Narrative:

Problem arose as a result of rushing cockpit duties in an effort to meet our flow time for a flight to lax. The captain with whom I was flying tends to rush his requests for checklists, and the fact that we were already behind schedule added to the problem. During our inbound leg, the captain advised our ground crew that we needed to execute a 'quick turn' so that we could meet our flow time for a departure to lax. The assigned time was XA23 hours, void if not off by XA25. The passenger were boarded at XA20. While the captain checked the load manifest, I performed the necessary safety briefings required by company and FAA. The captain then proceeded with the engine starts, and called for the appropriate checklists. Before checklist completion, he asked me to contact ground control to obtain taxi clearance. I did as he asked, and ground instructed us to taxi to runway 4. I then advised the captain of our instructions to taxi to runway 4. He responded with 'runway 25?' I said, 'negative, runway 4.' we began to taxi towards runway 4 via taxiway left. I proceeded to complete the engine start checklist and the taxi checklist while the captain taxied the aircraft. He again asked me 'runway 25?' I responded again, 'negative, 4' I proceeded with the checklist and with obtaining takeoff/landing performance data while the captain taxied at what I advised was an excessively high taxi speed. I looked up from my cockpit preflight duties to see our aircraft quickly approaching runway 4, which if crossed would continue to runway 25. I advised the captain to hold short of runway 4. He again responded with 'no, runway 25.' I again said 'negative! We're assigned 4. Hold short!' he stopped the aircraft and tower advised us to execute a 180 degree turn and cleared us for takeoff on runway 4. Fortunately there was no traffic in our area, so no potential for accident existed. This is a classic example of a problem that may easily arise if a crew member is pressured into rushing through normal duties. This captain had decided before engine start that we would be assigned runway 25, since this is our most frequently assigned departure runway. Although I told him several times that we were assigned runway 4, he did not hear it that way. I was pressured into completing 'in the cockpit duties' while on the taxi out so I did not have my eyes outside the cockpit. I contacted our chief pilot and discussed the problem with him. We discussed the problems that may arise when crews 'rush.' he assured me that measures will be taken to prevent unnecessary pressures in the cockpit that may lead to mistakes. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter says he tried everything he could think of to make PIC understand that they were assigned runway 4 and should hold short of that runway. Could not jump on brakes as right seat cannot take over brakes without left seat releasing them. As they left gate area the reporter knew that PIC had confused runway assignment and so asked ground controller to verify runway 4. Ground controller repeated runway 4, but the PIC still had runway 25 mindset. Says that this captain does not listen effectively and tends to rush things too much, but has shown some improvement since this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTHORIZED RWY XING BY COMMUTER.

Narrative: PROBLEM AROSE AS A RESULT OF RUSHING COCKPIT DUTIES IN AN EFFORT TO MEET OUR FLOW TIME FOR A FLT TO LAX. THE CAPT WITH WHOM I WAS FLYING TENDS TO RUSH HIS REQUESTS FOR CHKLISTS, AND THE FACT THAT WE WERE ALREADY BEHIND SCHEDULE ADDED TO THE PROBLEM. DURING OUR INBOUND LEG, THE CAPT ADVISED OUR GND CREW THAT WE NEEDED TO EXECUTE A 'QUICK TURN' SO THAT WE COULD MEET OUR FLOW TIME FOR A DEP TO LAX. THE ASSIGNED TIME WAS XA23 HRS, VOID IF NOT OFF BY XA25. THE PAX WERE BOARDED AT XA20. WHILE THE CAPT CHKED THE LOAD MANIFEST, I PERFORMED THE NECESSARY SAFETY BRIEFINGS REQUIRED BY COMPANY AND FAA. THE CAPT THEN PROCEEDED WITH THE ENG STARTS, AND CALLED FOR THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS. BEFORE CHKLIST COMPLETION, HE ASKED ME TO CONTACT GND CTL TO OBTAIN TAXI CLRNC. I DID AS HE ASKED, AND GND INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI TO RWY 4. I THEN ADVISED THE CAPT OF OUR INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI TO RWY 4. HE RESPONDED WITH 'RWY 25?' I SAID, 'NEGATIVE, RWY 4.' WE BEGAN TO TAXI TOWARDS RWY 4 VIA TAXIWAY L. I PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ENG START CHKLIST AND THE TAXI CHKLIST WHILE THE CAPT TAXIED THE ACFT. HE AGAIN ASKED ME 'RWY 25?' I RESPONDED AGAIN, 'NEGATIVE, 4' I PROCEEDED WITH THE CHKLIST AND WITH OBTAINING TKOF/LNDG PERFORMANCE DATA WHILE THE CAPT TAXIED AT WHAT I ADVISED WAS AN EXCESSIVELY HIGH TAXI SPD. I LOOKED UP FROM MY COCKPIT PREFLT DUTIES TO SEE OUR ACFT QUICKLY APCHING RWY 4, WHICH IF CROSSED WOULD CONTINUE TO RWY 25. I ADVISED THE CAPT TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4. HE AGAIN RESPONDED WITH 'NO, RWY 25.' I AGAIN SAID 'NEGATIVE! WE'RE ASSIGNED 4. HOLD SHORT!' HE STOPPED THE ACFT AND TWR ADVISED US TO EXECUTE A 180 DEG TURN AND CLRED US FOR TKOF ON RWY 4. FORTUNATELY THERE WAS NO TFC IN OUR AREA, SO NO POTENTIAL FOR ACCIDENT EXISTED. THIS IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF A PROBLEM THAT MAY EASILY ARISE IF A CREW MEMBER IS PRESSURED INTO RUSHING THROUGH NORMAL DUTIES. THIS CAPT HAD DECIDED BEFORE ENG START THAT WE WOULD BE ASSIGNED RWY 25, SINCE THIS IS OUR MOST FREQUENTLY ASSIGNED DEP RWY. ALTHOUGH I TOLD HIM SEVERAL TIMES THAT WE WERE ASSIGNED RWY 4, HE DID NOT HEAR IT THAT WAY. I WAS PRESSURED INTO COMPLETING 'IN THE COCKPIT DUTIES' WHILE ON THE TAXI OUT SO I DID NOT HAVE MY EYES OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT. I CONTACTED OUR CHIEF PLT AND DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH HIM. WE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE WHEN CREWS 'RUSH.' HE ASSURED ME THAT MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY PRESSURES IN THE COCKPIT THAT MAY LEAD TO MISTAKES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAYS HE TRIED EVERYTHING HE COULD THINK OF TO MAKE PIC UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WERE ASSIGNED RWY 4 AND SHOULD HOLD SHORT OF THAT RWY. COULD NOT JUMP ON BRAKES AS R SEAT CANNOT TAKE OVER BRAKES WITHOUT L SEAT RELEASING THEM. AS THEY LEFT GATE AREA THE RPTR KNEW THAT PIC HAD CONFUSED RWY ASSIGNMENT AND SO ASKED GND CTLR TO VERIFY RWY 4. GND CTLR REPEATED RWY 4, BUT THE PIC STILL HAD RWY 25 MINDSET. SAYS THAT THIS CAPT DOES NOT LISTEN EFFECTIVELY AND TENDS TO RUSH THINGS TOO MUCH, BUT HAS SHOWN SOME IMPROVEMENT SINCE THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.