Narrative:

The aircraft referenced in this report has an autoplt/flight director system. Maintenance suggestion was to fly the aircraft to kisp where they had the facilities to solve the problem. It was suggested to disconnect the autoplt rudder trim servo and the aircraft rudder servo. This action would still leave the aircraft with an autoplt system although its reaction would not be as precise. This action was performed by FBO maintenance. I personally inspected the aircraft and ascertained that these 2 units were disconnected, properly safetied and the cannon plugs wrapped in plastic to protect them. It was decided to make the flight under VFR conditions. A logbook entry was inserted on apr/mon/92 while the aircraft was being svced at kisp. Since the aircraft was going to the FBO facility, I researched the logs and outstanding discrepancies to have them taken care of. I found that the 24 month transponder and altitude checks were overdue. I had assumed these were complied with at the annual inspection which was performed in oct 1991 when the static system and fuel calibration checks were performed. The other discrepancy items were as follows: 1. Left hand beta light does not come on when depressing the unfeathering switch. Requires the switch to be depressed again in order to get a light. Once light is on start/nts test is normal. 2. On the last landing the stick shaker activated on rollout. 3. Rear-facing port seat recliner button is inoperative. At (FBO) all discrepancies were solved. The problem with the (aircraft) autoplt/flight director was attributed to the (aircraft) rudder trim computer. All ground tests of all discrepancy items were completed and a flight test of the (aircraft) autoplt/flight director was authorized by the maintenance facility. A flight test was performed. I was PIC and a mechanic was on board to oversee their work and manufacturer's representative of (autoplt) was on board to observe the autoplt operation. Start-up, taxi, and takeoff were normal. We requested and were cleared eastbound to 7500 ft to perform the autoplt test. At about 4000 ft, we saw and smelled smoke in the cabin. It was determined that the cause was not electrical but a bleed air overheat. The environmental panel was checked. It was normal, both engines on automatic position and in the maximum cool position and all circuit breakers were depressed. The annunciator panel showed a 'defog overtemp.' ram air was selected on the environmental panel. We reported 'smoke in the cabin and requested to return to kisp to depctl. We were cleared to return to kisp and land on any runway. Landing and taxi were uneventful but there was smoke in the cabin and the cabin temperature was hot. After landing we discussed the incident with the emergency vehicle crew and 2 FAA representatives. They are now looking into the problem. 2 representatives from the FAA boarded the aircraft and idented themselves. They requested and were shown the following documents: 1. Pilot certificate. 2. Pilot's medical. 3. Aircraft airworthiness certificate. 4. Aircraft registration. 5. Radio station license. All the above were examined and found to be in order. They requested amel. I told them we do not maintain an MEL for the aircraft. They requested to examine the aircraft records, which were not on board, but they examined them at the (air carrier) facility. Their questions seemed to indicate the following: 1. A concern that no log entries were in the aircraft records substantiating the work done by (FBO) and (FBO) at khpn on the autoplt. 2. Not having an MEL, was it proper to fly the aircraft from khpn with the (aircraft) rudder trim servo and the (autoplt) rudder servo disengaged? The autoplt would function, but this would cause the yaw damper to be inoperative. Would this constitute an inoperative instrument or piece of equipment? 3. They did not question the fact that the altimeters and transponders were beyond inspection limits prior to them being checked at the (FBO) facility. They said they did not know if there was any violation. They would have to report the incident back to operations for a decision. The applicable rules of operating an aircraft without an MEL will have to be reached in more detail I will seek advice on this matter from the FAA. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he had not heard from the FAA regarding the requirement for an aircraft MEL or any proposed action. Analyst advised reporter that section 91.213 of the FARS require all turbine pwred aircraft to have an approved MEL accompanied by a letter of approval in the aircraft. Further, the yaw damper and autoplt would be covered with regard to any operation being permitted when they were inoperative. He was advised to request a copy of the master MEL from the local FSDO and was recommended to seek help in establishing his own aircraft MEL from the nbaa, of which he is a member, and present that to the FAA for approval.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF SMT TURBOPROP ACFT EXPERIENCED SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT ON A MAINT CHK FLT AND RETURNED TO THE ARPT, RESULTING IN A RAMP CHK BY THE FAA WHO FOUND THAT THE FLT WAS IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE ACFT MEL PROVISIONS.

