Narrative:

The first officer was flying. Our flight was planned at FL270, however, we were cleared to cruise at FL290 for a better ride. The FMC was not updated to cruise at FL290. We were cleared to cross clarr at 13000 ft and 250 KTS. As we approached clarr, I reminded the first officer of our crossing restr, as my mental calculations said we should be descending, even though our computer did not. As we proceeded on toward clarr, it became obvious that we needed to start our descent now. I checked the FMC -- found the error and told the first officer to start down. I hadn't been more insistent to start down earlier because the first officer was a very experienced pilot, and I've found in the past that his planning was as good as mine. (A mistake because I'm the one that's ultimately responsible. I should have at least been more vocal in my concerns.) we crossed clarr at 250 KTS and 400 ft high. As we continued the STAR, we were to cross povac at 9000 ft and 210 KTS. We crossed at 9000 ft and 240 KTS, and I'm sure the first officer would have continued at that speed if I had not told him to slow down now. The rest of the approach and landing were normal and ATC never commented on our errors during the rest of our flying day. I made it a point to make sure that the first officer made all of his crossing restrs. As the day continued, it was obvious that the first officer had been fatigued all day long. That's not an excuse, because I not only should have noticed that, but I should have been more forceful with my 'hints' about our xings. There is a tendency not to want to give 'flying lessons' to experienced first officer's but that's certainly not an excuse to not make clearance limitations. A lesson learned and taken.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CAPT ATTEMPTS TO KEEP EXPERIENCED FO 'ON TOP' OF SKEBR XING RESTR COMPLIANCE AFTER RECOGNIZING FO'S FATIGUE LEVEL HAS IMPACTED HIS ABILITY TO MULTITASK.

Narrative: THE FO WAS FLYING. OUR FLT WAS PLANNED AT FL270, HOWEVER, WE WERE CLRED TO CRUISE AT FL290 FOR A BETTER RIDE. THE FMC WAS NOT UPDATED TO CRUISE AT FL290. WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS CLARR AT 13000 FT AND 250 KTS. AS WE APCHED CLARR, I REMINDED THE FO OF OUR XING RESTR, AS MY MENTAL CALCULATIONS SAID WE SHOULD BE DSNDING, EVEN THOUGH OUR COMPUTER DID NOT. AS WE PROCEEDED ON TOWARD CLARR, IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT WE NEEDED TO START OUR DSCNT NOW. I CHKED THE FMC -- FOUND THE ERROR AND TOLD THE FO TO START DOWN. I HADN'T BEEN MORE INSISTENT TO START DOWN EARLIER BECAUSE THE FO WAS A VERY EXPERIENCED PLT, AND I'VE FOUND IN THE PAST THAT HIS PLANNING WAS AS GOOD AS MINE. (A MISTAKE BECAUSE I'M THE ONE THAT'S ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE. I SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST BEEN MORE VOCAL IN MY CONCERNS.) WE CROSSED CLARR AT 250 KTS AND 400 FT HIGH. AS WE CONTINUED THE STAR, WE WERE TO CROSS POVAC AT 9000 FT AND 210 KTS. WE CROSSED AT 9000 FT AND 240 KTS, AND I'M SURE THE FO WOULD HAVE CONTINUED AT THAT SPD IF I HAD NOT TOLD HIM TO SLOW DOWN NOW. THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG WERE NORMAL AND ATC NEVER COMMENTED ON OUR ERRORS DURING THE REST OF OUR FLYING DAY. I MADE IT A POINT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE FO MADE ALL OF HIS XING RESTRS. AS THE DAY CONTINUED, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE FO HAD BEEN FATIGUED ALL DAY LONG. THAT'S NOT AN EXCUSE, BECAUSE I NOT ONLY SHOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT, BUT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FORCEFUL WITH MY 'HINTS' ABOUT OUR XINGS. THERE IS A TENDENCY NOT TO WANT TO GIVE 'FLYING LESSONS' TO EXPERIENCED FO'S BUT THAT'S CERTAINLY NOT AN EXCUSE TO NOT MAKE CLRNC LIMITATIONS. A LESSON LEARNED AND TAKEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.