Narrative:

Flight on aug/mon/91, departed dfw to las with a MEL item that was not complied with (no cargo in the aft compartment). The primary release information for flight was done by the preceding dispatcher. The turnover information sheet for the desk did not include any knowledge about the flight or MEL item. When the flight was released by the computer, I reviewed and checked it and found the MEL item. The preceding dispatcher did have on the release in the remark section a note to the captain about the MEL restrictions. At this time, I was going to call loadsecond officerps to check to see if they had been informed about the aft cargo compartment restriction, but the workload on my desk at the time made me bypass the opportunity. My inaction to call loads or the captain to advise him to check his aircraft loading and failure of the captain to check his release or loading of his aircraft and finally inaction of loads to call and ask about the MEL was a total breakdown in the line of communications. Just 1 call would have stopped the chain of events. Instead we all took for granted that all of the personnel involved with the flight were doing the correct procedure. The flight landed in las, and the captain called and advised me that 4700 pounds of cargo was in the aft compartment on the flight. The next flight outbound, I called loadsecond officerps, and the problem was corrected.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT DEP WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH MEL REQUIREMENT.

Narrative: FLT ON AUG/MON/91, DEPARTED DFW TO LAS WITH A MEL ITEM THAT WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH (NO CARGO IN THE AFT COMPARTMENT). THE PRIMARY RELEASE INFO FOR FLT WAS DONE BY THE PRECEDING DISPATCHER. THE TURNOVER INFO SHEET FOR THE DESK DID NOT INCLUDE ANY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE FLT OR MEL ITEM. WHEN THE FLT WAS RELEASED BY THE COMPUTER, I REVIEWED AND CHKED IT AND FOUND THE MEL ITEM. THE PRECEDING DISPATCHER DID HAVE ON THE RELEASE IN THE REMARK SECTION A NOTE TO THE CAPT ABOUT THE MEL RESTRICTIONS. AT THIS TIME, I WAS GOING TO CALL LOADS/OPS TO CHK TO SEE IF THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THE AFT CARGO COMPARTMENT RESTRICTION, BUT THE WORKLOAD ON MY DESK AT THE TIME MADE ME BYPASS THE OPPORTUNITY. MY INACTION TO CALL LOADS OR THE CAPT TO ADVISE HIM TO CHK HIS ACFT LOADING AND FAILURE OF THE CAPT TO CHK HIS RELEASE OR LOADING OF HIS ACFT AND FINALLY INACTION OF LOADS TO CALL AND ASK ABOUT THE MEL WAS A TOTAL BREAKDOWN IN THE LINE OF COMS. JUST 1 CALL WOULD HAVE STOPPED THE CHAIN OF EVENTS. INSTEAD WE ALL TOOK FOR GRANTED THAT ALL OF THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED WITH THE FLT WERE DOING THE CORRECT PROCEDURE. THE FLT LANDED IN LAS, AND THE CAPT CALLED AND ADVISED ME THAT 4700 POUNDS OF CARGO WAS IN THE AFT COMPARTMENT ON THE FLT. THE NEXT FLT OUTBOUND, I CALLED LOADS/OPS, AND THE PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.