Narrative: THE ACFT REFERENCED IN THIS RPT HAS AN AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR SYS. MAINT SUGGESTION WAS TO FLY THE ACFT TO KISP WHERE THEY HAD THE FACILITIES TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO DISCONNECT THE AUTOPLT RUDDER TRIM SERVO AND THE ACFT RUDDER SERVO. THIS ACTION WOULD STILL LEAVE THE ACFT WITH AN AUTOPLT SYS ALTHOUGH ITS REACTION WOULD NOT BE AS PRECISE. THIS ACTION WAS PERFORMED BY FBO MAINT. I PERSONALLY INSPECTED THE ACFT AND ASCERTAINED THAT THESE 2 UNITS WERE DISCONNECTED, PROPERLY SAFETIED AND THE CANNON PLUGS WRAPPED IN PLASTIC TO PROTECT THEM. IT WAS DECIDED TO MAKE THE FLT UNDER VFR CONDITIONS. A LOGBOOK ENTRY WAS INSERTED ON APR/MON/92 WHILE THE ACFT WAS BEING SVCED AT KISP. SINCE THE ACFT WAS GOING TO THE FBO FACILITY, I RESEARCHED THE LOGS AND OUTSTANDING DISCREPANCIES TO HAVE THEM TAKEN CARE OF. I FOUND THAT THE 24 MONTH TRANSPONDER AND ALT CHKS WERE OVERDUE. I HAD ASSUMED THESE WERE COMPLIED WITH AT THE ANNUAL INSPECTION WHICH WAS PERFORMED IN OCT 1991 WHEN THE STATIC SYS AND FUEL CALIBRATION CHKS WERE PERFORMED. THE OTHER DISCREPANCY ITEMS WERE AS FOLLOWS: 1. L HAND BETA LIGHT DOES NOT COME ON WHEN DEPRESSING THE UNFEATHERING SWITCH. REQUIRES THE SWITCH TO BE DEPRESSED AGAIN IN ORDER TO GET A LIGHT. ONCE LIGHT IS ON START/NTS TEST IS NORMAL. 2. ON THE LAST LNDG THE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED ON ROLLOUT. 3. REAR-FACING PORT SEAT RECLINER BUTTON IS INOP. AT (FBO) ALL DISCREPANCIES WERE SOLVED. THE PROBLEM WITH THE (ACFT) AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE (ACFT) RUDDER TRIM COMPUTER. ALL GND TESTS OF ALL DISCREPANCY ITEMS WERE COMPLETED AND A FLT TEST OF THE (ACFT) AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE MAINT FACILITY. A FLT TEST WAS PERFORMED. I WAS PIC AND A MECH WAS ON BOARD TO OVERSEE THEIR WORK AND MANUFACTURER'S REPRESENTATIVE OF (AUTOPLT) WAS ON BOARD TO OBSERVE THE AUTOPLT OP. START-UP, TAXI, AND TKOF WERE NORMAL. WE REQUESTED AND WERE CLRED EBOUND TO 7500 FT TO PERFORM THE AUTOPLT TEST. AT ABOUT 4000 FT, WE SAW AND SMELLED SMOKE IN THE CABIN. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE CAUSE WAS NOT ELECTRICAL BUT A BLEED AIR OVERHEAT. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PANEL WAS CHKED. IT WAS NORMAL, BOTH ENGS ON AUTOMATIC POS AND IN THE MAX COOL POS AND ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE DEPRESSED. THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL SHOWED A 'DEFOG OVERTEMP.' RAM AIR WAS SELECTED ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL PANEL. WE RPTED 'SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND REQUESTED TO RETURN TO KISP TO DEPCTL. WE WERE CLRED TO RETURN TO KISP AND LAND ON ANY RWY. LNDG AND TAXI WERE UNEVENTFUL BUT THERE WAS SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND THE CABIN TEMP WAS HOT. AFTER LNDG WE DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT WITH THE EMER VEHICLE CREW AND 2 FAA REPRESENTATIVES. THEY ARE NOW LOOKING INTO THE PROBLEM. 2 REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE FAA BOARDED THE ACFT AND IDENTED THEMSELVES. THEY REQUESTED AND WERE SHOWN THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS: 1. PLT CERTIFICATE. 2. PLT'S MEDICAL. 3. ACFT AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE. 4. ACFT REGISTRATION. 5. RADIO STATION LICENSE. ALL THE ABOVE WERE EXAMINED AND FOUND TO BE IN ORDER. THEY REQUESTED AMEL. I TOLD THEM WE DO NOT MAINTAIN AN MEL FOR THE ACFT. THEY REQUESTED TO EXAMINE THE ACFT RECORDS, WHICH WERE NOT ON BOARD, BUT THEY EXAMINED THEM AT THE (ACR) FACILITY. THEIR QUESTIONS SEEMED TO INDICATE THE FOLLOWING: 1. A CONCERN THAT NO LOG ENTRIES WERE IN THE ACFT RECORDS SUBSTANTIATING THE WORK DONE BY (FBO) AND (FBO) AT KHPN ON THE AUTOPLT. 2. NOT HAVING AN MEL, WAS IT PROPER TO FLY THE ACFT FROM KHPN WITH THE (ACFT) RUDDER TRIM SERVO AND THE (AUTOPLT) RUDDER SERVO DISENGAGED? THE AUTOPLT WOULD FUNCTION, BUT THIS WOULD CAUSE THE YAW DAMPER TO BE INOP. WOULD THIS CONSTITUTE AN INOP INST OR PIECE OF EQUIP? 3. THEY DID NOT QUESTION THE FACT THAT THE ALTIMETERS AND TRANSPONDERS WERE BEYOND INSPECTION LIMITS PRIOR TO THEM BEING CHKED AT THE (FBO) FACILITY. THEY SAID THEY DID NOT KNOW IF THERE WAS ANY VIOLATION. THEY WOULD HAVE TO RPT THE INCIDENT BACK TO OPS FOR A DECISION. THE APPLICABLE RULES OF OPERATING AN ACFT WITHOUT AN MEL WILL HAVE TO BE REACHED IN MORE DETAIL I WILL SEEK ADVICE ON THIS MATTER FROM THE FAA. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD FROM THE FAA REGARDING THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN ACFT MEL OR ANY PROPOSED ACTION. ANALYST ADVISED RPTR THAT SECTION 91.213 OF THE FARS REQUIRE ALL TURBINE PWRED ACFT TO HAVE AN APPROVED MEL ACCOMPANIED BY A LETTER OF APPROVAL IN THE ACFT. FURTHER, THE YAW DAMPER AND AUTOPLT WOULD BE COVERED WITH REGARD TO ANY OP BEING PERMITTED WHEN THEY WERE INOP. HE WAS ADVISED TO REQUEST A COPY OF THE MASTER MEL FROM THE LCL FSDO AND WAS RECOMMENDED TO SEEK HELP IN ESTABLISHING HIS OWN ACFT MEL FROM THE NBAA, OF WHICH HE IS A MEMBER, AND PRESENT THAT TO THE FAA FOR APPROVAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.