Narrative:

I was the captain of flight from pit to sfo in 5/91. First officer was at the controls on this leg of the trip. I picked up the arrival ATIS for sfo over modesto. The airport was VFR and visibility approachs were being conducted to runway 28L and quiet bridge approachs to runway 28R. The 28L localizer was reported to be off the air. Upon contacting bay approach control, we were cleared for a quiet bridge approach to runway 28R. Approach control advised us that we were following a heavy to runway 28R and an medium large transport was for runway 28L, and to report medium large transport in sight. We reported medium large transport in sight. Over or slightly inside the san mateo bridge approach, approach control turned us over to sfo tower. Tower cleared us to land on runway 28R and we also heard the tower clear medium large transport flight to land on left runway. Once inside the bridge we started to transition to the runway 28R ILS and began to fully configure the aircraft for landing. The medium large transport flight was off to our left and slightly higher than we were. From our angle to medium large transport and to the runway, it appeared that everything was normal for our approach. First officer did comment that medium large transport looked a little high to him. We were on G/south but had not intercepted the 28R localizer as yet. I commented that medium large transport appeared to be slowing and was attempting to acquire the G/south, forgetting the fact that the 28L ILS was OTS. We completed the landing checklist, and as we slowed to the sal bug the automatic throttles let the speed decay to below the bug before applying a large amount of power to get back on speed. This sudden surge of power distracted both first officer and I. We had both been watching medium large transport and it took a few seconds to realize what the automatic throttles were attempting to do. When we looked out again at medium large transport, he appeared to be crowding us. Both the medium large transport flight and we realized at the same moment that a conflict did exist. Medium large transport banked sharply to the left and climbed approximately 50' above us. We started to bank to the right and I told first officer to stop the turn as medium large transport was safely off to our left. As medium large transport banked to the left he asked the tower for verification of his runway. Tower replied 28L, and medium large transport landed on 28L. We were never outside a normal landing profile and touched down on 28R at the thousand foot marker on speed. During taxi-in, first officer had operations get the phone # for gate, which was medium large transport flight gate. As our passenger were deplaning, several stopped at the cockpit door and commented on the apparent closeness of the medium large transport flight. First officer placed a call to the medium large transport gate and when the captain came on the line I asked him what type of clearance did he think he had received from approach control. He said, 'I thought we received a clearance for a visibility approach to runway 28R, but obviously I was wrong. I had a new copilot with me, but that is no excuse. We were in the wrong. My copilot said he never saw you until we banked away to the left.' he also said he had several irate passenger stop by the cockpit, one of which wanted to talk to an FAA official. Upon reaching san diego, I called pit and talked to a dispatcher. I gave him all the details of the incident. The medium large transport captain called me at home and stated that someone had called the media who in turn had called his company with questions about the incident. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter states that after the incident the first officer was on a bus with some of the passenger from the other flight. Since he was in uniform, they quizzed him and he stated, 'yes, he did know something about the incident.' he explained what had happened and helped to 'defuse' their anger. Apparently the other captain got some time off. Reporter aware of this as his company chief pilot was in contact with other company chief pilot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR ON VISUAL APCH HAS NMAC WITH ACFT ASSIGNED TO PARALLEL RWY.