Narrative:

Our scheduled far 121 supplemental cargo airline large transport taxied onto a controled taxiway without contacting ground control. Crew taxied aircraft north on taxiway 'G' for departure on runway 19. While taxiing crew heard company on radio and was curious why they were talking on ground control. Checking our radio selectors we realized the toggle switch was never placed to ground control. PIC immediately stopped aircraft while first officer called ground control and confessed our mistake. Ground control was aware of us and told us there wasn't a problem but reminded us of the potential for catastrophe. We concurred, apologized to ground control. They cleared us to runway 19 and an uneventful flight was flown to destination. In analysis of event by crew the following is submitted... Crew reported for a late afternoon flight. WX was clear, 20 mi visibility and 62 degree F. During crew's review of paperwork, PIC was approached by management flight standards pilot and briefed on an electrical problem that occurred earlier in the day. We were asked to check on the parameters of the system and monitor. Arriving, crew found an additional unrelated mechanical item which was corrected prior to taxi. Crew taxied out of blocks on 2 engines to conform to a reemphasized fuel savings program. Due to the anticipated additional workload while taxiing because of the normal yet non-routine delayed engine start, it was decided to brief the takeoff early and select takeoff flaps early while taxiing on the uncontrolled company ramp. During the time and at the normal position where ground control is called, the crew was monitoring the towing of another aircraft, briefing for takeoff and extending the flaps. The PIC and first officer taxied out on the taxiway mentally believing that ground control had been contacted since they were beyond the normal position where it is done. Human factors include; distrs during routine tasks due to non-routine procedures and external movement of aircraft, a beautiful spring day; unusual daytime operations for this crew (causing some fatigue due to a change in a sleep cycle); non-routing delayed #2 engine start; first officer takeoff briefing earlier than normal; and concern to extend flaps prior to a 90 degree turn with only 1 'a' hydraulic pump operating. The habit of contacting ground control at a specific point on the ramp was so strong that when the non-routine tasks of this day displaced the call, the crew was beyond the normal point in their flow, as well as the geographic location, and failed to recognize and return to the place where the interruption occurred. Mentally, we believed the call had been made to ground control. The PIC and first officer had 42 yrs of experience without anything even close to his nature ever happening. It was a humbling experience the entire crew will never forget. This crew will submit a report to the company and union's safety committee in hopes that other pilots will learn from this mistake, as well as, a recommendation to standardize all before takeoff functions and tasks after the ground control call.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTHORIZED TAXI.

Narrative: OUR SCHEDULED FAR 121 SUPPLEMENTAL CARGO AIRLINE LGT TAXIED ONTO A CTLED TAXIWAY WITHOUT CONTACTING GND CTL. CREW TAXIED ACFT N ON TAXIWAY 'G' FOR DEP ON RWY 19. WHILE TAXIING CREW HEARD COMPANY ON RADIO AND WAS CURIOUS WHY THEY WERE TALKING ON GND CTL. CHKING OUR RADIO SELECTORS WE REALIZED THE TOGGLE SWITCH WAS NEVER PLACED TO GND CTL. PIC IMMEDIATELY STOPPED ACFT WHILE FO CALLED GND CTL AND CONFESSED OUR MISTAKE. GND CTL WAS AWARE OF US AND TOLD US THERE WASN'T A PROBLEM BUT REMINDED US OF THE POTENTIAL FOR CATASTROPHE. WE CONCURRED, APOLOGIZED TO GND CTL. THEY CLRED US TO RWY 19 AND AN UNEVENTFUL FLT WAS FLOWN TO DEST. IN ANALYSIS OF EVENT BY CREW THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED... CREW RPTED FOR A LATE AFTERNOON FLT. WX WAS CLR, 20 MI VISIBILITY AND 62 DEG F. DURING CREW'S REVIEW OF PAPERWORK, PIC WAS APCHED BY MGMNT FLT STANDARDS PLT AND BRIEFED ON AN ELECTRICAL PROBLEM THAT OCCURRED EARLIER IN THE DAY. WE WERE ASKED TO CHK ON THE PARAMETERS OF THE SYS AND MONITOR. ARRIVING, CREW FOUND AN ADDITIONAL UNRELATED MECHANICAL ITEM WHICH WAS CORRECTED PRIOR TO TAXI. CREW TAXIED OUT OF BLOCKS ON 2 ENGS TO CONFORM TO A REEMPHASIZED FUEL SAVINGS PROGRAM. DUE TO THE ANTICIPATED ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD WHILE TAXIING BECAUSE OF THE NORMAL YET NON-ROUTINE DELAYED ENG START, IT WAS DECIDED TO BRIEF THE TKOF EARLY AND SELECT TKOF FLAPS EARLY WHILE TAXIING ON THE UNCTLED COMPANY RAMP. DURING THE TIME AND AT THE NORMAL POS WHERE GND CTL IS CALLED, THE CREW WAS MONITORING THE TOWING OF ANOTHER ACFT, BRIEFING FOR TKOF AND EXTENDING THE FLAPS. THE PIC AND FO TAXIED OUT ON THE TAXIWAY MENTALLY BELIEVING THAT GND CTL HAD BEEN CONTACTED SINCE THEY WERE BEYOND THE NORMAL POS WHERE IT IS DONE. HUMAN FACTORS INCLUDE; DISTRS DURING ROUTINE TASKS DUE TO NON-ROUTINE PROCS AND EXTERNAL MOVEMENT OF ACFT, A BEAUTIFUL SPRING DAY; UNUSUAL DAYTIME OPS FOR THIS CREW (CAUSING SOME FATIGUE DUE TO A CHANGE IN A SLEEP CYCLE); NON-ROUTING DELAYED #2 ENG START; FO TKOF BRIEFING EARLIER THAN NORMAL; AND CONCERN TO EXTEND FLAPS PRIOR TO A 90 DEG TURN WITH ONLY 1 'A' HYD PUMP OPERATING. THE HABIT OF CONTACTING GND CTL AT A SPECIFIC POINT ON THE RAMP WAS SO STRONG THAT WHEN THE NON-ROUTINE TASKS OF THIS DAY DISPLACED THE CALL, THE CREW WAS BEYOND THE NORMAL POINT IN THEIR FLOW, AS WELL AS THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, AND FAILED TO RECOGNIZE AND RETURN TO THE PLACE WHERE THE INTERRUPTION OCCURRED. MENTALLY, WE BELIEVED THE CALL HAD BEEN MADE TO GND CTL. THE PIC AND FO HAD 42 YRS OF EXPERIENCE WITHOUT ANYTHING EVEN CLOSE TO HIS NATURE EVER HAPPENING. IT WAS A HUMBLING EXPERIENCE THE ENTIRE CREW WILL NEVER FORGET. THIS CREW WILL SUBMIT A RPT TO THE COMPANY AND UNION'S SAFETY COMMITTEE IN HOPES THAT OTHER PLTS WILL LEARN FROM THIS MISTAKE, AS WELL AS, A RECOMMENDATION TO STANDARDIZE ALL BEFORE TKOF FUNCTIONS AND TASKS AFTER THE GND CTL CALL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.