Narrative:

We were held high north of fim due crossing traffic, then cleared runway 24/25 profile descent to lax. We requested high speed and it was approved. We overshot the radial inbound to smo. The controller recognized this and reclred us, 'direct to smo, cross smo at 7000'.' in the vicinity of bayst intersection (slightly south due overshoot) we left 10000 for 7000'. Shortly thereafter the approach controller broadcast an urgent 'climb air carrier X, climb,' and 'traffic 12 O'clock, 1 mi at 9000'.' we initiated a prompt pull-up, went into VMC approximately 10000' and leveled at 11000'. Controller asked if we had seen the traffic. We replied, 'negative, we were IMC at the time of the alert.' we were then cleared to 7000'. After passing smo, we asked the controller if there had been a C/a at his station. He replied that he did not know, as he had come on duty only 30 seconds prior. We got his phone # for follow-up on the ground. No notice of any action on ATC's part was passed on to us as a result of the traffic alert. After landing, ground control passed another phone # to us. Captain called that # and got the watch supervisor. Was asked for his license # and was informed he would be contacted by FAA flight standards for leaving 10000' before bayst intersection. The usual clearance for this routing is the runway 24/25 profile descent, with a clearance to cross small transport at 7000' issued before bayst intersection. Our flight operations manual interprets the far's in this situation to require us to maintain 10000' until bayst intersection, then descend to cross smo at 7000'. Our flight operations manual also interprets the far's to allow us, in a situation as described in this event when off the arrival routing and reclred 'direct' to a fix, to descend from our last assigned altitude (10000') to the next assigned altitude (7000') with no requirement to pas over, in this situation, bayst intersection, or to resume the arrival routing until taking up the assigned heading after smo, which is what we did. We contend that the controller removed our 10000' restriction with the 'direct' clearance and, as a result, allowed this situation to develop. We found it to be very interesting that on a flight the following day with the same routing operated by this crew (except for F/east) that the 'usual' clearance had been slightly changed. The clearance for that flight was after fim runway 24/25 profile descent at bayst intersection, were reclred to cross smo at 7000'. If this is now the standard clearance, I applaud and think it will remove some of the confusion evident in the description of this event. As an aside, it has been this reporter's experience and observation that when conflicts of this nature occur between the operations conducted by a crew or the actions of a controller, that the FAA is much more likely to call the crew to task than it is a controller or the ATC system. I believe that this is true, and furthermore, believe it true because the FAA regulates, trains personnel for and operates the ATC system. Perhaps it is time to consider removing the FAA's responsibility to operate the ATC system and allow that function to be assumed by an independent agency, perhaps analogous in function to NASA. This might remove what is perceived by many as a bias by the FAA toward the ATC system and against operating crews. In this incident, the operating crew had been on duty approximately 6 hours and 15 mins, after a rest period of approximately 16 hours and 15 mins.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN 2 IFR ACFT. PLT DEVIATION OR ATC OPERATIONAL ERROR.

