Narrative:

On night of 7/91, I was PIC of an light transport jet out of phl. The cmh area was experiencing thunderstorms. The cmh ATIS reported 2 mi visibility and a 2500' broken ceiling. As we were vectored to intercept the localizer, we were in the clear and could see several lightning strikes between us and the airport. The airport and the area 1/2 mi west of it was obscured by heavy rain. I asked for the runway lights on full intensity and my copilot conveyed the request to the tower. They did not acknowledge. I asked him to confirm the lights were on high. Tower acknowledged, 'runway lights are on step 7--do you want the flashers?' I don't remember reply. The needles were centered, gear was down and locked, flaps 20 degrees. We were at a normal speed in the proper approach confign, and in a position from which a normal landing could easily be made. No yet at DH, we had the runway in sight, though we were now entering moderate rain. As I went visibility the intensity of the rain greatly increased. First officer called we were drifting right. I corrected and we were now crossing the threshold. The rain was gushing over the windshield (windshield heat was on) making the runway lights difficult to interpret. I leveled off carrying a small amount of power, in hopes the intensity of the rain would subside. Depth and height perception were almost impossible to determine due to the glare of the runway lights and extremely heavy precipitation. About 1/4 of the way down the runway I pulled the references together and touched down. The last speed callout I remember was 'minus 5.' during and after the T/D the rain again because so heavy it was nearly impossible to interpret (visually) the separate side of runways lights. I pointed the nose directly into the center of the glare and braked evenly. From the side loads I could feel we were being pulled to the left. First officer noted this with a 'steer right,' which I did, very heavily steered right. I felt the impact of at least 1 runway light and the bumpy ride left no doubt we were off the left side of the pavement. I continued steering right and using heavy differential braking. Visibility through the windshield at this time was only a bright light glare through heavy gushing water. We were decelerating when the nose turned sharply left with an abrupt side impact and we came to a complete stop. Even then the windshield was so flooded that from inside I could not determine our position relative to the runway. We exited and ran north away from the aircraft. Within 1 min, an airport veh (station wagon) was heading toward us. Runway centerline lighting, windshield wipers on the aircraft and perhaps the runway light should have been requested to medium intensity rather than high to reduce glare to avoid the situation. I believe a missed approach would have been the most prudent solution. Supplemental information from acn 182541: we were at about reference+10 as the flare began. The extra speed was necessary because we had only extended 20 degrees of flaps. The captain had delayed calling for full flaps due to the WX. As we got closer to the ground, it became very difficult to judge height or depth. The captain carried a small amount of power for insurance as he felt for the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATX LTT RWY EXCURSION LNDG IN HEAVY RAIN.

Narrative: ON NIGHT OF 7/91, I WAS PIC OF AN LTT JET OUT OF PHL. THE CMH AREA WAS EXPERIENCING TSTMS. THE CMH ATIS RPTED 2 MI VISIBILITY AND A 2500' BROKEN CEILING. AS WE WERE VECTORED TO INTERCEPT THE LOC, WE WERE IN THE CLR AND COULD SEE SEVERAL LIGHTNING STRIKES BTWN US AND THE ARPT. THE ARPT AND THE AREA 1/2 MI W OF IT WAS OBSCURED BY HEAVY RAIN. I ASKED FOR THE RWY LIGHTS ON FULL INTENSITY AND MY COPLT CONVEYED THE REQUEST TO THE TWR. THEY DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE. I ASKED HIM TO CONFIRM THE LIGHTS WERE ON HIGH. TWR ACKNOWLEDGED, 'RWY LIGHTS ARE ON STEP 7--DO YOU WANT THE FLASHERS?' I DON'T REMEMBER REPLY. THE NEEDLES WERE CENTERED, GEAR WAS DOWN AND LOCKED, FLAPS 20 DEGS. WE WERE AT A NORMAL SPD IN THE PROPER APCH CONFIGN, AND IN A POS FROM WHICH A NORMAL LNDG COULD EASILY BE MADE. NO YET AT DH, WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT, THOUGH WE WERE NOW ENTERING MODERATE RAIN. AS I WENT VIS THE INTENSITY OF THE RAIN GREATLY INCREASED. F/O CALLED WE WERE DRIFTING RIGHT. I CORRECTED AND WE WERE NOW XING THE THRESHOLD. THE RAIN WAS GUSHING OVER THE WINDSHIELD (WINDSHIELD HEAT WAS ON) MAKING THE RWY LIGHTS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET. I LEVELED OFF CARRYING A SMALL AMOUNT OF PWR, IN HOPES THE INTENSITY OF THE RAIN WOULD SUBSIDE. DEPTH AND HEIGHT PERCEPTION WERE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DUE TO THE GLARE OF THE RWY LIGHTS AND EXTREMELY HEAVY PRECIP. ABOUT 1/4 OF THE WAY DOWN THE RWY I PULLED THE REFS TOGETHER AND TOUCHED DOWN. THE LAST SPD CALLOUT I REMEMBER WAS 'MINUS 5.' DURING AND AFTER THE T/D THE RAIN AGAIN BECAUSE SO HEAVY IT WAS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO INTERPRET (VISUALLY) THE SEPARATE SIDE OF RWYS LIGHTS. I POINTED THE NOSE DIRECTLY INTO THE CENTER OF THE GLARE AND BRAKED EVENLY. FROM THE SIDE LOADS I COULD FEEL WE WERE BEING PULLED TO THE LEFT. F/O NOTED THIS WITH A 'STEER RIGHT,' WHICH I DID, VERY HEAVILY STEERED RIGHT. I FELT THE IMPACT OF AT LEAST 1 RWY LIGHT AND THE BUMPY RIDE LEFT NO DOUBT WE WERE OFF THE LEFT SIDE OF THE PAVEMENT. I CONTINUED STEERING RIGHT AND USING HEAVY DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING. VISIBILITY THROUGH THE WINDSHIELD AT THIS TIME WAS ONLY A BRIGHT LIGHT GLARE THROUGH HEAVY GUSHING WATER. WE WERE DECELERATING WHEN THE NOSE TURNED SHARPLY LEFT WITH AN ABRUPT SIDE IMPACT AND WE CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP. EVEN THEN THE WINDSHIELD WAS SO FLOODED THAT FROM INSIDE I COULD NOT DETERMINE OUR POS RELATIVE TO THE RWY. WE EXITED AND RAN N AWAY FROM THE ACFT. WITHIN 1 MIN, AN ARPT VEH (STATION WAGON) WAS HDG TOWARD US. RWY CENTERLINE LIGHTING, WINDSHIELD WIPERS ON THE ACFT AND PERHAPS THE RWY LIGHT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO MEDIUM INTENSITY RATHER THAN HIGH TO REDUCE GLARE TO AVOID THE SITUATION. I BELIEVE A MISSED APCH WOULD HAVE BEEN THE MOST PRUDENT SOLUTION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 182541: WE WERE AT ABOUT REF+10 AS THE FLARE BEGAN. THE EXTRA SPD WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE WE HAD ONLY EXTENDED 20 DEGS OF FLAPS. THE CAPT HAD DELAYED CALLING FOR FULL FLAPS DUE TO THE WX. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO THE GND, IT BECAME VERY DIFFICULT TO JUDGE HEIGHT OR DEPTH. THE CAPT CARRIED A SMALL AMOUNT OF PWR FOR INSURANCE AS HE FELT FOR THE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.