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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1746350 |
Time | |
Date | 202006 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ATL.Airport |
State Reference | GA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Flight Instructor |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200 Flight Crew Total 25000 Flight Crew Type 3000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
During approach to atl we were vectored out of the class B airspace and told we would re-enter in 5 miles. The preceding aircraft was also vectored out of the class B. The ILS was functional and all aircraft were on IFR flight plans. I believe this was done by ATC in order to assign visual approaches. Part 121 IFR traffic should never be vectored out of the class B. This extremely unsafe practice defeats the entire purpose for having class B airspace. VFR traffic is excluded allowing the traffic to the class B anchor airport separation from each other. Class B airspace (then TCA) came into being due to the midair collision causing great loss of life in a similar situation. It is apparent ATC believes the requirement for aircraft operating within the mode C veil and under class B airspace to have ads-B out capability allows them to see all aircraft. This is simply not true. There are many aircraft types which can legally operate in this airspace without ads-B out capability. Gliders; ultralights and any part 91 aircraft never having had an electrical system are some of the types. A midair collision between an airliner on an IFR clearance and one of these VFR types operating legally in the airspace would be catastrophic. The presence of a part 91 aircraft required to have ads-B out capability but with an ads-B equipment failure unknown to the pilot in command would be another possibility. All of this is easily avoidable. Keep the traffic requiring the class B confined to that airspace as ATC is supposed to do. Do not have airliners outside of their protected airspace infringing on airspace where other traffic may be. The price of an error on the part of a controller; pilot or equipment is simply too high. We should have been kept in the class B and given clearance to fly the ILS we were told to expect and for which we were briefed and prepared.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air carrier Captain reported ATL TRACON vectors commercial aircraft outside of Class B airspace on approach.
Narrative: During approach to ATL we were vectored out of the Class B airspace and told we would re-enter in 5 miles. The preceding aircraft was also vectored out of the Class B. The ILS was functional and all aircraft were on IFR flight plans. I believe this was done by ATC in order to assign visual approaches. Part 121 IFR traffic should never be vectored out of the Class B. This extremely unsafe practice defeats the entire purpose for having Class B airspace. VFR traffic is excluded allowing the traffic to the Class B anchor airport separation from each other. Class B airspace (then TCA) came into being due to the midair collision causing great loss of life in a similar situation. It is apparent ATC believes the requirement for aircraft operating within the Mode C veil and under Class B airspace to have ADS-B Out capability allows them to see all aircraft. This is simply not true. There are many aircraft types which can legally operate in this airspace without ADS-B Out capability. Gliders; ultralights and any Part 91 aircraft never having had an electrical system are some of the types. A midair collision between an airliner on an IFR clearance and one of these VFR types operating legally in the airspace would be catastrophic. The presence of a Part 91 aircraft required to have ADS-B Out capability but with an ADS-B equipment failure unknown to the pilot in command would be another possibility. All of this is easily avoidable. Keep the traffic requiring the Class B confined to that airspace as ATC is supposed to do. Do not have airliners outside of their protected airspace infringing on airspace where other traffic may be. The price of an error on the part of a controller; pilot or equipment is simply too high. We should have been kept in the Class B and given clearance to fly the ILS we were told to expect and for which we were briefed and prepared.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.