-15' WIDE. I STARTED A RAPID DSNT, ANNOUNCED TO CTR THAT I WAS DECLARING AN EMER AND ASKED FOR VECTORS TO THE NEAREST ARPT. I GOT MY OXY MASK ON AND TOLD CTR THAT AND MY COM TO THEM MAY BE DELAYED. THE CTR XFERRED ME TO MY APCH WHO HAVE ME A HDG OF APPROX 230 FOR ISLIP ARPT AND 2000'. ON APCHING 2000' THE FIRE HAD SUBSIDED AND SMOKE REDUCED TO THE POINT WHERE I WAS ABLE TO REMOVE THE MASK. AT 2000', I WAS IN IFR CONDITIONS. AFTER A FEW SECS OF SILENCE FROM MY APCH, I TESTED THE RADIOS AND REALIZED I HAD LOST RADIO CONTACT. ALL RADIOS WERE INOPERABLE, APPARENTLY EFFECTED BY THE FIRE OR SMOKE. I SWITCHED TO A CODE OF 7700 AND THEN TO 7600. I DECIDED TO CLB BACK UP TO 7500' (OVER THE NY TCA) AND CONTINUE TOWARDS BRADLEY, SINCE I FIGURED 20 MINS OR SO IN RTE, FIRE UNDER CTL, AND BETTER WX (I HAD CHKED ATIS BEFORE THE INCIDENT) IN CASE I LOSE NAV AS WELL. ANOTHER COORD FOR THE DECISION TO CONTINUE TO BRADLEY WAS THAT MY NY APCH PLATES WERE IN A FLT BAG IN A REAR SEAT AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TOO DISTR TO GET THEM, FIND ISLIP AND MAKE THE APCH. AT 2000' AND THE AUTOPLT CUTTING IN AND OUT THIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE A SAFE THING TO DO. WHILE PROCEEDING TOWARDS BRADLEY, I RETRIEVED MY HAND HELD TRANSCEIVER AND TRIED TO REACH THE NY APCH CTLR I HAD LOST COM WITH, FIGURING THAT IF I CAN REESTABLISH COM I CAN GET VECTORS AND FREQS NEEDED TO LAND AT ISLIP. THIS BEING UNSUCCESSFUL, I TRIED BRADLEY APCH, BUT THEY ALSO COULD NOT RECEIVE MY XMISSIONS. AFTER APPROX 5 MINS ON HDG TOWARDS BRADLEY, I HEARD ON THE TRANSCEIVER BRADLEY APCH CALLING ME AND ASKING ME TO RESPOND BY SQUAWK ID IF I COULD HEAR THEM. FROM THEN ON, HDGS ALT AND OTHER CLRNCS WERE ACCOMPLISHED BY THIS COM. LNDG AT BRADLEY WAS UNEVENTFUL AS FAR AS THE AIRPLANE WAS CONCERNED. THE FIRE AS OF THIS WRITING, SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY A SHORT IN THE WINDSHIELD HEATING ELEMENT, IGNITING THE INSULATION AROUND THE WINDSHIELD. THE FIRE BURNED THE RADIO HARNESS, DISABLING THE RADIOS. THINKING ABOUT THE INCIDENT AFTERWARDS, I CANNOT PERCEIVE ANYTHING SIGNIFICANTLY I WOULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY; HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING EMER STEPS I SHOULD HAVE DONE AND DIDN'T DO: THERE IS A FIRE EXTINGUISHER ON BOARD. I DID NOT KNOW IT NOR IT'S LOCATION. WHEN I STARTED DOWN, I SHOULD HAVE PUT THE GEAR OUT FOR MORE RAPID DSNT AND DEPRESSURIZATION THE CABIN TO VENT THE SMOKE. I STILL QUESTION WHETHER SQUAWK 7600 OR 7700 IS RIGHT FOR THIS EMER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.