Narrative:

On feb/xx/93 at approximately XA00 hours, a widebody transport landed at sfo with #1 hydraulic quantity loss. Aircraft was recovered off a taxiway. It is my understanding that the recovery crew obtained a set of gear pins that were kept in a box labeled emergency only. My understanding from operating manager mr. X, 4 main gear pins were installed, and the pin they had for the nose gear was incorrect. Aircraft was towed to the gate for repairs. At XX50 hours I came on shift and aircraft was turned over to me. At this time we were remanufacturing an edp pressure line for #1 pylon. I had numerous tool return write-ups and a write-up stating all 5 year pins were installed. I received a verbal from day shift station maintenance controller, mr. Y, that there were only 4 main gear down lock pins installed and there was no pin in the nose gear due to the fact that they could not find one. At approximately XY30 hours we started installing the new hydraulic line. Aircraft had to depart by XY20 hours or trip would be cancelled due to curfew in seoul. When hydraulic line was installed and leak checked, I assigned a mechanic to remove all 5 gear pins. My mechanic removed 4 main gear pins and advised me he could not find a nose gear pin. I looked at the nose gear myself and was unable to locate a nose gear down lock pin. Paperwork was taken care of including the write-up for 5 gear pins. Aircraft departed at YY17 hours. On rotation 2 of my mechanics saw what they said looked like a landing gear hit a flock of birds. At the time they notified me we also got the word that the nose gear would not retract, aircraft was going to return to sfo and would be overgrossing its landing. I notified airfield safety of my situation and of my need to see how much rubber was on the runway. Upon seeing amount of rubber that was collected, and confirming my aircraft was the last one to use the runway, I notified my manager by radio that in my opinion the aircraft had thrown at least 1 recap and an overgrossed landing was unsafe. My understanding is that he followed proper channels to have the flight crew notified of their tire situation and our request to dump fuel and not land overgrossed. Aircraft landed safely but overgrossed landing. I recovered aircraft on taxiway and towed to gate due to #5F tire shredded its recap and brakes were very hot. Aircraft was towed with hydraulic system 1 and 4 pressurized. Our nose gear problem was a widebody transport steering bypass pin installed in the down lock, secured in place by its safety streamer, rendering its safety streamer, not visible. This pin was only visible by climbing into the nose gear wheel well. I discussed my findings with the captain and it's my understanding that he filed a formal complaint with air carrier. The captain felt that he should have been advised of the suspected condition of his tires and that an overgrossed landing was unsafe in his opinion, as his tires were compromised. I feel that when maintenance feels there is a safety issue with an aircraft the captain should be notified. If the correct landing gear pins were used initially, these 2 incidents would not have happened and aircraft safety would not have been compromised. It is my understanding that the flight safety committee has been requesting for yrs that each aircraft maintain its own set of gear pins on board, as equipped by manufacturer. On widebody transport there is a landing gear pin box located in the electronics compartment, but it contains no gear pins. It is my understanding from operating manager, mr. X, that day shift foreman, mr. Z, approved the use of a nonstandard pin in the nose gear. Such neglect for emergency policies and procedures is unacceptable at any level. I would like to request that the findings and reports of the flight safety committee be rereviewed. I believe that if each aircraft maintained its own set of gear pins, incidents like this would not happen and the safety of air travel would not have been compromised.