Narrative:

Birmingham airport was a marginal operation, having had 12 inches snow 2 days before this time. Ramps and some txwys had been plowed but no broomed and snow remaining on ramps (airline terminal) had turned to slush and refrozen with numerous ruts and large chunks of frozen snow/ice on the taxi route in and out of the terminal ramp. Runway 5/23 was plowed with 2000 ft (departure end) of runway 5 notamed closed. The runway surface itself to the width of the plowing was bare and dry with the approach end of runway 23 from the displaced threshold toward the 'closed' portion being narrower in width of plowed area. The snow/ice along the runway edge wasn't groomed. It was a shear berm between 18-24 inches high. With some large chunks sitting atop this berm. There were no barricades to mark the closed portion of the runway. We taxied out to depart on runway 23 from the displaced threshold which was in the 2000 ft notamed closed portion (ATIS). We asked ground control if the displaced threshold was available for takeoff or in fact closed. They said it was open and was available. We had to taxi back on runway because the parallel taxiway was closed. We made the turn in position approximately 200 ft beyond the displaced threshold to make sure we had all available length for this takeoff on runway 23. As we made the turn in position on runway 23 we approached the berm of snow/ice on the right side of runway before we turned left to depart. It looked close to the engine and I remarked 'you're getting close over here.' the captain then turned left into position on runway 23. I did not think we got too close to the berm at runway edge during this turn. With me flying we were cleared for takeoff, all indications normal, full power. At 132 KTS, 5 KTS prior to V1, the right engine began compressor stall still producing power, we aborted on the runway, and after having aircraft inspected for fire/hot brakes by airport emergency personnel, taxied back to gate. Right engine sustained damage to underside of cowling just aft of lip of cowling. And fan stage blades showed substantial damage as if from FOD. Chunks of blade tips were missing with several blades curled, split, twisted. There were no injuries and the airplane stopped well before end of runway. The brakes were not hot enough to melt the fuse plugs on tires, at least not within time that I observed them (approximately 30 mins after abort). Human performance considerations: being unable to see the engine from the cockpit, could have led to engine contacting berm prior to takeoff, although nothing was felt during the taxi out. The abort itself went well, however, just prior to V1 when the engine began to violently compressor stall, pop, shake airframe, etc, trained reactions to incidents affecting the go/no go decision become much more strained and confused. The noise was so loud that cogent communications between the pilots is impossible, especially in an medium large transport with the engines so close to the cockpit. I could hardly hear myself make the 'abort' call to the tower after it had begun. The training we have in the simulator for the rejected takeoff is so sedate by comparison with what we experienced above (i.e., engine spool down, engine fire warning, engine overheat warning) and not nearly so startling that I feel that the training would be improved if some loud sound effects were added with appropriate knowledge of how well a damaged, compressor stalling engine will hold together until it can be dealt with in the air, and not elicit a possibly 'knee jerk' abort under conditions less favorable than above, and resulting north a tragedy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG ENG HITS SNOW BERM WHILE TURNING TO ALIGN WITH CTRLINE. DAMAGED, TKOF ABORT.

