Narrative:

This is going to read like your classic screw-up: at push time, load planning still waiting to hear from ramp re: cargo weight. All 3 bell doors open; lots of mail being loaded. Company operations manual states that a 2-M crew aircraft should wait at gate until load close-out is received. However, at the discretion of the captain, one can begin to taxi, but should be stopped while receiving the #south. (The first officer must handwrite 10 lines and read back 3.) the norm is to taxi west/O the #south if the distance to taxi and the first officer's experience level will not cause haste. Airport construction. Several closed txwys. Ground control's clearance confusion. I was half listening to first officer when he said, 'boy, the payload sure dropped off' (clue #1). I was half listening because the taxiway I was supposed to hold short of I couldn't get to because of construction. Forgot to get the payload from first officer to get a rough check of gross weight. This is not a company requirement, but good sense. Asked first officer how much the maximum takeoff weight for the use of flex power. He said 7000 pounds. We used flex. He made takeoff and remarked how nose heavy the stabilizer trim was (clue #2). The computer gross weight had been entered in pms. Climb to FL310 encountered engine/airframe ice. Climb was a little slow, but attributed to bleed air losses from ice protection (clue #3?). Still in icing at FL310. Pms computer indicated climb to FL370 ok; flight plan, based on expected weight said not for another hour (clue #4?). Company operations requires new flight plan if weight is heavier by a certain amount, not lighter. To request a new flight plan at push time would be rare, indeed. Anyhow, autoplt/pms (vertical performance management system) flying aircraft in attempted climb to F370. Speed low; crew figures it was because of power loss from ice protection at high altitude (clue #5?). Aircraft couldn't get above FL360. Speed down to almost minimum holding (mach). Wings started to rock back and forth (big clue #6--crew started to wake up to situation). I told first officer to turn off autoplt. He did. Rocking ceased. Aircraft started to lose altitude. I didn't know if it was his input or not. My question was answered when he grabbed microphone and requested a block altitude from ATC of FL350-370. They could not--crossing traffic. Crew now aware that aircraft was losing altitude no matter what. I requested clearance back to FL330 and it was approved. With sweaty hands the weight manifest was reexamined--and there it was: payload 11344 pounds, 15 passenger. No way, unless they were all midgets. I'll bet the experienced load planner left out the passenger weight or made a 10000# error. 20 yrs ago, the freighters I flew had a means to measure the weight and percent of mac (balance). One can make a case for such a system on a freighter. I wonder if a similar case could be made for passenger aircraft? Who said experience is the best teacher? He should've spoken with the person who said, 'with experience comes complacency.' I liked what the first officer said: 'you gotta fly the aircraft with the idea that everybody out there it trying to kill you.' amen. It is obvious that we should not have attempted the aircraft to FL370, but that is not all. Because of the weight difference, flex power might not have been used, or at least adjusted up. V speeds were wrong by about 10 KTS. Stabilizer trim setting is wrong. Flap setting wrong. Second segment climb would most likely have been a descent.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG DEPARTS BHM WITH INACCURATE WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA, DISCOVERS THE PROBLEM THROUGH NEAR LOSS OF ACFT CTL ATTEMPTING CLIMB TO FL370.

