Narrative:

Takeoff warning horn sounded at the start of the takeoff roll. A quick check showed all controls and switches correctly positioned. We exited the runway and did another 'before takeoff' checklist. All was in order. The automatic spoiler system was on MEL with the circuit breaker pulled so the automatic retract system was not functioning. The speed brake handle was down in the detent, but when we wiggled it a bit, the horn quit. The automatic retract system pulls the handle forward and down hard, and my guess is that, while the handle was in the slot, it might have just been off the micro switch. The only way we could have discovered the problem was by advancing the throttles before entering the runway. While this is a checklist procedure on other types of aircraft, it is not in the checklist for the medium large transport. This crew did all checklists properly. In fact, I am filling out this form to preclude penalties in case of FAA enforcement action. Our poi has, in the past, treated takeoff warning horn activation as conclusive and irrefutable proof of improper checklist usage. As demonstrated by this occurrence, the presumption is incorrect. Recently, we have been told that so called 'nuisance' warnings will not result in enforcement action in the absence of a return to the gate for maintenance follow-up. If true, this is a good move to enhance safety by the FAA. But as always, I remain deeply suspicious of FAA actions, and will therefore cya with this report. Supplemental information from acn 231822: should incorporate throttle check in before takeoff checks.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MLG ABORTED ITS TKOF DUE TO THE SPOILER HANDLE NOT BEING FULL DOWN.

Narrative: TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDED AT THE START OF THE TKOF ROLL. A QUICK CHK SHOWED ALL CTLS AND SWITCHES CORRECTLY POSITIONED. WE EXITED THE RWY AND DID ANOTHER 'BEFORE TKOF' CHKLIST. ALL WAS IN ORDER. THE AUTO SPOILER SYS WAS ON MEL WITH THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PULLED SO THE AUTO RETRACT SYS WAS NOT FUNCTIONING. THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE WAS DOWN IN THE DETENT, BUT WHEN WE WIGGLED IT A BIT, THE HORN QUIT. THE AUTO RETRACT SYS PULLS THE HANDLE FORWARD AND DOWN HARD, AND MY GUESS IS THAT, WHILE THE HANDLE WAS IN THE SLOT, IT MIGHT HAVE JUST BEEN OFF THE MICRO SWITCH. THE ONLY WAY WE COULD HAVE DISCOVERED THE PROB WAS BY ADVANCING THE THROTTLES BEFORE ENTERING THE RWY. WHILE THIS IS A CHKLIST PROC ON OTHER TYPES OF ACFT, IT IS NOT IN THE CHKLIST FOR THE MLG. THIS CREW DID ALL CHKLISTS PROPERLY. IN FACT, I AM FILLING OUT THIS FORM TO PRECLUDE PENALTIES IN CASE OF FAA ENFORCEMENT ACTION. OUR POI HAS, IN THE PAST, TREATED TKOF WARNING HORN ACTIVATION AS CONCLUSIVE AND IRREFUTABLE PROOF OF IMPROPER CHKLIST USAGE. AS DEMONSTRATED BY THIS OCCURRENCE, THE PRESUMPTION IS INCORRECT. RECENTLY, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT SO CALLED 'NUISANCE' WARNINGS WILL NOT RESULT IN ENFORCEMENT ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF A RETURN TO THE GATE FOR MAINT FOLLOW-UP. IF TRUE, THIS IS A GOOD MOVE TO ENHANCE SAFETY BY THE FAA. BUT AS ALWAYS, I REMAIN DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF FAA ACTIONS, AND WILL THEREFORE CYA WITH THIS RPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 231822: SHOULD INCORPORATE THROTTLE CHK IN BEFORE TKOF CHKS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.