Narrative:

This incident was on an overwater segment of a flight from bda to rdu. The segment consisted of the reporting points: priss-swaps-emary-bacus. VHF radio contact with bermuda was lost just prior to priss and the position report was relayed to bermuda by another aircraft on VHF. We had established radio contact with ny oceanic and completed a SELCAL check on 11396 (primary) and 08846 (secondary) prior to priss. The aircraft was on autoplt and auxiliary navigation was engaged. Aircraft made a positive right turn at priss to a new heading toward swaps. An attempt was made to contact ny for a position report on 11396 but was delayed due to excessive radio communication by other aircraft and then by poor reception and transmission quality on the frequency. By the time the position report was made, we were approaching swaps, but the omega sets indicated a substantial difference in time to swaps from our original estimate. We plotted our position from the omega set and it indicated we were considerably south/west of our intended course. Since we had been tracking outbnd from bda until shortly before priss, we concluded our actual position could not be that far off course in such a short time. We selected man mode on the autoplt selector, using winds and the plotting chart. We determined that we were west of our intended position and set up a new heading to put us back on our course. We attempted contact with ny to advise of our situation and action, but were unable on primary HF. Eventually we were able to contact ny on secondary HF frequency, but only after we determined we were past emary intersection and approaching bacus. Ny advised us to maintain our altitude and heading and attempt contact with washington center on VHF, we established a line of position from dixon that confirmed our estimated position inbound to bacus. Shortly thereafter we established VHF contact with washington center and they confirmed our estimated crossing time at bacus on radar. Contributing factors to a potential navigation problem or traffic conflict include the inability to communication our problem with any ATC agency in a timely manner. HF communications on these short overwater segments is not adequate for relaying navigation problems with the proximity of arwys and enhanced communications and/or radar surveillance is a must for these operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT FLT ENROUTE BDA TO EAST COAST CITY DRIFTED OFF COURSE ON AUTO OMEGA. FLT CREW WENT MANUAL AND DEAD RECKONING BUT HAD COM DIFFICULTY WITH ZNY AND ZDC.

Narrative: THIS INCIDENT WAS ON AN OVERWATER SEGMENT OF A FLT FROM BDA TO RDU. THE SEGMENT CONSISTED OF THE RPTING POINTS: PRISS-SWAPS-EMARY-BACUS. VHF RADIO CONTACT WITH BERMUDA WAS LOST JUST PRIOR TO PRISS AND THE POSITION RPT WAS RELAYED TO BERMUDA BY ANOTHER ACFT ON VHF. WE HAD ESTABLISHED RADIO CONTACT WITH NY OCEANIC AND COMPLETED A SELCAL CHK ON 11396 (PRIMARY) AND 08846 (SECONDARY) PRIOR TO PRISS. THE ACFT WAS ON AUTOPLT AND AUX NAV WAS ENGAGED. ACFT MADE A POSITIVE R TURN AT PRISS TO A NEW HDG TOWARD SWAPS. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONTACT NY FOR A POS RPT ON 11396 BUT WAS DELAYED DUE TO EXCESSIVE RADIO COM BY OTHER ACFT AND THEN BY POOR RECEPTION AND XMISSION QUALITY ON THE FREQ. BY THE TIME THE POSITION RPT WAS MADE, WE WERE APCHING SWAPS, BUT THE OMEGA SETS INDICATED A SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE IN TIME TO SWAPS FROM OUR ORIGINAL ESTIMATE. WE PLOTTED OUR POSITION FROM THE OMEGA SET AND IT INDICATED WE WERE CONSIDERABLY S/W OF OUR INTENDED COURSE. SINCE WE HAD BEEN TRACKING OUTBND FROM BDA UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE PRISS, WE CONCLUDED OUR ACTUAL POSITION COULD NOT BE THAT FAR OFF COURSE IN SUCH A SHORT TIME. WE SELECTED MAN MODE ON THE AUTOPLT SELECTOR, USING WINDS AND THE PLOTTING CHART. WE DETERMINED THAT WE WERE W OF OUR INTENDED POSITION AND SET UP A NEW HDG TO PUT US BACK ON OUR COURSE. WE ATTEMPTED CONTACT WITH NY TO ADVISE OF OUR SITUATION AND ACTION, BUT WERE UNABLE ON PRIMARY HF. EVENTUALLY WE WERE ABLE TO CONTACT NY ON SECONDARY HF FREQ, BUT ONLY AFTER WE DETERMINED WE WERE PAST EMARY INTXN AND APCHING BACUS. NY ADVISED US TO MAINTAIN OUR ALT AND HDG AND ATTEMPT CONTACT WITH WASHINGTON CTR ON VHF, WE ESTABLISHED A LINE OF POSITION FROM DIXON THAT CONFIRMED OUR ESTIMATED POSITION INBND TO BACUS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE ESTABLISHED VHF CONTACT WITH WASHINGTON CTR AND THEY CONFIRMED OUR ESTIMATED XING TIME AT BACUS ON RADAR. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO A POTENTIAL NAV PROB OR TFC CONFLICT INCLUDE THE INABILITY TO COM OUR PROB WITH ANY ATC AGENCY IN A TIMELY MANNER. HF COMS ON THESE SHORT OVERWATER SEGMENTS IS NOT ADEQUATE FOR RELAYING NAV PROBS WITH THE PROX OF ARWYS AND ENHANCED COMS AND/OR RADAR SURVEILLANCE IS A MUST FOR THESE OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.