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB RETURNS LANDS AFTER FAILURE TO RETRACT NOSEWHEEL AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: ON FEB/XX/93 AT APPROX XA00 HRS, A WDB LANDED AT SFO WITH #1 HYD QUANTITY LOSS. ACFT WAS RECOVERED OFF A TXWY. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE RECOVERY CREW OBTAINED A SET OF GEAR PINS THAT WERE KEPT IN A BOX LABELED EMER ONLY. MY UNDERSTANDING FROM OPERATING MGR MR. X, 4 MAIN GEAR PINS WERE INSTALLED, AND THE PIN THEY HAD FOR THE NOSE GEAR WAS INCORRECT. ACFT WAS TOWED TO THE GATE FOR REPAIRS. AT XX50 HRS I CAME ON SHIFT AND ACFT WAS TURNED OVER TO ME. AT THIS TIME WE WERE REMANUFACTURING AN EDP PRESSURE LINE FOR #1 PYLON. I HAD NUMEROUS TOOL RETURN WRITE-UPS AND A WRITE-UP STATING ALL 5 YEAR PINS WERE INSTALLED. I RECEIVED A VERBAL FROM DAY SHIFT STATION MAINT CTLR, MR. Y, THAT THERE WERE ONLY 4 MAIN GEAR DOWN LOCK PINS INSTALLED AND THERE WAS NO PIN IN THE NOSE GEAR DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY COULD NOT FIND ONE. AT APPROX XY30 HRS WE STARTED INSTALLING THE NEW HYD LINE. ACFT HAD TO DEPART BY XY20 HRS OR TRIP WOULD BE CANCELLED DUE TO CURFEW IN SEOUL. WHEN HYD LINE WAS INSTALLED AND LEAK CHKED, I ASSIGNED A MECH TO REMOVE ALL 5 GEAR PINS. MY MECH REMOVED 4 MAIN GEAR PINS AND ADVISED ME HE COULD NOT FIND A NOSE GEAR PIN. I LOOKED AT THE NOSE GEAR MYSELF AND WAS UNABLE TO LOCATE A NOSE GEAR DOWN LOCK PIN. PAPERWORK WAS TAKEN CARE OF INCLUDING THE WRITE-UP FOR 5 GEAR PINS. ACFT DEPARTED AT YY17 HRS. ON ROTATION 2 OF MY MECHS SAW WHAT THEY SAID LOOKED LIKE A LNDG GEAR HIT A FLOCK OF BIRDS. AT THE TIME THEY NOTIFIED ME WE ALSO GOT THE WORD THAT THE NOSE GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT, ACFT WAS GOING TO RETURN TO SFO AND WOULD BE OVERGROSSING ITS LNDG. I NOTIFIED AIRFIELD SAFETY OF MY SIT AND OF MY NEED TO SEE HOW MUCH RUBBER WAS ON THE RWY. UPON SEEING AMOUNT OF RUBBER THAT WAS COLLECTED, AND CONFIRMING MY ACFT WAS THE LAST ONE TO USE THE RWY, I NOTIFIED MY MGR BY RADIO THAT IN MY OPINION THE ACFT HAD THROWN AT LEAST 1 RECAP AND AN OVERGROSSED LNDG WAS UNSAFE. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT HE FOLLOWED PROPER CHANNELS TO HAVE THE FLC NOTIFIED OF THEIR TIRE SIT AND OUR REQUEST TO DUMP FUEL AND NOT LAND OVERGROSSED. ACFT LANDED SAFELY BUT OVERGROSSED LNDG. I RECOVERED ACFT ON TXWY AND TOWED TO GATE DUE TO #5F TIRE SHREDDED ITS RECAP AND BRAKES WERE VERY HOT. ACFT WAS TOWED WITH HYD SYS 1 AND 4 PRESSURIZED. OUR NOSE GEAR PROB WAS A WDB STEERING BYPASS PIN INSTALLED IN THE DOWN LOCK, SECURED IN PLACE BY ITS SAFETY STREAMER, RENDERING ITS SAFETY STREAMER, NOT VISIBLE. THIS PIN WAS ONLY VISIBLE BY CLBING INTO THE NOSE GEAR WHEEL WELL. I DISCUSSED MY FINDINGS WITH THE CAPT AND IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT HE FILED A FORMAL COMPLAINT WITH ACR. THE CAPT FELT THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE SUSPECTED CONDITION OF HIS TIRES AND THAT AN OVERGROSSED LNDG WAS UNSAFE IN HIS OPINION, AS HIS TIRES WERE COMPROMISED. I FEEL THAT WHEN MAINT FEELS THERE IS A SAFETY ISSUE WITH AN ACFT THE CAPT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. IF THE CORRECT LNDG GEAR PINS WERE USED INITIALLY, THESE 2 INCIDENTS WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED AND ACFT SAFETY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FLT SAFETY COMMITTEE HAS BEEN REQUESTING FOR YRS THAT EACH ACFT MAINTAIN ITS OWN SET OF GEAR PINS ON BOARD, AS EQUIPPED BY MANUFACTURER. ON WDB THERE IS A LNDG GEAR PIN BOX LOCATED IN THE ELECTRONICS COMPARTMENT, BUT IT CONTAINS NO GEAR PINS. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING FROM OPERATING MGR, MR. X, THAT DAY SHIFT FOREMAN, MR. Z, APPROVED THE USE OF A NONSTANDARD PIN IN THE NOSE GEAR. SUCH NEGLECT FOR EMER POLICIES AND PROCS IS UNACCEPTABLE AT ANY LEVEL. I WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST THAT THE FINDINGS AND RPTS OF THE FLT SAFETY COMMITTEE BE REREVIEWED. I BELIEVE THAT IF EACH ACFT MAINTAINED ITS OWN SET OF GEAR PINS, INCIDENTS LIKE THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN AND THE SAFETY OF AIR TRAVEL WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.