Narrative:

We were at ase on a charter flight preparing to depart for teb. We were awaiting our passenger that were due to arrive at xx:30 mountain time. The WX was variable as snow showers were moving through the area. During our preparations a fellow pilot mentioned that under part 135 you need a ceiling of 5000' and a visibility of 5 SM to depart ase. I was not aware of this, so I looked at the departure minimums specified on the plate page. The departure minimums did in part indicate this unless you can maintain me specified climb gradient which we cannot meet. I proceeded to discuss this with the copilot who said we must adhere to the 5000' ceiling and 5 SM departure minimums. I, on the other hand, was under the impression that visibility was the only factor that had to be considered as a go or no go decision. I related my view to the copilot, who thought that this was not the case, but rather that both ceiling and visibility criteria had to be met prior to takeoff. We decided to wait until the passenger arrived and then see what the conditions were. The forecast indicated that the WX was supposed to be 3000' scattered, 8000' scattered and no restrictions to visibility at the time of our departure. However, when the passenger arrived at XY30, the WX had no improved as forecast. It was 1000' scattered, 3000' broken, 2 1/2 SM in light snow. The copilot and I decided to wait until the WX improved before departing. After waiting 1 hour at XY30 the WX had improved to 3000' broken and 5 SM visibility. The passenger were getting anxious because everyone else had left, 'why couldn't we?' approximately 20 aircraft had left between XX30 and XY30. I explained to the passenger that chartered flts are subject to stricter takeoff minimums that other aircraft. However, after 1 hour of waiting and being the last aircraft on the ramp, they were questioning the validity of this. I began to doubt myself and said to my copilot that visibility is the only legal requirement for takeoff. I should mention that the copilot is significantly less experienced that I am and relatively new to charter. The copilot recommended that we board the passenger and taxi out, but not depart until we had the required ceiling of 5000'. We proceeded to do this, but by the time we got to east runway there was no change. Nothing more was said and we departed with the ceiling being reported as 3000' broken and a visibility of 5 mi. We departed ase west/O any incident or problem at all. The flight to teb was uneventful with no problems. The following day I decided to research to see if you are required to meet both ceiling and visibility minimums prior to takeoff for 135 operations. I discovered that you are required to meet these minimums. Ase is surrounded by mountains and the departure procedure requires you to see the mountains in order to turn. I do not feel that we did anything unsafe because we could clearly see the mountains and were able to make the required turns. However, I now realize that the 5000' minimum is required so you can see the mountains. At the time of departure I truly believe I was correct in not needing a ceiling minimum to depart because all our previous minimums concerned visibility only. I think there are several factors that contributed to this situation: first, I should have believed in my copilot despite experience level. If I had I would have found out if it was ok or not to go before actually going. Secondly, I should have been more insistent with the passenger. The fact that some of the previously mentioned 20 aircraft that departed were also charters does not mean that they were smart or legal by departing in WX below takeoff minimums. In conclusion, in the future I will not be pressured by passenger into making decisions. I think the passenger impatience weighed heavily on my decision causing me to doubt myself. I also have a lot more respect for my copilot and if I disagree with what they are saying I will research the situation thoroughly before acting. I think I learned a lot from this situation, both operationally and from a crew coordination viewpoint. I certainly think that this will help make me a safer pilot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LTT CHARTER TAKES OFF WITH WX BELOW MINIMUMS FROM AN ARPT SURROUNDED BY HAZARDOUS TERRAIN.

