Narrative:

I have never, repeat never, flown a missed approach as published. I have always been given a different heading than that which is published, primarily for traffic reasons. It appears that most missed approach procedures are set up to conform to the departure procedure for that runway. That is fine, except for when another aircraft is taking off and is already using that corridor. Here is what happened. Lda DME 18 approach in use. We were cleared for the approach and intercepted the lda and GS and began our descent to MDA of 720 ft. Upon reaching MDA, I could see lights to the left and right along the river and the strobe on the 14TH street bridge, but I could not see the runway or approach lights for 18. The first officer asked, 'do you see it?' 'no,' I answered. The first officer called 'missed approach, maximum power, flaps 15, positive rate gear up,' and we commenced the missed approach. I called the tower and said, 'flight number missed approach.' at that instant we received a TCASII warning of 'traffic, traffic!' the alert was generated by an aircraft which had just lifted off ahead of us and was climbing, although I did not have to look at the scope to know that and gave it hardly more than a glance. The normal departure clearance for dca is the 183 degree radial of dca and climb to 5000. The tower called back and said, 'did someone say that they are making a missed approach?' (or something to that effect). Before I could transmit my reply, another aircraft made an initial call onto the frequency. When he unkeyed his microphone, I repeated my missed approach call and the tower gave us a heading to the east and told us to maintain 2000 ft and contact approach control. Let me say that all this takes much longer to read than it did to do at the time. The workload in the cockpit during a missed approach is greater than that of a rejected takeoff and the potential for disaster is even higher. We were adding power, changing confign of the aircraft, talking on the radio, complying with a change of clearance (change to published missed approach procedure), checking a TCASII alert, repeating a radio call, changing the missed approach altitude, and trying to do this while the TCASII screams 'traffic, traffic.' a missed approach is usually a surprise to both the flight crew and the tower controller since when the WX is reported below minimums, the approach cannot be commenced. This surprise adds to the cockpit and tower workload and confusion during this maneuver. When you add radio congestion and TCASII alerts during these few seconds, the potential for disaster is high. A very simple solution to this problem exists. Publish a realistic missed approach procedure that takes departure traffic into account and provides needed separation. That way, a controller does not have to make a change in the clearance for traffic separation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG ON MISSED APCH FROM LDA RWY 18 APCH CONFLICTS WITH A DEP FROM RWY 18 AND RECEIVES A TCASII ALERT.

Narrative: I HAVE NEVER, REPEAT NEVER, FLOWN A MISSED APCH AS PUBLISHED. I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN GIVEN A DIFFERENT HDG THAN THAT WHICH IS PUBLISHED, PRIMARILY FOR TFC REASONS. IT APPEARS THAT MOST MISSED APCH PROCS ARE SET UP TO CONFORM TO THE DEP PROC FOR THAT RWY. THAT IS FINE, EXCEPT FOR WHEN ANOTHER ACFT IS TAKING OFF AND IS ALREADY USING THAT CORRIDOR. HERE IS WHAT HAPPENED. LDA DME 18 APCH IN USE. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND INTERCEPTED THE LDA AND GS AND BEGAN OUR DSCNT TO MDA OF 720 FT. UPON REACHING MDA, I COULD SEE LIGHTS TO THE L AND R ALONG THE RIVER AND THE STROBE ON THE 14TH STREET BRIDGE, BUT I COULD NOT SEE THE RWY OR APCH LIGHTS FOR 18. THE FO ASKED, 'DO YOU SEE IT?' 'NO,' I ANSWERED. THE FO CALLED 'MISSED APCH, MAX PWR, FLAPS 15, POSITIVE RATE GEAR UP,' AND WE COMMENCED THE MISSED APCH. I CALLED THE TWR AND SAID, 'FLT NUMBER MISSED APCH.' AT THAT INSTANT WE RECEIVED A TCASII WARNING OF 'TFC, TFC!' THE ALERT WAS GENERATED BY AN ACFT WHICH HAD JUST LIFTED OFF AHEAD OF US AND WAS CLBING, ALTHOUGH I DID NOT HAVE TO LOOK AT THE SCOPE TO KNOW THAT AND GAVE IT HARDLY MORE THAN A GLANCE. THE NORMAL DEP CLRNC FOR DCA IS THE 183 DEG RADIAL OF DCA AND CLB TO 5000. THE TWR CALLED BACK AND SAID, 'DID SOMEONE SAY THAT THEY ARE MAKING A MISSED APCH?' (OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT). BEFORE I COULD XMIT MY REPLY, ANOTHER ACFT MADE AN INITIAL CALL ONTO THE FREQ. WHEN HE UNKEYED HIS MIKE, I REPEATED MY MISSED APCH CALL AND THE TWR GAVE US A HDG TO THE E AND TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 2000 FT AND CONTACT APCH CTL. LET ME SAY THAT ALL THIS TAKES MUCH LONGER TO READ THAN IT DID TO DO AT THE TIME. THE WORKLOAD IN THE COCKPIT DURING A MISSED APCH IS GREATER THAN THAT OF A REJECTED TKOF AND THE POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER IS EVEN HIGHER. WE WERE ADDING PWR, CHANGING CONFIGN OF THE ACFT, TALKING ON THE RADIO, COMPLYING WITH A CHANGE OF CLRNC (CHANGE TO PUBLISHED MISSED APCH PROC), CHKING A TCASII ALERT, REPEATING A RADIO CALL, CHANGING THE MISSED APCH ALT, AND TRYING TO DO THIS WHILE THE TCASII SCREAMS 'TFC, TFC.' A MISSED APCH IS USUALLY A SURPRISE TO BOTH THE FLC AND THE TWR CTLR SINCE WHEN THE WX IS RPTED BELOW MINIMUMS, THE APCH CANNOT BE COMMENCED. THIS SURPRISE ADDS TO THE COCKPIT AND TWR WORKLOAD AND CONFUSION DURING THIS MANEUVER. WHEN YOU ADD RADIO CONGESTION AND TCASII ALERTS DURING THESE FEW SECONDS, THE POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER IS HIGH. A VERY SIMPLE SOLUTION TO THIS PROB EXISTS. PUBLISH A REALISTIC MISSED APCH PROC THAT TAKES DEP TFC INTO ACCOUNT AND PROVIDES NEEDED SEPARATION. THAT WAY, A CTLR DOES NOT HAVE TO MAKE A CHANGE IN THE CLRNC FOR TFC SEPARATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.