Narrative:

ZHN had cleared us to cross sakki intersection at 6000 ft and at 250 KIAS. I was originally the PF, and with center's permission I had been deviating south of course to avoid WX buildups. I was correcting back on course and descending through 12000 ft when I realized that there was only 20 mi remaining to go to sakki intersection and I was doing 320 KIAS and still had 6000 ft to descend. I mentioned to the captain that I was not going to be able to make the crossing restrictions. He agreed and said that we needed to slow down, so I asked to deploy the speed brakes. He said 'come on back.' I didn't understand what he meant and I replied 'say again?' he again said 'come on back.' I still did not understand what he was getting at, so I said, 'what do you mean?' he then took the controls and began to level off to bleed off the airspeed and said, 'we need to come on back (with the control column) to slow down.' he then advised center that we would not be able to make the crossing restriction at sakki intersection and asked them if they would like us to do a 360 degree turn to lose the altitude. Center then gave us a right turn to 090. As we began our right turn, the captain (who was then flying) set the flap/slat lever to the slat position. The airplane then exhibited a rolling tendency and the slat disagreement light illuminated. He tried to recycle the slats several times before we realized that the hydraulic pressure was insufficient to extend the slats symmetrically. We switched the hydraulic pumps to high output and the slats operated normally. In the meantime, center asked us if we could now cross sakki at 6000 ft. The captain radioed back 'affirmative.' center then cleared us to join the lda approach course and the captain turned back to the left. Center then called us and asked if we were in a left turn. I replied in the affirmative. Center said that he had wanted us to continue our right turn back towards sakki to join the lda course, but since we were already in a left turn, to continue it on around. Eventually, with the captain still flying, we did comply with the crossing restrictions at sakki. The captain later gave control of the airplane back to me and I flew an uneventful approach and landing. It is amazing how quickly things can snowball into confusion. In this instance it all started with my fixation with circumnaving circuit breaker clouds and failing to plan my descent properly. From there it deteriorated when I didn't understand what the captain had meant by 'come on back.' the abnormal operation of the slats then distracted us, and we both did not understand that center had wanted us to continue our turn all the way around to the right to head inbound to sakki. In addition to all of this, the captain was not only flying the airplane, he was also operating and troubleshooting the slats and talking to center too. Although this situation could have been entirely avoided by more vigilance on my part, it also would not have been so confusing if we had had better crew coordination and communication. While I hope our company institutes cockpit resource management training, in the meantime I have made it a point to plan ahead and to increase my level of vigilance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HDG TRACK DEV DURING RADAR VECTORING DURING DSCNT PROC AND WX AVOIDANCE. TSTM ACTIVITY.

Narrative: ZHN HAD CLRED US TO CROSS SAKKI INTXN AT 6000 FT AND AT 250 KIAS. I WAS ORIGINALLY THE PF, AND WITH CTR'S PERMISSION I HAD BEEN DEVIATING S OF COURSE TO AVOID WX BUILDUPS. I WAS CORRECTING BACK ON COURSE AND DSNDING THROUGH 12000 FT WHEN I REALIZED THAT THERE WAS ONLY 20 MI REMAINING TO GO TO SAKKI INTXN AND I WAS DOING 320 KIAS AND STILL HAD 6000 FT TO DSND. I MENTIONED TO THE CAPT THAT I WAS NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTRICTIONS. HE AGREED AND SAID THAT WE NEEDED TO SLOW DOWN, SO I ASKED TO DEPLOY THE SPD BRAKES. HE SAID 'COME ON BACK.' I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT HE MEANT AND I REPLIED 'SAY AGAIN?' HE AGAIN SAID 'COME ON BACK.' I STILL DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HE WAS GETTING AT, SO I SAID, 'WHAT DO YOU MEAN?' HE THEN TOOK THE CTLS AND BEGAN TO LEVEL OFF TO BLEED OFF THE AIRSPD AND SAID, 'WE NEED TO COME ON BACK (WITH THE CTL COLUMN) TO SLOW DOWN.' HE THEN ADVISED CTR THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTRICTION AT SAKKI INTXN AND ASKED THEM IF THEY WOULD LIKE US TO DO A 360 DEG TURN TO LOSE THE ALT. CTR THEN GAVE US A R TURN TO 090. AS WE BEGAN OUR R TURN, THE CAPT (WHO WAS THEN FLYING) SET THE FLAP/SLAT LEVER TO THE SLAT POS. THE AIRPLANE THEN EXHIBITED A ROLLING TENDENCY AND THE SLAT DISAGREEMENT LIGHT ILLUMINATED. HE TRIED TO RECYCLE THE SLATS SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE WE REALIZED THAT THE HYD PRESSURE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO EXTEND THE SLATS SYMMETRICALLY. WE SWITCHED THE HYD PUMPS TO HIGH OUTPUT AND THE SLATS OPERATED NORMALLY. IN THE MEANTIME, CTR ASKED US IF WE COULD NOW CROSS SAKKI AT 6000 FT. THE CAPT RADIOED BACK 'AFFIRMATIVE.' CTR THEN CLRED US TO JOIN THE LDA APCH COURSE AND THE CAPT TURNED BACK TO THE L. CTR THEN CALLED US AND ASKED IF WE WERE IN A L TURN. I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. CTR SAID THAT HE HAD WANTED US TO CONTINUE OUR R TURN BACK TOWARDS SAKKI TO JOIN THE LDA COURSE, BUT SINCE WE WERE ALREADY IN A L TURN, TO CONTINUE IT ON AROUND. EVENTUALLY, WITH THE CAPT STILL FLYING, WE DID COMPLY WITH THE XING RESTRICTIONS AT SAKKI. THE CAPT LATER GAVE CTL OF THE AIRPLANE BACK TO ME AND I FLEW AN UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG. IT IS AMAZING HOW QUICKLY THINGS CAN SNOWBALL INTO CONFUSION. IN THIS INSTANCE IT ALL STARTED WITH MY FIXATION WITH CIRCUMNAVING CB CLOUDS AND FAILING TO PLAN MY DSCNT PROPERLY. FROM THERE IT DETERIORATED WHEN I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT THE CAPT HAD MEANT BY 'COME ON BACK.' THE ABNORMAL OP OF THE SLATS THEN DISTRACTED US, AND WE BOTH DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT CTR HAD WANTED US TO CONTINUE OUR TURN ALL THE WAY AROUND TO THE R TO HEAD INBOUND TO SAKKI. IN ADDITION TO ALL OF THIS, THE CAPT WAS NOT ONLY FLYING THE AIRPLANE, HE WAS ALSO OPERATING AND TROUBLESHOOTING THE SLATS AND TALKING TO CTR TOO. ALTHOUGH THIS SITUATION COULD HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY AVOIDED BY MORE VIGILANCE ON MY PART, IT ALSO WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO CONFUSING IF WE HAD HAD BETTER CREW COORD AND COM. WHILE I HOPE OUR COMPANY INSTITUTES COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING, IN THE MEANTIME I HAVE MADE IT A POINT TO PLAN AHEAD AND TO INCREASE MY LEVEL OF VIGILANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.