Narrative: WE WERE AT ASE ON A CHARTER FLT PREPARING TO DEPART FOR TEB. WE WERE AWAITING OUR PAX THAT WERE DUE TO ARRIVE AT XX:30 MOUNTAIN TIME. THE WX WAS VARIABLE AS SNOW SHOWERS WERE MOVING THROUGH THE AREA. DURING OUR PREPARATIONS A FELLOW PLT MENTIONED THAT UNDER PART 135 YOU NEED A CEILING OF 5000' AND A VISIBILITY OF 5 SM TO DEPART ASE. I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS, SO I LOOKED AT THE DEP MINIMUMS SPECIFIED ON THE PLATE PAGE. THE DEP MINIMUMS DID IN PART INDICATE THIS UNLESS YOU CAN MAINTAIN ME SPECIFIED CLB GRADIENT WHICH WE CANNOT MEET. I PROCEEDED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE COPLT WHO SAID WE MUST ADHERE TO THE 5000' CEILING AND 5 SM DEP MINIMUMS. I, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT VISIBILITY WAS THE ONLY FACTOR THAT HAD TO BE CONSIDERED AS A GO OR NO GO DECISION. I RELATED MY VIEW TO THE COPLT, WHO THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, BUT RATHER THAT BOTH CEILING AND VISIBILITY CRITERIA HAD TO BE MET PRIOR TO TKOF. WE DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL THE PAX ARRIVED AND THEN SEE WHAT THE CONDITIONS WERE. THE FORECAST INDICATED THAT THE WX WAS SUPPOSED TO BE 3000' SCATTERED, 8000' SCATTERED AND NO RESTRICTIONS TO VISIBILITY AT THE TIME OF OUR DEP. HOWEVER, WHEN THE PAX ARRIVED AT XY30, THE WX HAD NO IMPROVED AS FORECAST. IT WAS 1000' SCATTERED, 3000' BROKEN, 2 1/2 SM IN LIGHT SNOW. THE COPLT AND I DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL THE WX IMPROVED BEFORE DEPARTING. AFTER WAITING 1 HR AT XY30 THE WX HAD IMPROVED TO 3000' BROKEN AND 5 SM VISIBILITY. THE PAX WERE GETTING ANXIOUS BECAUSE EVERYONE ELSE HAD LEFT, 'WHY COULDN'T WE?' APPROX 20 ACFT HAD LEFT BTWN XX30 AND XY30. I EXPLAINED TO THE PAX THAT CHARTERED FLTS ARE SUBJECT TO STRICTER TKOF MINIMUMS THAT OTHER ACFT. HOWEVER, AFTER 1 HR OF WAITING AND BEING THE LAST ACFT ON THE RAMP, THEY WERE QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THIS. I BEGAN TO DOUBT MYSELF AND SAID TO MY COPLT THAT VISIBILITY IS THE ONLY LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR TKOF. I SHOULD MENTION THAT THE COPLT IS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS EXPERIENCED THAT I AM AND RELATIVELY NEW TO CHARTER. THE COPLT RECOMMENDED THAT WE BOARD THE PAX AND TAXI OUT, BUT NOT DEPART UNTIL WE HAD THE REQUIRED CEILING OF 5000'. WE PROCEEDED TO DO THIS, BUT BY THE TIME WE GOT TO E RWY THERE WAS NO CHANGE. NOTHING MORE WAS SAID AND WE DEPARTED WITH THE CEILING BEING RPTED AS 3000' BROKEN AND A VISIBILITY OF 5 MI. WE DEPARTED ASE W/O ANY INCIDENT OR PROB AT ALL. THE FLT TO TEB WAS UNEVENTFUL WITH NO PROBS. THE FOLLOWING DAY I DECIDED TO RESEARCH TO SEE IF YOU ARE REQUIRED TO MEET BOTH CEILING AND VISIBILITY MINIMUMS PRIOR TO TKOF FOR 135 OPS. I DISCOVERED THAT YOU ARE REQUIRED TO MEET THESE MINIMUMS. ASE IS SURROUNDED BY MOUNTAINS AND THE DEP PROC REQUIRES YOU TO SEE THE MOUNTAINS IN ORDER TO TURN. I DO NOT FEEL THAT WE DID ANYTHING UNSAFE BECAUSE WE COULD CLEARLY SEE THE MOUNTAINS AND WERE ABLE TO MAKE THE REQUIRED TURNS. HOWEVER, I NOW REALIZE THAT THE 5000' MINIMUM IS REQUIRED SO YOU CAN SEE THE MOUNTAINS. AT THE TIME OF DEP I TRULY BELIEVE I WAS CORRECT IN NOT NEEDING A CEILING MINIMUM TO DEPART BECAUSE ALL OUR PREVIOUS MINIMUMS CONCERNED VISIBILITY ONLY. I THINK THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SITUATION: FIRST, I SHOULD HAVE BELIEVED IN MY COPLT DESPITE EXPERIENCE LEVEL. IF I HAD I WOULD HAVE FOUND OUT IF IT WAS OK OR NOT TO GO BEFORE ACTUALLY GOING. SECONDLY, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE INSISTENT WITH THE PAX. THE FACT THAT SOME OF THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED 20 ACFT THAT DEPARTED WERE ALSO CHARTERS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY WERE SMART OR LEGAL BY DEPARTING IN WX BELOW TKOF MINIMUMS. IN CONCLUSION, IN THE FUTURE I WILL NOT BE PRESSURED BY PAX INTO MAKING DECISIONS. I THINK THE PAX IMPATIENCE WEIGHED HEAVILY ON MY DECISION CAUSING ME TO DOUBT MYSELF. I ALSO HAVE A LOT MORE RESPECT FOR MY COPLT AND IF I DISAGREE WITH WHAT THEY ARE SAYING I WILL RESEARCH THE SITUATION THOROUGHLY BEFORE ACTING. I THINK I LEARNED A LOT FROM THIS SITUATION, BOTH OPERATIONALLY AND FROM A CREW COORD VIEWPOINT. I CERTAINLY THINK THAT THIS WILL HELP MAKE ME A SAFER PLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.