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Attributes | |
ACN | 176741 |
Time | |
Date | 199104 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : dca |
State Reference | DC |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 150 agl bound upper : 150 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : dca |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Transport, High Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : go around |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : go around |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 5000 flight time type : 1800 |
ASRS Report | 176741 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : nmac non adherence : required legal separation non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took evasive action |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 0 vertical : 300 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
Air carrier X hpn dca landing runway 33 dca. VFR thunderstorms in the area with wind shear and gusts to 33 KTS. We were given landing clearance on 33 after an medium large transport cleared 36. The medium large transport cleared the runway an we were cleared to land. Air carrier Y on a visibility to 36 was told to continue. At 50-80' above the runway, air carrier X was given a go around. Air carrier Y was just over the threshold of runway 36. Air carrier Y answered the go around as we complied. At the intersection of 33/36, we crossed paths at approximately 200-300'. We were told this by shaken passenger. Due to the angle of the 2 runways, the workload of a go around and WX conditions, we did not see air carrier Y. Supplemental information from acn 176537: air carrier Y making a mt vernon visibility approach to runway 36 at dca. At approximately 4-5 mi out, we were advised of air carrier X making an approach to runway 33. We spotted air carrier X when we were about 1 mi out. From that point on, the captain, first officer, and an ATC evaluator who was riding the jump seat made comments that it looked like we would be very close. At 300' AGL, I asked the tower if we were cleared to land. He answered, 'negative, continue approach.' I then informed the first officer PF to expect a go around. At this point, it was obvious that one of us had to go around. At approximately 150' AGL, I heard the words from the tower, 'go around.' I immediately told the first officer to around and advised the tower we were going around. He then told the other aircraft to go around and said, '...cleared to land--ah, I guess you already are going around.' needless to say, we encountered mass communication failure, including some communication blockage. On the go, we started a turn to the right and the other aircraft made a go around straight ahead. At no time did we come dangerously close. As a side note, we were given an altitude, at least 3 heading changes and a frequency change during a period of about 30-45 seconds on a very busy go around. Under the circumstances, I feel we took the proper course of action. At 150' is not the proper time for a decision on who is going around and who is going to land. Some observations: 1) there were very heavy communications during this entire approach with several blocking xmissions. 2) by 300' in a situation like this, some determination should have been made--not the 'continue approach' that we received. 3) at 150' there is no time to ask, 'who was that last transmission for?' 4) it might be helpful to publish on the visibility approach page an expected visibility missed approach procedure. This could be set up ahead of time in the sophisticated aircraft that we fly today, thus reducing workload.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR X HAD NMAC, LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION FROM ACR Y. SYSTEM ERROR.
Narrative: ACR X HPN DCA LNDG RWY 33 DCA. VFR TSTMS IN THE AREA WITH WIND SHEAR AND GUSTS TO 33 KTS. WE WERE GIVEN LNDG CLRNC ON 33 AFTER AN MLG CLRED 36. THE MLG CLRED THE RWY AN WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. ACR Y ON A VIS TO 36 WAS TOLD TO CONTINUE. AT 50-80' ABOVE THE RWY, ACR X WAS GIVEN A GAR. ACR Y WAS JUST OVER THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 36. ACR Y ANSWERED THE GAR AS WE COMPLIED. AT THE INTXN OF 33/36, WE CROSSED PATHS AT APPROX 200-300'. WE WERE TOLD THIS BY SHAKEN PAX. DUE TO THE ANGLE OF THE 2 RWYS, THE WORKLOAD OF A GAR AND WX CONDITIONS, WE DID NOT SEE ACR Y. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 176537: ACR Y MAKING A MT VERNON VIS APCH TO RWY 36 AT DCA. AT APPROX 4-5 MI OUT, WE WERE ADVISED OF ACR X MAKING AN APCH TO RWY 33. WE SPOTTED ACR X WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 1 MI OUT. FROM THAT POINT ON, THE CAPT, F/O, AND AN ATC EVALUATOR WHO WAS RIDING THE JUMP SEAT MADE COMMENTS THAT IT LOOKED LIKE WE WOULD BE VERY CLOSE. AT 300' AGL, I ASKED THE TWR IF WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. HE ANSWERED, 'NEGATIVE, CONTINUE APCH.' I THEN INFORMED THE F/O PF TO EXPECT A GAR. AT THIS POINT, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT ONE OF US HAD TO GO AROUND. AT APPROX 150' AGL, I HEARD THE WORDS FROM THE TWR, 'GO AROUND.' I IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE F/O TO AROUND AND ADVISED THE TWR WE WERE GOING AROUND. HE THEN TOLD THE OTHER ACFT TO GO AROUND AND SAID, '...CLRED TO LAND--AH, I GUESS YOU ALREADY ARE GOING AROUND.' NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE ENCOUNTERED MASS COM FAILURE, INCLUDING SOME COM BLOCKAGE. ON THE GO, WE STARTED A TURN TO THE RIGHT AND THE OTHER ACFT MADE A GO AROUND STRAIGHT AHEAD. AT NO TIME DID WE COME DANGEROUSLY CLOSE. AS A SIDE NOTE, WE WERE GIVEN AN ALT, AT LEAST 3 HDG CHANGES AND A FREQ CHANGE DURING A PERIOD OF ABOUT 30-45 SECS ON A VERY BUSY GAR. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I FEEL WE TOOK THE PROPER COURSE OF ACTION. AT 150' IS NOT THE PROPER TIME FOR A DECISION ON WHO IS GOING AROUND AND WHO IS GOING TO LAND. SOME OBSERVATIONS: 1) THERE WERE VERY HEAVY COMS DURING THIS ENTIRE APCH WITH SEVERAL BLOCKING XMISSIONS. 2) BY 300' IN A SITUATION LIKE THIS, SOME DETERMINATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE--NOT THE 'CONTINUE APCH' THAT WE RECEIVED. 3) AT 150' THERE IS NO TIME TO ASK, 'WHO WAS THAT LAST XMISSION FOR?' 4) IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO PUBLISH ON THE VIS APCH PAGE AN EXPECTED VIS MISSED APCH PROC. THIS COULD BE SET UP AHEAD OF TIME IN THE SOPHISTICATED ACFT THAT WE FLY TODAY, THUS REDUCING WORKLOAD.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.