Narrative: WE WERE HELD HIGH N OF FIM DUE XING TFC, THEN CLRED RWY 24/25 PROFILE DSNT TO LAX. WE REQUESTED HIGH SPD AND IT WAS APPROVED. WE OVERSHOT THE RADIAL INBND TO SMO. THE CTLR RECOGNIZED THIS AND RECLRED US, 'DIRECT TO SMO, CROSS SMO AT 7000'.' IN THE VICINITY OF BAYST INTXN (SLIGHTLY S DUE OVERSHOOT) WE LEFT 10000 FOR 7000'. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE APCH CTLR BROADCAST AN URGENT 'CLB ACR X, CLB,' AND 'TFC 12 O'CLOCK, 1 MI AT 9000'.' WE INITIATED A PROMPT PULL-UP, WENT INTO VMC APPROX 10000' AND LEVELED AT 11000'. CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD SEEN THE TFC. WE REPLIED, 'NEGATIVE, WE WERE IMC AT THE TIME OF THE ALERT.' WE WERE THEN CLRED TO 7000'. AFTER PASSING SMO, WE ASKED THE CTLR IF THERE HAD BEEN A C/A AT HIS STATION. HE REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW, AS HE HAD COME ON DUTY ONLY 30 SECS PRIOR. WE GOT HIS PHONE # FOR FOLLOW-UP ON THE GND. NO NOTICE OF ANY ACTION ON ATC'S PART WAS PASSED ON TO US AS A RESULT OF THE TFC ALERT. AFTER LNDG, GND CTL PASSED ANOTHER PHONE # TO US. CAPT CALLED THAT # AND GOT THE WATCH SUPVR. WAS ASKED FOR HIS LICENSE # AND WAS INFORMED HE WOULD BE CONTACTED BY FAA FLT STANDARDS FOR LEAVING 10000' BEFORE BAYST INTXN. THE USUAL CLRNC FOR THIS RTING IS THE RWY 24/25 PROFILE DSNT, WITH A CLRNC TO CROSS SMT AT 7000' ISSUED BEFORE BAYST INTXN. OUR FLT OPS MANUAL INTERPRETS THE FAR'S IN THIS SITUATION TO REQUIRE US TO MAINTAIN 10000' UNTIL BAYST INTXN, THEN DSND TO CROSS SMO AT 7000'. OUR FLT OPS MANUAL ALSO INTERPRETS THE FAR'S TO ALLOW US, IN A SITUATION AS DESCRIBED IN THIS EVENT WHEN OFF THE ARR RTING AND RECLRED 'DIRECT' TO A FIX, TO DSND FROM OUR LAST ASSIGNED ALT (10000') TO THE NEXT ASSIGNED ALT (7000') WITH NO REQUIREMENT TO PAS OVER, IN THIS SITUATION, BAYST INTXN, OR TO RESUME THE ARR RTING UNTIL TAKING UP THE ASSIGNED HDG AFTER SMO, WHICH IS WHAT WE DID. WE CONTEND THAT THE CTLR REMOVED OUR 10000' RESTRICTION WITH THE 'DIRECT' CLRNC AND, AS A RESULT, ALLOWED THIS SITUATION TO DEVELOP. WE FOUND IT TO BE VERY INTERESTING THAT ON A FLT THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH THE SAME RTING OPERATED BY THIS CREW (EXCEPT FOR F/E) THAT THE 'USUAL' CLRNC HAD BEEN SLIGHTLY CHANGED. THE CLRNC FOR THAT FLT WAS AFTER FIM RWY 24/25 PROFILE DSNT AT BAYST INTXN, WERE RECLRED TO CROSS SMO AT 7000'. IF THIS IS NOW THE STANDARD CLRNC, I APPLAUD AND THINK IT WILL REMOVE SOME OF THE CONFUSION EVIDENT IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THIS EVENT. AS AN ASIDE, IT HAS BEEN THIS RPTR'S EXPERIENCE AND OBSERVATION THAT WHEN CONFLICTS OF THIS NATURE OCCUR BTWN THE OPS CONDUCTED BY A CREW OR THE ACTIONS OF A CTLR, THAT THE FAA IS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO CALL THE CREW TO TASK THAN IT IS A CTLR OR THE ATC SYS. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS TRUE, AND FURTHERMORE, BELIEVE IT TRUE BECAUSE THE FAA REGULATES, TRAINS PERSONNEL FOR AND OPERATES THE ATC SYS. PERHAPS IT IS TIME TO CONSIDER REMOVING THE FAA'S RESPONSIBILITY TO OPERATE THE ATC SYS AND ALLOW THAT FUNCTION TO BE ASSUMED BY AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY, PERHAPS ANALOGOUS IN FUNCTION TO NASA. THIS MIGHT REMOVE WHAT IS PERCEIVED BY MANY AS A BIAS BY THE FAA TOWARD THE ATC SYS AND AGAINST OPERATING CREWS. IN THIS INCIDENT, THE OPERATING CREW HAD BEEN ON DUTY APPROX 6 HRS AND 15 MINS, AFTER A REST PERIOD OF APPROX 16 HRS AND 15 MINS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.