37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 226264 |
Time | |
Date | 199208 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : zan |
State Reference | AK |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 37000 msl bound upper : 37000 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Widebody, Low Wing, 4 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Route In Use | enroute : other oceanic enroute : pacific enroute airway : zan |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Route In Use | enroute : pacific enroute : other oceanic |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : non radar |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Experience | controller radar : 15 |
ASRS Report | 226264 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : non radar |
Qualification | controller : developmental |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : required legal separation non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 66000 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error Intra Facility Coordination Failure |
Narrative:
I assumed the sectors with a trainee. 2 oceanic sectors were combined. On the sector briefing we either missed the lack of separation by time/altitude or the strips were mismarked. Aircraft were 2 mins, 11 mi apart at FL370. Leading aircraft climbed to FL390 after loss of separation became evident. This occurred 5 mins after assumed sectors. In my opinion this error occurred for 3 principal reasons. 1) the 2 controllers I relieved had great confidence in one another. 2) the previous 'right' controller climbed the following aircraft on radar without being aware of a non- radar aircraft on a converging course at the same altitude. The 'D' controller was on landline making transfers to tokyo center and was not aware of action creating the confliction. He did not doublechk the 'right' controller's action, and the 'right' controller assumed the 'D' would advise him if there were potential conflictions. 3) a last reason is that I had so much confidence in the controllers I relieved that I did not thoroughly preview the sectors I assumed for potential conflictions.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: 2 ACFT IN NON RADAR ENVIRONMENT ARE INVOLVED IN LTSS DUE TO INTRAFAC COORD BREAKDOWN.
Narrative: I ASSUMED THE SECTORS WITH A TRAINEE. 2 OCEANIC SECTORS WERE COMBINED. ON THE SECTOR BRIEFING WE EITHER MISSED THE LACK OF SEPARATION BY TIME/ALT OR THE STRIPS WERE MISMARKED. ACFT WERE 2 MINS, 11 MI APART AT FL370. LEADING ACFT CLBED TO FL390 AFTER LOSS OF SEPARATION BECAME EVIDENT. THIS OCCURRED 5 MINS AFTER ASSUMED SECTORS. IN MY OPINION THIS ERROR OCCURRED FOR 3 PRINCIPAL REASONS. 1) THE 2 CTLRS I RELIEVED HAD GREAT CONFIDENCE IN ONE ANOTHER. 2) THE PREVIOUS 'R' CTLR CLBED THE FOLLOWING ACFT ON RADAR WITHOUT BEING AWARE OF A NON- RADAR ACFT ON A CONVERGING COURSE AT THE SAME ALT. THE 'D' CTLR WAS ON LANDLINE MAKING TRANSFERS TO TOKYO CTR AND WAS NOT AWARE OF ACTION CREATING THE CONFLICTION. HE DID NOT DOUBLECHK THE 'R' CTLR'S ACTION, AND THE 'R' CTLR ASSUMED THE 'D' WOULD ADVISE HIM IF THERE WERE POTENTIAL CONFLICTIONS. 3) A LAST REASON IS THAT I HAD SO MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THE CTLRS I RELIEVED THAT I DID NOT THOROUGHLY PREVIEW THE SECTORS I ASSUMED FOR POTENTIAL CONFLICTIONS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.