Narrative: BIRMINGHAM ARPT WAS A MARGINAL OP, HAVING HAD 12 INCHES SNOW 2 DAYS BEFORE THIS TIME. RAMPS AND SOME TXWYS HAD BEEN PLOWED BUT NO BROOMED AND SNOW REMAINING ON RAMPS (AIRLINE TERMINAL) HAD TURNED TO SLUSH AND REFROZEN WITH NUMEROUS RUTS AND LARGE CHUNKS OF FROZEN SNOW/ICE ON THE TAXI RTE IN AND OUT OF THE TERMINAL RAMP. RWY 5/23 WAS PLOWED WITH 2000 FT (DEP END) OF RWY 5 NOTAMED CLOSED. THE RWY SURFACE ITSELF TO THE WIDTH OF THE PLOWING WAS BARE AND DRY WITH THE APCH END OF RWY 23 FROM THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD TOWARD THE 'CLOSED' PORTION BEING NARROWER IN WIDTH OF PLOWED AREA. THE SNOW/ICE ALONG THE RWY EDGE WASN'T GROOMED. IT WAS A SHEAR BERM BTWN 18-24 INCHES HIGH. WITH SOME LARGE CHUNKS SITTING ATOP THIS BERM. THERE WERE NO BARRICADES TO MARK THE CLOSED PORTION OF THE RWY. WE TAXIED OUT TO DEPART ON RWY 23 FROM THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD WHICH WAS IN THE 2000 FT NOTAMED CLOSED PORTION (ATIS). WE ASKED GND CTL IF THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD WAS AVAILABLE FOR TKOF OR IN FACT CLOSED. THEY SAID IT WAS OPEN AND WAS AVAILABLE. WE HAD TO TAXI BACK ON RWY BECAUSE THE PARALLEL TXWY WAS CLOSED. WE MADE THE TURN IN POS APPROX 200 FT BEYOND THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD TO MAKE SURE WE HAD ALL AVAILABLE LENGTH FOR THIS TKOF ON RWY 23. AS WE MADE THE TURN IN POS ON RWY 23 WE APCHED THE BERM OF SNOW/ICE ON THE R SIDE OF RWY BEFORE WE TURNED L TO DEPART. IT LOOKED CLOSE TO THE ENG AND I REMARKED 'YOU'RE GETTING CLOSE OVER HERE.' THE CAPT THEN TURNED L INTO POS ON RWY 23. I DID NOT THINK WE GOT TOO CLOSE TO THE BERM AT RWY EDGE DURING THIS TURN. WITH ME FLYING WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, ALL INDICATIONS NORMAL, FULL PWR. AT 132 KTS, 5 KTS PRIOR TO V1, THE R ENG BEGAN COMPRESSOR STALL STILL PRODUCING PWR, WE ABORTED ON THE RWY, AND AFTER HAVING ACFT INSPECTED FOR FIRE/HOT BRAKES BY ARPT EMER PERSONNEL, TAXIED BACK TO GATE. R ENG SUSTAINED DAMAGE TO UNDERSIDE OF COWLING JUST AFT OF LIP OF COWLING. AND FAN STAGE BLADES SHOWED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE AS IF FROM FOD. CHUNKS OF BLADE TIPS WERE MISSING WITH SEVERAL BLADES CURLED, SPLIT, TWISTED. THERE WERE NO INJURIES AND THE AIRPLANE STOPPED WELL BEFORE END OF RWY. THE BRAKES WERE NOT HOT ENOUGH TO MELT THE FUSE PLUGS ON TIRES, AT LEAST NOT WITHIN TIME THAT I OBSERVED THEM (APPROX 30 MINS AFTER ABORT). HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: BEING UNABLE TO SEE THE ENG FROM THE COCKPIT, COULD HAVE LED TO ENG CONTACTING BERM PRIOR TO TKOF, ALTHOUGH NOTHING WAS FELT DURING THE TAXI OUT. THE ABORT ITSELF WENT WELL, HOWEVER, JUST PRIOR TO V1 WHEN THE ENG BEGAN TO VIOLENTLY COMPRESSOR STALL, POP, SHAKE AIRFRAME, ETC, TRAINED REACTIONS TO INCIDENTS AFFECTING THE GO/NO GO DECISION BECOME MUCH MORE STRAINED AND CONFUSED. THE NOISE WAS SO LOUD THAT COGENT COMS BTWN THE PLTS IS IMPOSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY IN AN MLG WITH THE ENGS SO CLOSE TO THE COCKPIT. I COULD HARDLY HEAR MYSELF MAKE THE 'ABORT' CALL TO THE TWR AFTER IT HAD BEGUN. THE TRAINING WE HAVE IN THE SIMULATOR FOR THE RTO IS SO SEDATE BY COMPARISON WITH WHAT WE EXPERIENCED ABOVE (I.E., ENG SPOOL DOWN, ENG FIRE WARNING, ENG OVERHEAT WARNING) AND NOT NEARLY SO STARTLING THAT I FEEL THAT THE TRAINING WOULD BE IMPROVED IF SOME LOUD SOUND EFFECTS WERE ADDED WITH APPROPRIATE KNOWLEDGE OF HOW WELL A DAMAGED, COMPRESSOR STALLING ENG WILL HOLD TOGETHER UNTIL IT CAN BE DEALT WITH IN THE AIR, AND NOT ELICIT A POSSIBLY 'KNEE JERK' ABORT UNDER CONDITIONS LESS FAVORABLE THAN ABOVE, AND RESULTING N A TRAGEDY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.