Narrative:

Our newly purchased aircraft was being returned to service from a 1 yr maintenance project. The maintenance facility requested a long flight to accept the aircraft. I notified the company of the request, they then scheduled a flight to dca for business. I elected to have our mechanic and their mechanic go on the flight. The flight to dca went uneventfully. On preflight the next day we found several system slow to come up, however, all did. We received our clearance and taxi to runway 36 hold. We were then clear for takeoff. Just after starting to roll we got a master caution warning and aborted takeoff. Tower cleared us to the runway 36 holding area. We, with the company mechanic, did the checklist items and cleared the warning. We were again cleared into position and cleared for takeoff. Just after takeoff a stall protection warning came on followed by a master caution. I did the memory items and put the copilot into the checklist, the mechanic was helping at this time. My attention became concentrated on checklists and did not totally comply with the noise abatement procedure. Just about 2 mins after departure, ATC inquired about our departure instruction. We read back what we had received from clearance and were given a vector. We later learned that we may have intruded into prohibited airspace. 3 things could have taken place to avoid this incident: 1) not mixing maintenance with business. 2) less people involved in checklist. 3) a change in the name of the departure procedure, it is far more than a noise abatement procedure. Recommend a SID designation and separate noise procedure. Supplemental information from acn 232767: we landed at bedford, ma (bed) and called the tower. They said we had flown over the white house and into prohibited airspace, and that the cia would be contacting us. We explained our in-flight problem and gave reasons why we went straight ahead. It is in my estimation that if we had no flight control problem when we initially positioned on the runway it would not have interrupted the routine of the controller and that he would have given us initial departure instructions to clear the airspace. It is also my opinion that we might not have missed the turn if our stall protection system had not acted up, and our attention was not diverted from flying. Most controllers vector the planes before the situation occurs but the controller's call was not received till after the fact. I believe the problem could have been prevented by better communications between controller and pilot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HDG TRACK DEV DEVELOPS INTO AN UNAUTH PENETRATION OF AIRSPACE. PROX OF PROHIBITED AREA.

Narrative: OUR NEWLY PURCHASED ACFT WAS BEING RETURNED TO SVC FROM A 1 YR MAINT PROJECT. THE MAINT FACILITY REQUESTED A LONG FLT TO ACCEPT THE ACFT. I NOTIFIED THE COMPANY OF THE REQUEST, THEY THEN SCHEDULED A FLT TO DCA FOR BUSINESS. I ELECTED TO HAVE OUR MECH AND THEIR MECH GO ON THE FLT. THE FLT TO DCA WENT UNEVENTFULLY. ON PREFLT THE NEXT DAY WE FOUND SEVERAL SYS SLOW TO COME UP, HOWEVER, ALL DID. WE RECEIVED OUR CLRNC AND TAXI TO RWY 36 HOLD. WE WERE THEN CLR FOR TKOF. JUST AFTER STARTING TO ROLL WE GOT A MASTER CAUTION WARNING AND ABORTED TKOF. TWR CLRED US TO THE RWY 36 HOLDING AREA. WE, WITH THE COMPANY MECH, DID THE CHKLIST ITEMS AND CLRED THE WARNING. WE WERE AGAIN CLRED INTO POS AND CLRED FOR TKOF. JUST AFTER TKOF A STALL PROTECTION WARNING CAME ON FOLLOWED BY A MASTER CAUTION. I DID THE MEMORY ITEMS AND PUT THE COPLT INTO THE CHKLIST, THE MECH WAS HELPING AT THIS TIME. MY ATTN BECAME CONCENTRATED ON CHKLISTS AND DID NOT TOTALLY COMPLY WITH THE NOISE ABATEMENT PROC. JUST ABOUT 2 MINS AFTER DEP, ATC INQUIRED ABOUT OUR DEP INSTRUCTION. WE READ BACK WHAT WE HAD RECEIVED FROM CLRNC AND WERE GIVEN A VECTOR. WE LATER LEARNED THAT WE MAY HAVE INTRUDED INTO PROHIBITED AIRSPACE. 3 THINGS COULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE TO AVOID THIS INCIDENT: 1) NOT MIXING MAINT WITH BUSINESS. 2) LESS PEOPLE INVOLVED IN CHKLIST. 3) A CHANGE IN THE NAME OF THE DEP PROC, IT IS FAR MORE THAN A NOISE ABATEMENT PROC. RECOMMEND A SID DESIGNATION AND SEPARATE NOISE PROC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 232767: WE LANDED AT BEDFORD, MA (BED) AND CALLED THE TWR. THEY SAID WE HAD FLOWN OVER THE WHITE HOUSE AND INTO PROHIBITED AIRSPACE, AND THAT THE CIA WOULD BE CONTACTING US. WE EXPLAINED OUR INFLT PROB AND GAVE REASONS WHY WE WENT STRAIGHT AHEAD. IT IS IN MY ESTIMATION THAT IF WE HAD NO FLT CTL PROB WHEN WE INITIALLY POSITIONED ON THE RWY IT WOULD NOT HAVE INTERRUPTED THE ROUTINE OF THE CTLR AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE GIVEN US INITIAL DEP INSTRUCTIONS TO CLR THE AIRSPACE. IT IS ALSO MY OPINION THAT WE MIGHT NOT HAVE MISSED THE TURN IF OUR STALL PROTECTION SYS HAD NOT ACTED UP, AND OUR ATTN WAS NOT DIVERTED FROM FLYING. MOST CTLRS VECTOR THE PLANES BEFORE THE SIT OCCURS BUT THE CTLR'S CALL WAS NOT RECEIVED TILL AFTER THE FACT. I BELIEVE THE PROB COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY BETTER COMS BTWN CTLR AND PLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.