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT OF FLT FROM PIT TO SFO IN 5/91. F/O WAS AT THE CTLS ON THIS LEG OF THE TRIP. I PICKED UP THE ARR ATIS FOR SFO OVER MODESTO. THE ARPT WAS VFR AND VIS APCHS WERE BEING CONDUCTED TO RWY 28L AND QUIET BRIDGE APCHS TO RWY 28R. THE 28L LOC WAS RPTED TO BE OFF THE AIR. UPON CONTACTING BAY APCH CTL, WE WERE CLRED FOR A QUIET BRIDGE APCH TO RWY 28R. APCH CTL ADVISED US THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING A HEAVY TO RWY 28R AND AN MLG WAS FOR RWY 28L, AND TO RPT MLG IN SIGHT. WE RPTED MLG IN SIGHT. OVER OR SLIGHTLY INSIDE THE SAN MATEO BRIDGE APCH, APCH CTL TURNED US OVER TO SFO TWR. TWR CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 28R AND WE ALSO HEARD THE TWR CLR MLG FLT TO LAND ON LEFT RWY. ONCE INSIDE THE BRIDGE WE STARTED TO TRANSITION TO THE RWY 28R ILS AND BEGAN TO FULLY CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR LNDG. THE MLG FLT WAS OFF TO OUR LEFT AND SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN WE WERE. FROM OUR ANGLE TO MLG AND TO THE RWY, IT APPEARED THAT EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL FOR OUR APCH. F/O DID COMMENT THAT MLG LOOKED A LITTLE HIGH TO HIM. WE WERE ON G/S BUT HAD NOT INTERCEPTED THE 28R LOC AS YET. I COMMENTED THAT MLG APPEARED TO BE SLOWING AND WAS ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE THE G/S, FORGETTING THE FACT THAT THE 28L ILS WAS OTS. WE COMPLETED THE LNDG CHKLIST, AND AS WE SLOWED TO THE SAL BUG THE AUTO THROTTLES LET THE SPD DECAY TO BELOW THE BUG BEFORE APPLYING A LARGE AMOUNT OF PWR TO GET BACK ON SPD. THIS SUDDEN SURGE OF PWR DISTRACTED BOTH F/O AND I. WE HAD BOTH BEEN WATCHING MLG AND IT TOOK A FEW SECS TO REALIZE WHAT THE AUTO THROTTLES WERE ATTEMPTING TO DO. WHEN WE LOOKED OUT AGAIN AT MLG, HE APPEARED TO BE CROWDING US. BOTH THE MLG FLT AND WE REALIZED AT THE SAME MOMENT THAT A CONFLICT DID EXIST. MLG BANKED SHARPLY TO THE LEFT AND CLBED APPROX 50' ABOVE US. WE STARTED TO BANK TO THE RIGHT AND I TOLD F/O TO STOP THE TURN AS MLG WAS SAFELY OFF TO OUR LEFT. AS MLG BANKED TO THE LEFT HE ASKED THE TWR FOR VERIFICATION OF HIS RWY. TWR REPLIED 28L, AND MLG LANDED ON 28L. WE WERE NEVER OUTSIDE A NORMAL LNDG PROFILE AND TOUCHED DOWN ON 28R AT THE THOUSAND FOOT MARKER ON SPD. DURING TAXI-IN, F/O HAD OPS GET THE PHONE # FOR GATE, WHICH WAS MLG FLT GATE. AS OUR PAX WERE DEPLANING, SEVERAL STOPPED AT THE COCKPIT DOOR AND COMMENTED ON THE APPARENT CLOSENESS OF THE MLG FLT. F/O PLACED A CALL TO THE MLG GATE AND WHEN THE CAPT CAME ON THE LINE I ASKED HIM WHAT TYPE OF CLRNC DID HE THINK HE HAD RECEIVED FROM APCH CTL. HE SAID, 'I THOUGHT WE RECEIVED A CLRNC FOR A VIS APCH TO RWY 28R, BUT OBVIOUSLY I WAS WRONG. I HAD A NEW COPLT WITH ME, BUT THAT IS NO EXCUSE. WE WERE IN THE WRONG. MY COPLT SAID HE NEVER SAW YOU UNTIL WE BANKED AWAY TO THE LEFT.' HE ALSO SAID HE HAD SEVERAL IRATE PAX STOP BY THE COCKPIT, ONE OF WHICH WANTED TO TALK TO AN FAA OFFICIAL. UPON REACHING SAN DIEGO, I CALLED PIT AND TALKED TO A DISPATCHER. I GAVE HIM ALL THE DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT. THE MLG CAPT CALLED ME AT HOME AND STATED THAT SOMEONE HAD CALLED THE MEDIA WHO IN TURN HAD CALLED HIS COMPANY WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATES THAT AFTER THE INCIDENT THE F/O WAS ON A BUS WITH SOME OF THE PAX FROM THE OTHER FLT. SINCE HE WAS IN UNIFORM, THEY QUIZZED HIM AND HE STATED, 'YES, HE DID KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT THE INCIDENT.' HE EXPLAINED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND HELPED TO 'DEFUSE' THEIR ANGER. APPARENTLY THE OTHER CAPT GOT SOME TIME OFF. RPTR AWARE OF THIS AS HIS COMPANY CHIEF PLT WAS IN CONTACT WITH OTHER COMPANY CHIEF PLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.