Narrative:

This is a description of an incident that happened to me while operating out of the grand island, northeast, airport on 1/tue/92 at approximately PM20 local time on a clear VFR night. While taxiing to runway 17 for an intersection takeoff to the south, I was monitoring a transmission from aircraft Y on a 4 mi right base to runway 31. The aircraft was clearly visible and I obviously had sufficient space to depart ahead of him. After announcing my intentions to 'grand island traffic' to depart to the south on runway 17, I turned to take the runway and noticed another aircraft, which I had not yet heard, at the approach end of runway 35 in the landing flare. This airplane turned out to be aircraft Y, an small transport. Knowing that he would want to use the taxiway that I was now occupying, and that I was already across the hold line, I made a quick turn around which took me onto the runway for a brief period. I announced my intentions to clear the runway but the small transport had already decided to execute a go around. After expressing my sincere apologies to them for the inconvenience, I noticed another airplane that I had also not heard on the radio, now on a left base for runway 35. This now brought the grand total to 3 aircraft, besides myself, of which I was aware of only one. Of course I accept full responsibility for not scanning the approach end of the runway more thoroughly. I did, in fact, expect the opposite runway to be in use since the wind was from the southwest and I, and another aircraft, had just landed to the south not 15 mins prior. However, everyone who has ever flown an small aircraft X is well aware of the horrible visibility above and to either side, especially to the rear. Even cocking the aircraft at an angle to the runway to check the final approach is not enough to see other aircraft on base legs because of the pilot's extended position behind the leading edge of the wing. After hearing only one position report from the 3 aircraft that were in the area at the time and establishing visual contact with that airplane, there was no other indication to me that suggested any other traffic was in the pattern. How could the incident have been avoided? 1. Grand island tower should remain open until midnight to handle the increased en route and arriving and departing airline traffic. There is more traffic in the grand island area after 2000 local time than in lincoln now, yet lincoln stays open until midnight. 2. I, myself, should have been more cautious and have expected the traffic to be heavier than anticipated. 3. Aircraft Y, on short final, after seeing that I was approaching the runway, should have made himself aware to me with the appropriate radio call.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN APPARENT RWY INCURSION BY AN SMA AT A NON TWR ARPT UNICOM CREATED BY A NON ANNOUNCE SITUATION BY THE LNDG SMT WHICH PERFORMS A GAR. POTENTIAL CONFLICT ENSUED.

Narrative: THIS IS A DESCRIPTION OF AN INCIDENT THAT HAPPENED TO ME WHILE OPERATING OUT OF THE GRAND ISLAND, NE, ARPT ON 1/TUE/92 AT APPROX PM20 LCL TIME ON A CLR VFR NIGHT. WHILE TAXIING TO RWY 17 FOR AN INTXN TKOF TO THE S, I WAS MONITORING A XMISSION FROM ACFT Y ON A 4 MI R BASE TO RWY 31. THE ACFT WAS CLRLY VISIBLE AND I OBVIOUSLY HAD SUFFICIENT SPACE TO DEPART AHEAD OF HIM. AFTER ANNOUNCING MY INTENTIONS TO 'GRAND ISLAND TFC' TO DEPART TO THE S ON RWY 17, I TURNED TO TAKE THE RWY AND NOTICED ANOTHER ACFT, WHICH I HAD NOT YET HEARD, AT THE APCH END OF RWY 35 IN THE LNDG FLARE. THIS AIRPLANE TURNED OUT TO BE ACFT Y, AN SMT. KNOWING THAT HE WOULD WANT TO USE THE TAXIWAY THAT I WAS NOW OCCUPYING, AND THAT I WAS ALREADY ACROSS THE HOLD LINE, I MADE A QUICK TURN AROUND WHICH TOOK ME ONTO THE RWY FOR A BRIEF PERIOD. I ANNOUNCED MY INTENTIONS TO CLR THE RWY BUT THE SMT HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO EXECUTE A GAR. AFTER EXPRESSING MY SINCERE APOLOGIES TO THEM FOR THE INCONVENIENCE, I NOTICED ANOTHER AIRPLANE THAT I HAD ALSO NOT HEARD ON THE RADIO, NOW ON A L BASE FOR RWY 35. THIS NOW BROUGHT THE GRAND TOTAL TO 3 ACFT, BESIDES MYSELF, OF WHICH I WAS AWARE OF ONLY ONE. OF COURSE I ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOT SCANNING THE APCH END OF THE RWY MORE THOROUGHLY. I DID, IN FACT, EXPECT THE OPPOSITE RWY TO BE IN USE SINCE THE WIND WAS FROM THE SW AND I, AND ANOTHER ACFT, HAD JUST LANDED TO THE S NOT 15 MINS PRIOR. HOWEVER, EVERYONE WHO HAS EVER FLOWN AN SMA X IS WELL AWARE OF THE HORRIBLE VISIBILITY ABOVE AND TO EITHER SIDE, ESPECIALLY TO THE REAR. EVEN COCKING THE ACFT AT AN ANGLE TO THE RWY TO CHK THE FINAL APCH IS NOT ENOUGH TO SEE OTHER ACFT ON BASE LEGS BECAUSE OF THE PLT'S EXTENDED POS BEHIND THE LEADING EDGE OF THE WING. AFTER HEARING ONLY ONE POS RPT FROM THE 3 ACFT THAT WERE IN THE AREA AT THE TIME AND ESTABLISHING VISUAL CONTACT WITH THAT AIRPLANE, THERE WAS NO OTHER INDICATION TO ME THAT SUGGESTED ANY OTHER TFC WAS IN THE PATTERN. HOW COULD THE INCIDENT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED? 1. GRAND ISLAND TWR SHOULD REMAIN OPEN UNTIL MIDNIGHT TO HANDLE THE INCREASED ENRTE AND ARRIVING AND DEPARTING AIRLINE TFC. THERE IS MORE TFC IN THE GRAND ISLAND AREA AFTER 2000 LCL TIME THAN IN LINCOLN NOW, YET LINCOLN STAYS OPEN UNTIL MIDNIGHT. 2. I, MYSELF, SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CAUTIOUS AND HAVE EXPECTED THE TFC TO BE HEAVIER THAN ANTICIPATED. 3. ACFT Y, ON SHORT FINAL, AFTER SEEING THAT I WAS APCHING THE RWY, SHOULD HAVE MADE HIMSELF AWARE TO ME WITH THE APPROPRIATE RADIO CALL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.