Narrative:

After departing from dtw we were given a vector of 050 degrees to intercept 108 degree bearing into wings intersection. We were level at 10000 ft. We had a TCASII TA showing 'traffic' level with us, 10 O'clock 4 mi. Aircraft appeared on a southeast heading. Departure control issued a climb for us to 13000 ft and I immediately started climbing to resolve advisory. 'Traffic' continued to close showing 'level' and when it entered 2 mi circle we got a traffic resolution for a descent. Rather than try to reverse momentum of aircraft as I was now exceeding 1500 FPM, I pulled up immediately, giving us a climb rate in excess of 6000 FPM. 'Traffic' closed to within about 1/2 mi on TCASII indicator and showed 700 ft below us when it disappeared behind us. In the process of climbing to avoid 'traffic' I exceeded my 13000 ft clearance by 300 ft as I pushed over from my 6000 FPM climb rate. Subsequent information obtained showed 'traffic' was level at 10000 ft on a 120 degree heading when his TCASII spotted us and gave him a climb resolution. He started reacting to this resolution after departure control had issued a climb clearance to us to 13000 ft. Supplemental information from acn 206320: the captain elected to continue the climb as we were already well established and our knowledge of the intruder was that he was still at 10000 ft. We both advanced the thrust levers to the full forward limit achieving a climb rate in excess of 6000 FPM. At 1/2 to 1 mi, altitude separation started increasing and the target passed slightly behind and 700 ft below us. As we stopped our climb, we overshot our assigned altitude by 300 ft using an abrupt, negative-G, nose-down control input. No injuries were sustained because all occupants were still strapped in. The initial cause of this incident was seemingly dtw departure's failure to provide adequate separation. Of particular interest is a conversation held with the crew of the converging aircraft, an medium large transport, in which we were informed that they had received a TCASII RA to climb. This explains the difficulty we experienced in achieving vertical separation. The captain and I later questioned our decision to continue climb, ignoring the RA. My instinct at the time was to climb. We had no way of knowing the TCASII equipment or advisory status of medium large transport. Furthermore, had we reversed our flight profile to a descent, it is very likely that we would have worsened the situation descending into the converging target. The large transport's superb climb performance was definitely a helpful factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POTENTIAL CONFLICT LTSS.

Narrative: AFTER DEPARTING FROM DTW WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR OF 050 DEGS TO INTERCEPT 108 DEG BEARING INTO WINGS INTXN. WE WERE LEVEL AT 10000 FT. WE HAD A TCASII TA SHOWING 'TFC' LEVEL WITH US, 10 O'CLOCK 4 MI. ACFT APPEARED ON A SE HDG. DEP CTL ISSUED A CLB FOR US TO 13000 FT AND I IMMEDIATELY STARTED CLBING TO RESOLVE ADVISORY. 'TFC' CONTINUED TO CLOSE SHOWING 'LEVEL' AND WHEN IT ENTERED 2 MI CIRCLE WE GOT A TFC RESOLUTION FOR A DSCNT. RATHER THAN TRY TO REVERSE MOMENTUM OF ACFT AS I WAS NOW EXCEEDING 1500 FPM, I PULLED UP IMMEDIATELY, GIVING US A CLB RATE IN EXCESS OF 6000 FPM. 'TFC' CLOSED TO WITHIN ABOUT 1/2 MI ON TCASII INDICATOR AND SHOWED 700 FT BELOW US WHEN IT DISAPPEARED BEHIND US. IN THE PROCESS OF CLBING TO AVOID 'TFC' I EXCEEDED MY 13000 FT CLRNC BY 300 FT AS I PUSHED OVER FROM MY 6000 FPM CLB RATE. SUBSEQUENT INFO OBTAINED SHOWED 'TFC' WAS LEVEL AT 10000 FT ON A 120 DEG HDG WHEN HIS TCASII SPOTTED US AND GAVE HIM A CLB RESOLUTION. HE STARTED REACTING TO THIS RESOLUTION AFTER DEP CTL HAD ISSUED A CLB CLRNC TO US TO 13000 FT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 206320: THE CAPT ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE CLB AS WE WERE ALREADY WELL ESTABLISHED AND OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTRUDER WAS THAT HE WAS STILL AT 10000 FT. WE BOTH ADVANCED THE THRUST LEVERS TO THE FULL FORWARD LIMIT ACHIEVING A CLB RATE IN EXCESS OF 6000 FPM. AT 1/2 TO 1 MI, ALT SEPARATION STARTED INCREASING AND THE TARGET PASSED SLIGHTLY BEHIND AND 700 FT BELOW US. AS WE STOPPED OUR CLB, WE OVERSHOT OUR ASSIGNED ALT BY 300 FT USING AN ABRUPT, NEGATIVE-G, NOSE-DOWN CTL INPUT. NO INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED BECAUSE ALL OCCUPANTS WERE STILL STRAPPED IN. THE INITIAL CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS SEEMINGLY DTW DEP'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SEPARATION. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IS A CONVERSATION HELD WITH THE CREW OF THE CONVERGING ACFT, AN MLG, IN WHICH WE WERE INFORMED THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED A TCASII RA TO CLB. THIS EXPLAINS THE DIFFICULTY WE EXPERIENCED IN ACHIEVING VERT SEPARATION. THE CAPT AND I LATER QUESTIONED OUR DECISION TO CONTINUE CLB, IGNORING THE RA. MY INSTINCT AT THE TIME WAS TO CLB. WE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THE TCASII EQUIP OR ADVISORY STATUS OF MLG. FURTHERMORE, HAD WE REVERSED OUR FLT PROFILE TO A DSCNT, IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT WE WOULD HAVE WORSENED THE SITUATION DSNDING INTO THE CONVERGING TARGET. THE LGT'S SUPERB CLB PERFORMANCE WAS DEFINITELY A HELPFUL FACTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.