Narrative:

I was captain and PNF on this flight into milwaukee (mke). ATIS xx reported indefinite 600 obscured 1/2 mi snow and fog temperature 13 dew point 10 calm winds, ATIS xy indefinite 600 obscured 1/2 mi snow and fog temperature 18 dew point 14 wind 150 at 6 runway 19R was in use, braking action reported as poor. As we turned onto final about 8 or 9 mi outside the marker we were still at 210 KTS assigned so I informed the controller that we were starting to slow. The clearance for approach included a restriction to maintain 170 KTS to the marker, 26 KTS above my approach speed. Given the WX conditions and runway conditions, I felt that this was unsafe and informed the controller that we could not comply and that we were slowing to approach speed. We were then taken off the approach, told to maintain 4000 and turn to 120 heading and were vectored for another approach which was completed successfully. Speed restrictions (within reason) to the marker is acceptable when the field is VMC, but certainly not in these conditions. Given the ATIS reports and the lake effect, I had fully expected to be faced with a missed approach when we reached decision altitude even though the RVR was reported at 3000-4000 ft. I do not feel that I was being overly cautious when I wanted to be stabilized at approach speed ready for landing at the marker. Because we were in icing conditions with all the anti-icing on, we were also restr to a min power setting. I doubt that we could have been stabilized 3 mi from touchdown (always my goal in VMC), if we had followed the first clearance. I feel that this controller should have been more aware of the WX conditions and not tried to use the same procedures in these conditions as would have been acceptable in VMC. I certainly hope that this is not another case where the controller's manual disregards the FARS and common sense.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF LGT INSISTED ON SLOWER SPD AND WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE APCH SEQUENCE AND RESEQUENCED FOR APCH.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT AND PNF ON THIS FLT INTO MILWAUKEE (MKE). ATIS XX RPTED INDEFINITE 600 OBSCURED 1/2 MI SNOW AND FOG TEMP 13 DEW POINT 10 CALM WINDS, ATIS XY INDEFINITE 600 OBSCURED 1/2 MI SNOW AND FOG TEMP 18 DEW POINT 14 WIND 150 AT 6 RWY 19R WAS IN USE, BRAKING ACTION RPTED AS POOR. AS WE TURNED ONTO FINAL ABOUT 8 OR 9 MI OUTSIDE THE MARKER WE WERE STILL AT 210 KTS ASSIGNED SO I INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE WERE STARTING TO SLOW. THE CLRNC FOR APCH INCLUDED A RESTRICTION TO MAINTAIN 170 KTS TO THE MARKER, 26 KTS ABOVE MY APCH SPD. GIVEN THE WX CONDITIONS AND RWY CONDITIONS, I FELT THAT THIS WAS UNSAFE AND INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE COULD NOT COMPLY AND THAT WE WERE SLOWING TO APCH SPD. WE WERE THEN TAKEN OFF THE APCH, TOLD TO MAINTAIN 4000 AND TURN TO 120 HDG AND WERE VECTORED FOR ANOTHER APCH WHICH WAS COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY. SPD RESTRICTIONS (WITHIN REASON) TO THE MARKER IS ACCEPTABLE WHEN THE FIELD IS VMC, BUT CERTAINLY NOT IN THESE CONDITIONS. GIVEN THE ATIS RPTS AND THE LAKE EFFECT, I HAD FULLY EXPECTED TO BE FACED WITH A MISSED APCH WHEN WE REACHED DECISION ALT EVEN THOUGH THE RVR WAS RPTED AT 3000-4000 FT. I DO NOT FEEL THAT I WAS BEING OVERLY CAUTIOUS WHEN I WANTED TO BE STABILIZED AT APCH SPD READY FOR LNDG AT THE MARKER. BECAUSE WE WERE IN ICING CONDITIONS WITH ALL THE ANTI-ICING ON, WE WERE ALSO RESTR TO A MIN PWR SETTING. I DOUBT THAT WE COULD HAVE BEEN STABILIZED 3 MI FROM TOUCHDOWN (ALWAYS MY GOAL IN VMC), IF WE HAD FOLLOWED THE FIRST CLRNC. I FEEL THAT THIS CTLR SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AWARE OF THE WX CONDITIONS AND NOT TRIED TO USE THE SAME PROCS IN THESE CONDITIONS AS WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE IN VMC. I CERTAINLY HOPE THAT THIS IS NOT ANOTHER CASE WHERE THE CTLR'S MANUAL DISREGARDS THE FARS AND COMMON SENSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.