Narrative:

I was PF on our company small transport from mzz to mnm to grb. PNF was the senior pilot (in the right seat). On descent for the approach to mnm, approximately 1/8 of rime ice accumulated between 5000 and 6000 MSL. Pitot/static and stall warning heat was on. Nacelle and propeller anti-ice were turned on. Windshield heat (installed left side only) was used until ice was clear. The ice on the wing was believed insufficient for effective use of the de-ice boots. The 10 min flight to grb (with the 2 passengers picked up at mnm) was flown at 4000 MSL expecting we would be clear of icing conditions. Wing ice was checked with the deice light prior to the start of the approach. There was no obvious new accumulation. During the flight, grb ATIS was revised from 1100 overcast to 700 overcast. I anticipated breakout prior to the missed approach point on the localizer (back course) 24L approach. While I was using the HSI (set to the front course for proper sensing), I had not flown a back course approach in several months. I anticipated a stronger crosswind on the approach than was actually encountered because of wind experienced at mnm. ATIS reported the wind as 340 degrees at 4 KTS. The result was a sloppy approach with needle deflections of approximately 2 dots. At the map, I was about 2 dots right of the localizer centerline and just deciding to miss when I spotted the VASI and runway at about the 9:30 to 10 O'clock position. As a low flare was initiated, the aircraft stalled without warning. The landing was a bit rough but was not believed to be hard by either of the crew. We were surprised when we noticed the right wing low attitude and that right propeller was spinning to a stop. After disembarking, we determined that the left propeller also contacted the runway but did not stop. We also found ice on stall warning sensor (the stall warning heat switch was in the 'on' position). The ice on the wing was between 3/16 inch and 1/4 inch. A tv report later advised that there was some patchy freezing drizzle in area (not reported on ATIS). I should note that later small transport have the deice light outboard of the left nacelle instead of the fuselage side. If our's had been such, I might have noticed the inoperative stall warning heat. The aircraft weight at landing was approximately 8800 pounds (560 below maximum landing weight). I should have remembered and lived by the old saw that a bad approach equals a bad landing. I discovered while talking to the FSDO representative that my last physical was 12/90, not 1/91 as I believed and I therefore did not have a valid second class medical certificate. I had made an appointment at least 1 week prior for a medical examination scheduled 2 days subsequent to the incident. The crew was already scheduled for proficiency training 3 days subsequent to incident. My last proficiency training had been 11/84. This incident occurred on my 40TH birthday!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CORP SMT ACCUMULATES ICE, MAKES POOR APCH AND HARD LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS PF ON OUR COMPANY SMT FROM MZZ TO MNM TO GRB. PNF WAS THE SENIOR PLT (IN THE R SEAT). ON DSCNT FOR THE APCH TO MNM, APPROX 1/8 OF RIME ICE ACCUMULATED BTWN 5000 AND 6000 MSL. PITOT/STATIC AND STALL WARNING HEAT WAS ON. NACELLE AND PROP ANTI-ICE WERE TURNED ON. WINDSHIELD HEAT (INSTALLED L SIDE ONLY) WAS USED UNTIL ICE WAS CLR. THE ICE ON THE WING WAS BELIEVED INSUFFICIENT FOR EFFECTIVE USE OF THE DE-ICE BOOTS. THE 10 MIN FLT TO GRB (WITH THE 2 PAXS PICKED UP AT MNM) WAS FLOWN AT 4000 MSL EXPECTING WE WOULD BE CLR OF ICING CONDITIONS. WING ICE WAS CHKED WITH THE DEICE LIGHT PRIOR TO THE START OF THE APCH. THERE WAS NO OBVIOUS NEW ACCUMULATION. DURING THE FLT, GRB ATIS WAS REVISED FROM 1100 OVCST TO 700 OVCST. I ANTICIPATED BREAKOUT PRIOR TO THE MISSED APCH POINT ON THE LOC (BC) 24L APCH. WHILE I WAS USING THE HSI (SET TO THE FRONT COURSE FOR PROPER SENSING), I HAD NOT FLOWN A BACK COURSE APCH IN SEVERAL MONTHS. I ANTICIPATED A STRONGER XWIND ON THE APCH THAN WAS ACTUALLY ENCOUNTERED BECAUSE OF WIND EXPERIENCED AT MNM. ATIS RPTED THE WIND AS 340 DEGS AT 4 KTS. THE RESULT WAS A SLOPPY APCH WITH NEEDLE DEFLECTIONS OF APPROX 2 DOTS. AT THE MAP, I WAS ABOUT 2 DOTS R OF THE LOC CENTERLINE AND JUST DECIDING TO MISS WHEN I SPOTTED THE VASI AND RWY AT ABOUT THE 9:30 TO 10 O'CLOCK POS. AS A LOW FLARE WAS INITIATED, THE ACFT STALLED WITHOUT WARNING. THE LNDG WAS A BIT ROUGH BUT WAS NOT BELIEVED TO BE HARD BY EITHER OF THE CREW. WE WERE SURPRISED WHEN WE NOTICED THE R WING LOW ATTITUDE AND THAT R PROP WAS SPINNING TO A STOP. AFTER DISEMBARKING, WE DETERMINED THAT THE L PROP ALSO CONTACTED THE RWY BUT DID NOT STOP. WE ALSO FOUND ICE ON STALL WARNING SENSOR (THE STALL WARNING HEAT SWITCH WAS IN THE 'ON' POS). THE ICE ON THE WING WAS BTWN 3/16 INCH AND 1/4 INCH. A TV RPT LATER ADVISED THAT THERE WAS SOME PATCHY FREEZING DRIZZLE IN AREA (NOT RPTED ON ATIS). I SHOULD NOTE THAT LATER SMT HAVE THE DEICE LIGHT OUTBOARD OF THE L NACELLE INSTEAD OF THE FUSELAGE SIDE. IF OUR'S HAD BEEN SUCH, I MIGHT HAVE NOTICED THE INOPERATIVE STALL WARNING HEAT. THE ACFT WT AT LNDG WAS APPROX 8800 POUNDS (560 BELOW MAX LNDG WT). I SHOULD HAVE REMEMBERED AND LIVED BY THE OLD SAW THAT A BAD APCH EQUALS A BAD LNDG. I DISCOVERED WHILE TALKING TO THE FSDO REPRESENTATIVE THAT MY LAST PHYSICAL WAS 12/90, NOT 1/91 AS I BELIEVED AND I THEREFORE DID NOT HAVE A VALID SECOND CLASS MEDICAL CERTIFICATE. I HAD MADE AN APPOINTMENT AT LEAST 1 WK PRIOR FOR A MEDICAL EXAM SCHEDULED 2 DAYS SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT. THE CREW WAS ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR PROFICIENCY TRAINING 3 DAYS SUBSEQUENT TO INCIDENT. MY LAST PROFICIENCY TRAINING HAD BEEN 11/84. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED ON MY 40TH BIRTHDAY!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.