Narrative:

Incident occurred at start of descent on tag northeast starr leading to keann arrival gate 50 denver. After crossing smity intersection we were cleared to descend at pilots discretion to cross keann intersection at 17000' MSL, speed our choice. Programming error of FMS resulted in off course track and being too high, too close to intended intersection to meet crossing restriction west/O off course vector. Factors involved: a very compentent first officer who was flying the plane, distraction caused by cabin crew member who was in conflict with other F/a's, lack of WX and traffic (sat afternoon), a programming error by first officer, my failure to x-chk input or track during critical phase of flight. F/a entree to denver ATIS. Using ATIS data, first officer programmed the approach and landing. He apparently hit wrong starr from key negating flight plan routing and substituting ioc intersection for keann intersection. I altered my normal cockpit discipline to handle a preceived problem and delayed other nonflt related duties (company calls, etc) until a more critical phase, just prior to descent. ATC noted the track error after smity and inquired. I immediately saw the problem and corrected but too late to meet crossing restriction west/O center vector. Conclusions: don't allow distrs to interfere with normal cockpit procedures and discipline. Always x-chk FMS programming and navigation progress no matter who is flying or how trusted they are. Demand both from myself and my first officer's that track and distance be monitored and compared with flight plan to help catch errors. I was in progress of reading checklist when asked by ATC what our heading was, as they often do for parallel vectors of aircraft. If he had said that we appeard to be diverging from flight plan route on his initial call, my response would have been more timely and may not have required vector to meet crossing restriction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG TRACK HEADING DEVIATION AT START OF STAR TO DEN ALSO ALT DEVIATION UNDERSHOT CROSSING RESTRICTION.

Narrative: INCIDENT OCCURRED AT START OF DSNT ON TAG NE STARR LEADING TO KEANN ARR GATE 50 DENVER. AFTER XING SMITY INTXN WE WERE CLRED TO DSND AT PLTS DISCRETION TO CROSS KEANN INTXN AT 17000' MSL, SPD OUR CHOICE. PROGRAMMING ERROR OF FMS RESULTED IN OFF COURSE TRACK AND BEING TOO HIGH, TOO CLOSE TO INTENDED INTXN TO MEET XING RESTRICTION W/O OFF COURSE VECTOR. FACTORS INVOLVED: A VERY COMPENTENT F/O WHO WAS FLYING THE PLANE, DISTR CAUSED BY CABIN CREW MEMBER WHO WAS IN CONFLICT WITH OTHER F/A'S, LACK OF WX AND TFC (SAT AFTERNOON), A PROGRAMMING ERROR BY F/O, MY FAILURE TO X-CHK INPUT OR TRACK DURING CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. F/A ENTREE TO DENVER ATIS. USING ATIS DATA, F/O PROGRAMMED THE APCH AND LNDG. HE APPARENTLY HIT WRONG STARR FROM KEY NEGATING FLT PLAN RTING AND SUBSTITUTING IOC INTXN FOR KEANN INTXN. I ALTERED MY NORMAL COCKPIT DISCIPLINE TO HANDLE A PRECEIVED PROB AND DELAYED OTHER NONFLT RELATED DUTIES (COMPANY CALLS, ETC) UNTIL A MORE CRITICAL PHASE, JUST PRIOR TO DSNT. ATC NOTED THE TRACK ERROR AFTER SMITY AND INQUIRED. I IMMEDIATELY SAW THE PROB AND CORRECTED BUT TOO LATE TO MEET XING RESTRICTION W/O CTR VECTOR. CONCLUSIONS: DON'T ALLOW DISTRS TO INTERFERE WITH NORMAL COCKPIT PROCS AND DISCIPLINE. ALWAYS X-CHK FMS PROGRAMMING AND NAV PROGRESS NO MATTER WHO IS FLYING OR HOW TRUSTED THEY ARE. DEMAND BOTH FROM MYSELF AND MY F/O'S THAT TRACK AND DISTANCE BE MONITORED AND COMPARED WITH FLT PLAN TO HELP CATCH ERRORS. I WAS IN PROGRESS OF READING CHKLIST WHEN ASKED BY ATC WHAT OUR HDG WAS, AS THEY OFTEN DO FOR PARALLEL VECTORS OF ACFT. IF HE HAD SAID THAT WE APPEARD TO BE DIVERGING FROM FLT PLAN RTE ON HIS INITIAL CALL, MY RESPONSE WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE TIMELY AND MAY NOT HAVE REQUIRED VECTOR TO MEET XING RESTRICTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.