Narrative:

I was working the local control position at hnl tower. I have given mlt X that had landed on runway 4R a left turn at taxiway echo to cross runway 4L, turn left onto bravo taxiway and hold short of runway 8L at the approach end. The aircraft acknowledged and I cleared air carrier Y for takeoff on runway 8L. I then directed my attention to the ofdeps keyboard in order to enter a departure message on air carrier Y that I had just cleared for takeoff. As I glanced up, I saw mlt X in the middle of runway 8L at kilo taxiway, with air carrier Y rolling down the runway toward him. I immediately cancelled the takeoff clearance on air carrier Y, and he came to a stop before delta taxiway. I feel that a # of things contributed to this incident, the first being the fact that txwys are not very well marked at hnl. This may have contributed to the aircraft turning into the wrong taxiway and entering the runway. The second item that I feel contributed to this incident is the fact that we are required to manually input departure times on all IFR departures, when in fact the capability exists to have this done automatically through the ARTS when target acquisition occurs. This means for every departure, the controller's attention is diverted from where it should be, and that is scanning the airport area. I know for a fact that had I not been entering a departure message, that I would have observed mlt X turning into kilo taxiway and would have been able to stop him from entering the runway. This would have prevented this incident and this report. Another item that I feel contributed to this incident is the staffing and scheduling practices at hnl tower. At the time of the incident. There were only 2 controllers on duty. I was working the local position, which was combined with cabin attendant coordinator and all radar positions. The other controller was working ground control which was combined with clearance delivery and flight data. He was busy with obtaining oceanic clrncs and as such was not available as an extra set of eyes in the tower. Due to staffing shortages, and no money available for overtime, or pcs money available to bring in additional controllers, the management has been slowly reducing the # of controllers assigned to each shift. This particular shift used to have 3-4 controllers assigned, but has dropped to just 2. To prevent a similar occurrence, I believe that ofdeps departure messages should be automated since the technology exists to do so. This will eliminate the constant distraction that occurs with each departure. I also feel that the staffing of evening and mid watches needs to be returned to 'normal' levels. Working with minimal staffing eliminates that extra set of eyes available to detect abnormalities and as such is compromising safety and will allow incidents such as this to recur. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter stated he has 8 yrs radar experience. Reporter said the reason the tower has to departure message (dm) the departures is the center east ARTS does not interface with the center ofdeps equipment. Staffing problem: there are 3 operational personnel on duty. The supervisor is supposed to work an operational position. He was working on paperwork and combined the positions. The reporter stated the airport signage was not really a problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLT X NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC. UNAUTHORIZED RWY ENTRY HAD LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION FROM ACR Y.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE LCL CTL POS AT HNL TWR. I HAVE GIVEN MLT X THAT HAD LANDED ON RWY 4R A LEFT TURN AT TXWY ECHO TO CROSS RWY 4L, TURN LEFT ONTO BRAVO TXWY AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 8L AT THE APCH END. THE ACFT ACKNOWLEDGED AND I CLRED ACR Y FOR TKOF ON RWY 8L. I THEN DIRECTED MY ATTN TO THE OFDEPS KEYBOARD IN ORDER TO ENTER A DEP MESSAGE ON ACR Y THAT I HAD JUST CLRED FOR TKOF. AS I GLANCED UP, I SAW MLT X IN THE MIDDLE OF RWY 8L AT KILO TXWY, WITH ACR Y ROLLING DOWN THE RWY TOWARD HIM. I IMMEDIATELY CANCELLED THE TKOF CLRNC ON ACR Y, AND HE CAME TO A STOP BEFORE DELTA TXWY. I FEEL THAT A # OF THINGS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT, THE FIRST BEING THE FACT THAT TXWYS ARE NOT VERY WELL MARKED AT HNL. THIS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACFT TURNING INTO THE WRONG TXWY AND ENTERING THE RWY. THE SECOND ITEM THAT I FEEL CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT IS THE FACT THAT WE ARE REQUIRED TO MANUALLY INPUT DEP TIMES ON ALL IFR DEPS, WHEN IN FACT THE CAPABILITY EXISTS TO HAVE THIS DONE AUTOMATICALLY THROUGH THE ARTS WHEN TARGET ACQUISITION OCCURS. THIS MEANS FOR EVERY DEP, THE CTLR'S ATTN IS DIVERTED FROM WHERE IT SHOULD BE, AND THAT IS SCANNING THE ARPT AREA. I KNOW FOR A FACT THAT HAD I NOT BEEN ENTERING A DEP MESSAGE, THAT I WOULD HAVE OBSERVED MLT X TURNING INTO KILO TXWY AND WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO STOP HIM FROM ENTERING THE RWY. THIS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT AND THIS RPT. ANOTHER ITEM THAT I FEEL CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT IS THE STAFFING AND SCHEDULING PRACTICES AT HNL TWR. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. THERE WERE ONLY 2 CTLRS ON DUTY. I WAS WORKING THE LCL POS, WHICH WAS COMBINED WITH CAB COORDINATOR AND ALL RADAR POSITIONS. THE OTHER CTLR WAS WORKING GND CTL WHICH WAS COMBINED WITH CLRNC DELIVERY AND FLT DATA. HE WAS BUSY WITH OBTAINING OCEANIC CLRNCS AND AS SUCH WAS NOT AVAILABLE AS AN EXTRA SET OF EYES IN THE TWR. DUE TO STAFFING SHORTAGES, AND NO MONEY AVAILABLE FOR OVERTIME, OR PCS MONEY AVAILABLE TO BRING IN ADDITIONAL CTLRS, THE MGMNT HAS BEEN SLOWLY REDUCING THE # OF CTLRS ASSIGNED TO EACH SHIFT. THIS PARTICULAR SHIFT USED TO HAVE 3-4 CTLRS ASSIGNED, BUT HAS DROPPED TO JUST 2. TO PREVENT A SIMILAR OCCURRENCE, I BELIEVE THAT OFDEPS DEP MESSAGES SHOULD BE AUTOMATED SINCE THE TECHNOLOGY EXISTS TO DO SO. THIS WILL ELIMINATE THE CONSTANT DISTR THAT OCCURS WITH EACH DEP. I ALSO FEEL THAT THE STAFFING OF EVENING AND MID WATCHES NEEDS TO BE RETURNED TO 'NORMAL' LEVELS. WORKING WITH MINIMAL STAFFING ELIMINATES THAT EXTRA SET OF EYES AVAILABLE TO DETECT ABNORMALITIES AND AS SUCH IS COMPROMISING SAFETY AND WILL ALLOW INCIDENTS SUCH AS THIS TO RECUR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATED HE HAS 8 YRS RADAR EXPERIENCE. RPTR SAID THE REASON THE TWR HAS TO DEP MESSAGE (DM) THE DEPS IS THE CENTER E ARTS DOES NOT INTERFACE WITH THE CENTER OFDEPS EQUIP. STAFFING PROB: THERE ARE 3 OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ON DUTY. THE SUPVR IS SUPPOSED TO WORK AN OPERATIONAL POS. HE WAS WORKING ON PAPERWORK AND COMBINED THE POSITIONS. THE RPTR STATED THE ARPT SIGNAGE WAS NOT REALLY A PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.