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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 202348 |
Time | |
Date | 199202 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mco |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Widebody, Low Wing, 4 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 250 flight time total : 8500 flight time type : 5000 |
ASRS Report | 202348 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 4000 |
ASRS Report | 203291 |
Events | |
Anomaly | incursion : runway non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : rejected takeoff other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Flight taxied out on 1 engine. Captain's complete briefing to first officer for procedures to be followed for the entire trip was being accomplished on taxi out due to numerous interruptions/distrs which occurred while parked at the gate. Additional discussion evolved relating to criteria for possible abort situation during takeoff. This is because the company recently had issued revised policy guidance on this subject which has led to some necessary adjustment in both pilot's understanding of expected response. As the flight continued to approach the departure runway, the captain called for and the first officer accomplished the delayed engine start checklist. As that engine was winding up the briefing on captain's procedures continued. As the engine came up to idle speed the tower cleared the flight into position on the runway to hold and the first officer read back the clearance accurately. He then completed the steps remaining on the delayed engine start checklist and asked the captain if he could continue with the before takeoff checklist and the captain concurred. That checklist was completed as the captain taxied around the access taxiway onto the runway and advised the first officer 'I have the steering, you're brakes and throttle.' the first officer began to advance the throttles as the aircraft lined up on centerline. The aircraft had accelerated for about 500 ft down the runway at significantly less than normal takeoff thrust when the tower controller advised the flight he would have our 'takeoff clearance in about a min.' at that moment, both pilots realized takeoff clearance had not been received. The first officer reduced thrust to idle and brought the aircraft to a stop from less than 60 KTS. The tower controller referenced the heavy aircraft departing a widely spaced parallel runway before issuing us clearance for our takeoff about a min later. A completely normal takeoff and uneventful flight ensued. In retrospect, the perception seemed to be that, in spite of some interruptions and distrs leading to gave departure, all was coming together just as we were reaching the runway so we both failed to actively listen to the actual clearance as we were ready and we simply assumed everything else was ready for us to takeoff. Supplemental information from acn 203291: the tower issued clearance during this time and I acknowledged. After #2 engine start, went right into remainder of delayed engine start checklist as aircraft began taxiing onto runway. Went immediately into before takeoff checklist as captain was saying 'your throttles, your rudders once I line you up.' finished checklist and advanced throttles for takeoff. After a few seconds of takeoff roll, tower advised, 'flight XXX, I will have your takeoff clearance momentarily.' obviously, our clearance had been to position and hold, not cleared for takeoff. I brought aircraft to a stop. We were then issued a takeoff clearance and continued to destination. Obviously I was rushed and trying to do too many things at once. Captain's words of 'your throttles, your rudders' are always spoken at beginning of takeoff roll and I assumed, as did captain, that we had been cleared for takeoff. Should have started #2 engine much earlier during taxi out so as not to be so rushed. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter admits error. Says clearance was to taxi into position and hold. Flight crew got into a hurry up mode by completing engine start and checklists at last min. Reporter is very conscious of fuel conservation and may have waited too long to start second engine. Too many tasks were compressed into the time period as they moved onto runway. Described other aircraft. No conflict. Says tower controller was alert and did a good job of preventing more serious incident.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR STARTED TKOF ROLL WITHOUT CLRNC.
