Narrative:

It was a clear day great visibility. We mistakenly made an approach to malmstrom AFB instead of gtf. We mistook malmstrom AFB for great falls airport. Reasons this occurred: 5 mi distance between airports. Both main runways 10000 ft or longer, aprons at base and secondary runway at gtf very similar but mirror image. No cautions or 'notes' on airport diagram to alert pilots of possible confusion. Airport diagram or approach plates showed where city was located mistake would not have happened. When we thought it might not be the correct airport considerable discussion took place, keeping our heads in the cockpit more than normal reviewing airport diagram and approach plate for VOR runway 21 approach. The DME at gtf was not a conclusive reference due its location (1.6 DME) southwest of airport, add to that a 2 mi runway, 7 mi final approach and the 10 mi radius could be believable at malmstrom AFB. No precision approach on runway 21 gtf. If an instrument approach had been flown, the problem would not have occurred. Guard ramp at gtf made military aircraft at base not out of place. ATC did not say anything until go around had already been initiated. It was discovered by; ramp and buildings on wrong side of runway. Xchk of VOR approach at gtf. Different VASI system although it was on left side of runway just like gtf. When the mistake was discovered we executed immediate go around and proceeded to gtf for uneventful approach and landing. Human factors: perceptions judgements, decisions: we thought we were approaching the correct airport. We judged that it was the correct airport by available information such as runway confign, DME. Factors affecting human performance: first officer had been to the airport fairly recently and believed it was the right airport. Because the first officer had been into airport recently, captain believed it when first officer said it was the right airport. Scenario started about 20 mi from the airport. As we got closer, captain brought out concerns about correctness of airport based on ramp location. First officer felt it was still correct airport and stated so. Captain asked first officer to check airport diagram. First officer did and still felt it was the correct airport. First officer stated he felt the military aircraft were from the guard unit at gtf. When on 2 mi final, first officer realized it was wrong airport, said so, and suggested go around. Immediate go around was made as we added power approach control asked if we were lined up for 21 at gtf. We said no. A missed approach clearance was issued and an uneventful landing was made at gtf. ATC felt there were no problems because they owned all airspace at gtf and malmstrom AFB. There was no military traffic at the time. Had there been, the incident probably would not have occurred because approach control would have maneuvered us around. I think the incident occurred because of mindset by first officer and slowness of captain to react when questions arose.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WRONG ARPT APCH FINALLY RECOGNIZED AND PIC MAKES A MISSED APCH.

Narrative: IT WAS A CLR DAY GREAT VISIBILITY. WE MISTAKENLY MADE AN APCH TO MALMSTROM AFB INSTEAD OF GTF. WE MISTOOK MALMSTROM AFB FOR GREAT FALLS ARPT. REASONS THIS OCCURRED: 5 MI DISTANCE BTWN ARPTS. BOTH MAIN RWYS 10000 FT OR LONGER, APRONS AT BASE AND SECONDARY RWY AT GTF VERY SIMILAR BUT MIRROR IMAGE. NO CAUTIONS OR 'NOTES' ON ARPT DIAGRAM TO ALERT PLTS OF POSSIBLE CONFUSION. ARPT DIAGRAM OR APCH PLATES SHOWED WHERE CITY WAS LOCATED MISTAKE WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. WHEN WE THOUGHT IT MIGHT NOT BE THE CORRECT ARPT CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE, KEEPING OUR HEADS IN THE COCKPIT MORE THAN NORMAL REVIEWING ARPT DIAGRAM AND APCH PLATE FOR VOR RWY 21 APCH. THE DME AT GTF WAS NOT A CONCLUSIVE REF DUE ITS LOCATION (1.6 DME) SW OF ARPT, ADD TO THAT A 2 MI RWY, 7 MI FINAL APCH AND THE 10 MI RADIUS COULD BE BELIEVABLE AT MALMSTROM AFB. NO PRECISION APCH ON RWY 21 GTF. IF AN INST APCH HAD BEEN FLOWN, THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. GUARD RAMP AT GTF MADE MIL ACFT AT BASE NOT OUT OF PLACE. ATC DID NOT SAY ANYTHING UNTIL GAR HAD ALREADY BEEN INITIATED. IT WAS DISCOVERED BY; RAMP AND BUILDINGS ON WRONG SIDE OF RWY. XCHK OF VOR APCH AT GTF. DIFFERENT VASI SYS ALTHOUGH IT WAS ON L SIDE OF RWY JUST LIKE GTF. WHEN THE MISTAKE WAS DISCOVERED WE EXECUTED IMMEDIATE GAR AND PROCEEDED TO GTF FOR UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG. HUMAN FACTORS: PERCEPTIONS JUDGEMENTS, DECISIONS: WE THOUGHT WE WERE APCHING THE CORRECT ARPT. WE JUDGED THAT IT WAS THE CORRECT ARPT BY AVAILABLE INFO SUCH AS RWY CONFIGN, DME. FACTORS AFFECTING HUMAN PERFORMANCE: FO HAD BEEN TO THE ARPT FAIRLY RECENTLY AND BELIEVED IT WAS THE RIGHT ARPT. BECAUSE THE FO HAD BEEN INTO ARPT RECENTLY, CAPT BELIEVED IT WHEN FO SAID IT WAS THE RIGHT ARPT. SCENARIO STARTED ABOUT 20 MI FROM THE ARPT. AS WE GOT CLOSER, CAPT BROUGHT OUT CONCERNS ABOUT CORRECTNESS OF ARPT BASED ON RAMP LOCATION. FO FELT IT WAS STILL CORRECT ARPT AND STATED SO. CAPT ASKED FO TO CHK ARPT DIAGRAM. FO DID AND STILL FELT IT WAS THE CORRECT ARPT. FO STATED HE FELT THE MIL ACFT WERE FROM THE GUARD UNIT AT GTF. WHEN ON 2 MI FINAL, FO REALIZED IT WAS WRONG ARPT, SAID SO, AND SUGGESTED GAR. IMMEDIATE GAR WAS MADE AS WE ADDED PWR APCH CTL ASKED IF WE WERE LINED UP FOR 21 AT GTF. WE SAID NO. A MISSED APCH CLRNC WAS ISSUED AND AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG WAS MADE AT GTF. ATC FELT THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS BECAUSE THEY OWNED ALL AIRSPACE AT GTF AND MALMSTROM AFB. THERE WAS NO MIL TFC AT THE TIME. HAD THERE BEEN, THE INCIDENT PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED BECAUSE APCH CTL WOULD HAVE MANEUVERED US AROUND. I THINK THE INCIDENT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF MINDSET BY FO AND SLOWNESS OF CAPT TO REACT WHEN QUESTIONS AROSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.