Narrative:

Flight was scheduled to operate on aircraft X with MEL 28-X-xx which indicates that both center tank boost pumps are inoperative; thus limiting the usable fuel load to the wing tank capacity of 17.2. I planned the flight for a max fuel of 17.2 with 1.6 in tanker. Approximately 40 minutes before [the] scheduled departure time; the operations agent called to say he was unable to run weight and balance numbers due to an error message when attempting to enter the fuel information. He said he was getting an error when trying to put zero in the center tank column; and he couldn't leave it blank either; so he wasn't sure how to proceed. Because I was unfamiliar with the specific issue and the operations software; I transferred him to the ground operations coordinator for assistance.shortly after; he called back to say they were able to make it work by removing the tanker fuel and using the minimum planned fuel of 15.6; so I sent a new release for a departure fuel of 15.6. About 10 minutes after [the] scheduled departure time; the operations agent called again and said the fueler accidentally fueled the aircraft to the original planned 17.2 instead of the 15.6 indicated on release 2. I generated another release with a minimum planned fuel of 17.2 and moved the tanker fuel into dispatch add/contingency to prevent the earlier issue with tanker fuel. Operations called back again saying that he could not get the numbers to work again. He confirmed for the second time that the aircraft had 17.2 fob and no fuel in the center tank. Before sending him to the ground operations coordinator a second time; I suggested he try doing a manual weight and balance; and said I would run numbers on my end as well. I sent the captain an ACARS message informing him that I was calculating his takeoff numbers manually [and] asked if he'd like me to send them via ACARS. He said yes and that the operations agent was working on manual numbers as well. About 10 minutes later; the captain called and said the operations agent was new; and had told the captain he wasn't comfortable doing a manual weight and balance by himself; so he went to find another agent/supervisor to help. The captain then told me that he had instructed the fueler to put 500 lb. Of fuel in the center tank; even though the MEL specifically states that center tank fuel cannot be used and should not be planned; if not already present; due to no working boost pumps.upon receiving this information; I told the captain that I would send his weight and balance numbers; but I needed to speak with the operations agent again as soon as he returned because the aforementioned center tank fuel that I was previously told was not there; was indeed the problem and it needed to be moved into the ballast column in order to make the numbers work. A second operations agent called not long after and I explained to her that I needed to send another release with the center tank fuel in ballast; and that the wing tanks which I was originally told were full but were actually at 16.66; would need to be topped off in order to depart with fuel in the center tank. That would bring the planned departure fuel to 17.8; with 17.2 of that [being] usable fuel.the flight had still not departed 40 minutes later when the captain called to say they had just pushed the gate but needed to reduce the minimum fuel for takeoff by 300 lb. I agreed and sent him the amendment over ACARS while on the phone; and he then informed me that he; 'declined to have the wing tanks topped off because we're already so late and they overfueled us anyway;' then said he had to go and ended the call. Right after; I sent another ACARS message asking the captain to confirm water service had been completed if they were not airborne by XA57 per tarmac regulations. According to ACARS; the flight was airborne with 16.8 fob.the main issue here stems from poor communication between the ground crew/fuelers and operations; the captain and operations; and also between the captain and dispatch. It appears that neither the captain nor the fueler informed operations that fuel was added to the center tank; which explains why the agent kept getting an error when trying to perform the weight and balance. Had the captain informed the operations agent or the dispatcher of the center tank fuel and the fact that the wing tanks had not been filled; the paperwork could have been adjusted to reflect this and the delay would have been minimal; if at all. Another issue is that center tank fuel should not be added when the wing tanks are not full. The captain either did not read or did not comprehend the parameters of the MEL; which contributed to the delay.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Dispatcher reported poor communication between the various parties involved caused the aircraft to be fueled incorrectly.

Narrative: Flight was scheduled to operate on Aircraft X with MEL 28-X-XX which indicates that both center tank boost pumps are inoperative; thus limiting the usable fuel load to the wing tank capacity of 17.2. I planned the flight for a max fuel of 17.2 with 1.6 in tanker. Approximately 40 minutes before [the] scheduled departure time; the Operations Agent called to say he was unable to run weight and balance numbers due to an error message when attempting to enter the fuel information. He said he was getting an error when trying to put zero in the center tank column; and he couldn't leave it blank either; so he wasn't sure how to proceed. Because I was unfamiliar with the specific issue and the operations software; I transferred him to the Ground Operations Coordinator for assistance.Shortly after; he called back to say they were able to make it work by removing the tanker fuel and using the minimum planned fuel of 15.6; so I sent a new release for a departure fuel of 15.6. About 10 minutes after [the] scheduled departure time; the Operations Agent called again and said the Fueler accidentally fueled the aircraft to the original planned 17.2 instead of the 15.6 indicated on Release 2. I generated another release with a minimum planned fuel of 17.2 and moved the tanker fuel into dispatch add/contingency to prevent the earlier issue with tanker fuel. Operations called back again saying that he could not get the numbers to work again. He confirmed for the second time that the aircraft had 17.2 FOB and no fuel in the center tank. Before sending him to the Ground Operations Coordinator a second time; I suggested he try doing a manual weight and balance; and said I would run numbers on my end as well. I sent the Captain an ACARS message informing him that I was calculating his takeoff numbers manually [and] asked if he'd like me to send them via ACARS. He said yes and that the Operations Agent was working on manual numbers as well. About 10 minutes later; the Captain called and said the Operations Agent was new; and had told the Captain he wasn't comfortable doing a manual weight and balance by himself; so he went to find another Agent/Supervisor to help. The Captain then told me that he had instructed the Fueler to put 500 lb. of fuel in the center tank; even though the MEL specifically states that center tank fuel cannot be used and should not be planned; if not already present; due to no working boost pumps.Upon receiving this information; I told the Captain that I would send his weight and balance numbers; but I needed to speak with the Operations Agent again as soon as he returned because the aforementioned center tank fuel that I was previously told was not there; was indeed the problem and it needed to be moved into the ballast column in order to make the numbers work. A second Operations Agent called not long after and I explained to her that I needed to send another release with the center tank fuel in ballast; and that the wing tanks which I was originally told were full but were actually at 16.66; would need to be topped off in order to depart with fuel in the center tank. That would bring the planned departure fuel to 17.8; with 17.2 of that [being] usable fuel.The flight had still not departed 40 minutes later when the Captain called to say they had just pushed the gate but needed to reduce the minimum fuel for takeoff by 300 lb. I agreed and sent him the amendment over ACARS while on the phone; and he then informed me that he; 'Declined to have the wing tanks topped off because we're already so late and they overfueled us anyway;' then said he had to go and ended the call. Right after; I sent another ACARS message asking the Captain to confirm water service had been completed if they were not airborne by XA57 per tarmac regulations. According to ACARS; the flight was airborne with 16.8 FOB.The main issue here stems from poor communication between the ground crew/fuelers and Operations; the Captain and Operations; and also between the Captain and Dispatch. It appears that neither the Captain nor the fueler informed Operations that fuel was added to the center tank; which explains why the agent kept getting an error when trying to perform the weight and balance. Had the Captain informed the Operations Agent or the Dispatcher of the center tank fuel and the fact that the wing tanks had not been filled; the paperwork could have been adjusted to reflect this and the delay would have been minimal; if at all. Another issue is that center tank fuel should not be added when the wing tanks are not full. The Captain either did not read or did not comprehend the parameters of the MEL; which contributed to the delay.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.