Narrative: FLT TAXIED OUT ON 1 ENG. CAPT'S COMPLETE BRIEFING TO FO FOR PROCS TO BE FOLLOWED FOR THE ENTIRE TRIP WAS BEING ACCOMPLISHED ON TAXI OUT DUE TO NUMEROUS INTERRUPTIONS/DISTRS WHICH OCCURRED WHILE PARKED AT THE GATE. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION EVOLVED RELATING TO CRITERIA FOR POSSIBLE ABORT SITUATION DURING TKOF. THIS IS BECAUSE THE COMPANY RECENTLY HAD ISSUED REVISED POLICY GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH HAS LED TO SOME NECESSARY ADJUSTMENT IN BOTH PLT'S UNDERSTANDING OF EXPECTED RESPONSE. AS THE FLT CONTINUED TO APCH THE DEP RWY, THE CAPT CALLED FOR AND THE FO ACCOMPLISHED THE DELAYED ENG START CHKLIST. AS THAT ENG WAS WINDING UP THE BRIEFING ON CAPT'S PROCS CONTINUED. AS THE ENG CAME UP TO IDLE SPD THE TWR CLRED THE FLT INTO POS ON THE RWY TO HOLD AND THE FO READ BACK THE CLRNC ACCURATELY. HE THEN COMPLETED THE STEPS REMAINING ON THE DELAYED ENG START CHKLIST AND ASKED THE CAPT IF HE COULD CONTINUE WITH THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND THE CAPT CONCURRED. THAT CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AS THE CAPT TAXIED AROUND THE ACCESS TAXIWAY ONTO THE RWY AND ADVISED THE FO 'I HAVE THE STEERING, YOU'RE BRAKES AND THROTTLE.' THE FO BEGAN TO ADVANCE THE THROTTLES AS THE ACFT LINED UP ON CTRLINE. THE ACFT HAD ACCELERATED FOR ABOUT 500 FT DOWN THE RWY AT SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN NORMAL TKOF THRUST WHEN THE TWR CTLR ADVISED THE FLT HE WOULD HAVE OUR 'TKOF CLRNC IN ABOUT A MIN.' AT THAT MOMENT, BOTH PLTS REALIZED TKOF CLRNC HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED. THE FO REDUCED THRUST TO IDLE AND BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP FROM LESS THAN 60 KTS. THE TWR CTLR REFED THE HVY ACFT DEPARTING A WIDELY SPACED PARALLEL RWY BEFORE ISSUING US CLRNC FOR OUR TKOF ABOUT A MIN LATER. A COMPLETELY NORMAL TKOF AND UNEVENTFUL FLT ENSUED. IN RETROSPECT, THE PERCEPTION SEEMED TO BE THAT, IN SPITE OF SOME INTERRUPTIONS AND DISTRS LEADING TO GAVE DEP, ALL WAS COMING TOGETHER JUST AS WE WERE REACHING THE RWY SO WE BOTH FAILED TO ACTIVELY LISTEN TO THE ACTUAL CLRNC AS WE WERE READY AND WE SIMPLY ASSUMED EVERYTHING ELSE WAS READY FOR US TO TKOF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 203291: THE TWR ISSUED CLRNC DURING THIS TIME AND I ACKNOWLEDGED. AFTER #2 ENG START, WENT R INTO REMAINDER OF DELAYED ENG START CHKLIST AS ACFT BEGAN TAXIING ONTO RWY. WENT IMMEDIATELY INTO BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AS CAPT WAS SAYING 'YOUR THROTTLES, YOUR RUDDERS ONCE I LINE YOU UP.' FINISHED CHKLIST AND ADVANCED THROTTLES FOR TKOF. AFTER A FEW SECONDS OF TKOF ROLL, TWR ADVISED, 'FLT XXX, I WILL HAVE YOUR TKOF CLRNC MOMENTARILY.' OBVIOUSLY, OUR CLRNC HAD BEEN TO POS AND HOLD, NOT CLRED FOR TKOF. I BROUGHT ACFT TO A STOP. WE WERE THEN ISSUED A TKOF CLRNC AND CONTINUED TO DEST. OBVIOUSLY I WAS RUSHED AND TRYING TO DO TOO MANY THINGS AT ONCE. CAPT'S WORDS OF 'YOUR THROTTLES, YOUR RUDDERS' ARE ALWAYS SPOKEN AT BEGINNING OF TKOF ROLL AND I ASSUMED, AS DID CAPT, THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF. SHOULD HAVE STARTED #2 ENG MUCH EARLIER DURING TAXI OUT SO AS NOT TO BE SO RUSHED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADMITS ERROR. SAYS CLRNC WAS TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD. FLC GOT INTO A HURRY UP MODE BY COMPLETING ENG START AND CHKLISTS AT LAST MIN. RPTR IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF FUEL CONSERVATION AND MAY HAVE WAITED TOO LONG TO START SECOND ENG. TOO MANY TASKS WERE COMPRESSED INTO THE TIME PERIOD AS THEY MOVED ONTO RWY. DESCRIBED OTHER ACFT. NO CONFLICT. SAYS TWR CTLR WAS ALERT AND DID A GOOD JOB OF PREVENTING MORE SERIOUS INCIDENT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.