Narrative:

When on downwind ATC advised us to turn right to 210 degree. As soon as we rolled out on the 210 degree heading, ATC told us to turn left to 090 degree, descend to 3000 ft, and advise field in sight. While still in the turn we were told to continue left to heading 030 degree and advise field in sight. While passing through 4500 ft and 090 degree I saw the field and asked my first officer if he also had it in sight. He said he couldn't see it, so I told him to keep the turn coming because it looked to me like we were going to overshoot the final approach. I also advised ATC that we had the field in sight and they cleared us for a visual approach to runway 36L. We did overshoot final, almost to the 36R final approach course. While still in the turn, ATC gave us a very ambiguous TA. He said 'that traffic just off your right side is for the parallel.' he may have given a lock position, but I don't think so. I looked out and saw a twin turbo-propeller 2-3 mi ahead of us, lined up for 36R. I thought this was the traffic he was indicating and I told him 'traffic in sight.' approximately 10 seconds later the air traffic controller said 'that was really close,' and at the same time my first officer said that an aircraft had passed over us by about 200 ft. I never saw the aircraft, but it was apparent to me that his was the traffic that had been called out to us just a few seconds earlier. After landing I went into our operations to call the TRACON to find out what happened. When I got to the phone, the captain of the other conflict aircraft was already talking to the supervisor. The supervisor advised the other captain that since we were both on visual approachs there was no problem and he anticipated no follow- up action. We both left it at that. The other captain told me that he was on vectors to a visual approach to runway 36R and had been cleared for a visual approach approximately 10 seconds prior to our conflict. He had also been placed in a position from where he could not turn to final without a large overshoot. He apparently saw us before we saw him and slid over the top of us during his turn. No evasive action was required by either aircraft, but 2 of my passengers mentioned seeing an aircraft pass very close overhead. There are a number of factors that affected this very serious conflict. ATC failed to position either aircraft properly to execute a turn to final without overshooting. This was compounded by the ceiling (5000 ft broken) and by charlotte approach policy of keeping aircraft at 9000 ft until on downwind. Both aircraft were talking to different controllers. Because of this, neither aircraft had the chance to clear for the other aircraft by using the radio. I called the wrong traffic in sight. This is one of the greatest dangers when operating in the terminal area. Our problem was compounded because we were in a turn and because of the ambiguous nature of the traffic call. Neither aircraft was TCASII equipped. While over half of our medium large transport fleet has TCASII, neither of these aircraft were TCASII equipped. The TCASII would have provided an alert, aurally and visually, well ahead of ATC's warning.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC BTWN 2 MLGS TURNING FINAL FOR PARALLEL RWYS.

Narrative: WHEN ON DOWNWIND ATC ADVISED US TO TURN R TO 210 DEG. AS SOON AS WE ROLLED OUT ON THE 210 DEG HDG, ATC TOLD US TO TURN L TO 090 DEG, DSND TO 3000 FT, AND ADVISE FIELD IN SIGHT. WHILE STILL IN THE TURN WE WERE TOLD TO CONTINUE L TO HDG 030 DEG AND ADVISE FIELD IN SIGHT. WHILE PASSING THROUGH 4500 FT AND 090 DEG I SAW THE FIELD AND ASKED MY FO IF HE ALSO HAD IT IN SIGHT. HE SAID HE COULDN'T SEE IT, SO I TOLD HIM TO KEEP THE TURN COMING BECAUSE IT LOOKED TO ME LIKE WE WERE GOING TO OVERSHOOT THE FINAL APCH. I ALSO ADVISED ATC THAT WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT AND THEY CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36L. WE DID OVERSHOOT FINAL, ALMOST TO THE 36R FINAL APCH COURSE. WHILE STILL IN THE TURN, ATC GAVE US A VERY AMBIGUOUS TA. HE SAID 'THAT TFC JUST OFF YOUR R SIDE IS FOR THE PARALLEL.' HE MAY HAVE GIVEN A LOCK POS, BUT I DON'T THINK SO. I LOOKED OUT AND SAW A TWIN TURBO-PROP 2-3 MI AHEAD OF US, LINED UP FOR 36R. I THOUGHT THIS WAS THE TFC HE WAS INDICATING AND I TOLD HIM 'TFC IN SIGHT.' APPROX 10 SECONDS LATER THE AIR TFC CTLR SAID 'THAT WAS REALLY CLOSE,' AND AT THE SAME TIME MY FO SAID THAT AN ACFT HAD PASSED OVER US BY ABOUT 200 FT. I NEVER SAW THE ACFT, BUT IT WAS APPARENT TO ME THAT HIS WAS THE TFC THAT HAD BEEN CALLED OUT TO US JUST A FEW SECONDS EARLIER. AFTER LNDG I WENT INTO OUR OPS TO CALL THE TRACON TO FIND OUT WHAT HAPPENED. WHEN I GOT TO THE PHONE, THE CAPT OF THE OTHER CONFLICT ACFT WAS ALREADY TALKING TO THE SUPVR. THE SUPVR ADVISED THE OTHER CAPT THAT SINCE WE WERE BOTH ON VISUAL APCHS THERE WAS NO PROBLEM AND HE ANTICIPATED NO FOLLOW- UP ACTION. WE BOTH LEFT IT AT THAT. THE OTHER CAPT TOLD ME THAT HE WAS ON VECTORS TO A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36R AND HAD BEEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH APPROX 10 SECONDS PRIOR TO OUR CONFLICT. HE HAD ALSO BEEN PLACED IN A POS FROM WHERE HE COULD NOT TURN TO FINAL WITHOUT A LARGE OVERSHOOT. HE APPARENTLY SAW US BEFORE WE SAW HIM AND SLID OVER THE TOP OF US DURING HIS TURN. NO EVASIVE ACTION WAS REQUIRED BY EITHER ACFT, BUT 2 OF MY PAXS MENTIONED SEEING AN ACFT PASS VERY CLOSE OVERHEAD. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTORS THAT AFFECTED THIS VERY SERIOUS CONFLICT. ATC FAILED TO POS EITHER ACFT PROPERLY TO EXECUTE A TURN TO FINAL WITHOUT OVERSHOOTING. THIS WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE CEILING (5000 FT BROKEN) AND BY CHARLOTTE APCH POLICY OF KEEPING ACFT AT 9000 FT UNTIL ON DOWNWIND. BOTH ACFT WERE TALKING TO DIFFERENT CTLRS. BECAUSE OF THIS, NEITHER ACFT HAD THE CHANCE TO CLR FOR THE OTHER ACFT BY USING THE RADIO. I CALLED THE WRONG TFC IN SIGHT. THIS IS ONE OF THE GREATEST DANGERS WHEN OPERATING IN THE TERMINAL AREA. OUR PROBLEM WAS COMPOUNDED BECAUSE WE WERE IN A TURN AND BECAUSE OF THE AMBIGUOUS NATURE OF THE TFC CALL. NEITHER ACFT WAS TCASII EQUIPPED. WHILE OVER HALF OF OUR MLG FLEET HAS TCASII, NEITHER OF THESE ACFT WERE TCASII EQUIPPED. THE TCASII WOULD HAVE PROVIDED AN ALERT, AURALLY AND VISUALLY, WELL AHEAD OF ATC'S WARNING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.