Narrative: THIS IS GOING TO READ LIKE YOUR CLASSIC SCREW-UP: AT PUSH TIME, LOAD PLANNING STILL WAITING TO HEAR FROM RAMP RE: CARGO WT. ALL 3 BELL DOORS OPEN; LOTS OF MAIL BEING LOADED. COMPANY OPS MANUAL STATES THAT A 2-M CREW ACFT SHOULD WAIT AT GATE UNTIL LOAD CLOSE-OUT IS RECEIVED. HOWEVER, AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CAPT, ONE CAN BEGIN TO TAXI, BUT SHOULD BE STOPPED WHILE RECEIVING THE #S. (THE F/O MUST HANDWRITE 10 LINES AND READ BACK 3.) THE NORM IS TO TAXI W/O THE #S IF THE DISTANCE TO TAXI AND THE F/O'S EXPERIENCE LEVEL WILL NOT CAUSE HASTE. ARPT CONSTRUCTION. SEVERAL CLOSED TXWYS. GND CTL'S CLRNC CONFUSION. I WAS HALF LISTENING TO F/O WHEN HE SAID, 'BOY, THE PAYLOAD SURE DROPPED OFF' (CLUE #1). I WAS HALF LISTENING BECAUSE THE TXWY I WAS SUPPOSED TO HOLD SHORT OF I COULDN'T GET TO BECAUSE OF CONSTRUCTION. FORGOT TO GET THE PAYLOAD FROM F/O TO GET A ROUGH CHK OF GROSS WT. THIS IS NOT A COMPANY REQUIREMENT, BUT GOOD SENSE. ASKED F/O HOW MUCH THE MAX TKOF WT FOR THE USE OF FLEX PWR. HE SAID 7000 LBS. WE USED FLEX. HE MADE TKOF AND REMARKED HOW NOSE HEAVY THE STABILIZER TRIM WAS (CLUE #2). THE COMPUTER GROSS WT HAD BEEN ENTERED IN PMS. CLB TO FL310 ENCOUNTERED ENG/AIRFRAME ICE. CLB WAS A LITTLE SLOW, BUT ATTRIBUTED TO BLEED AIR LOSSES FROM ICE PROTECTION (CLUE #3?). STILL IN ICING AT FL310. PMS COMPUTER INDICATED CLB TO FL370 OK; FLT PLAN, BASED ON EXPECTED WT SAID NOT FOR ANOTHER HR (CLUE #4?). COMPANY OPS REQUIRES NEW FLT PLAN IF WT IS HEAVIER BY A CERTAIN AMOUNT, NOT LIGHTER. TO REQUEST A NEW FLT PLAN AT PUSH TIME WOULD BE RARE, INDEED. ANYHOW, AUTOPLT/PMS (VERT PERFORMANCE MGMNT SYS) FLYING ACFT IN ATTEMPTED CLB TO F370. SPD LOW; CREW FIGURES IT WAS BECAUSE OF PWR LOSS FROM ICE PROTECTION AT HIGH ALT (CLUE #5?). ACFT COULDN'T GET ABOVE FL360. SPD DOWN TO ALMOST MINIMUM HOLDING (MACH). WINGS STARTED TO ROCK BACK AND FORTH (BIG CLUE #6--CREW STARTED TO WAKE UP TO SITUATION). I TOLD F/O TO TURN OFF AUTOPLT. HE DID. ROCKING CEASED. ACFT STARTED TO LOSE ALT. I DIDN'T KNOW IF IT WAS HIS INPUT OR NOT. MY QUESTION WAS ANSWERED WHEN HE GRABBED MIC AND REQUESTED A BLOCK ALT FROM ATC OF FL350-370. THEY COULD NOT--XING TFC. CREW NOW AWARE THAT ACFT WAS LOSING ALT NO MATTER WHAT. I REQUESTED CLRNC BACK TO FL330 AND IT WAS APPROVED. WITH SWEATY HANDS THE WT MANIFEST WAS REEXAMINED--AND THERE IT WAS: PAYLOAD 11344 LBS, 15 PAX. NO WAY, UNLESS THEY WERE ALL MIDGETS. I'LL BET THE EXPERIENCED LOAD PLANNER LEFT OUT THE PAX WT OR MADE A 10000# ERROR. 20 YRS AGO, THE FREIGHTERS I FLEW HAD A MEANS TO MEASURE THE WT AND PERCENT OF MAC (BALANCE). ONE CAN MAKE A CASE FOR SUCH A SYS ON A FREIGHTER. I WONDER IF A SIMILAR CASE COULD BE MADE FOR PAX ACFT? WHO SAID EXPERIENCE IS THE BEST TEACHER? HE SHOULD'VE SPOKEN WITH THE PERSON WHO SAID, 'WITH EXPERIENCE COMES COMPLACENCY.' I LIKED WHAT THE F/O SAID: 'YOU GOTTA FLY THE ACFT WITH THE IDEA THAT EVERYBODY OUT THERE IT TRYING TO KILL YOU.' AMEN. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT WE SHOULD NOT HAVE ATTEMPTED THE ACFT TO FL370, BUT THAT IS NOT ALL. BECAUSE OF THE WT DIFFERENCE, FLEX PWR MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN USED, OR AT LEAST ADJUSTED UP. V SPDS WERE WRONG BY ABOUT 10 KTS. STABILIZER TRIM SETTING IS WRONG. FLAP SETTING WRONG. SECOND SEGMENT CLB WOULD MOST LIKELY HAVE BEEN A DSNT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.