Narrative:

The situation involves my decision to place family members of my crew in the cockpit jump seats on a flight from baton rouge to dallas ft worth for the sole purpose of getting them home the evening of mar/sun/93. The family members were the husband of a flight attendant and the wife of the flight engineer. Both had used their standby dependent travel privileges to come with us on the flight to baton rouge the evening before and were to turn home the same way. Another carrier cancelled a scheduled flight from baton rouge to dallas ft worth, and as many of those passenger as possible were placed on our flight. My decision to place the husband and wife of the respective crew members in the cockpit was based on the following: first, there were no seats available to them in the cabin. Second, both spouses were professional working people who needed to be home that evening in order to be at their jobs the following day, and it appeared there would be no other way for them to get to dallas ft worth that same evening. Finally and most importantly, I felt to leave them behind could become a source of worry and distraction for 2 of my crew. A conflict arises from the fact that they did not have proper written authorization in accordance with company policy and the FAA to occupy the jump seats. The authorization would have to be derived from my 'final authority' as PIC over operation of that aircraft. The jump seat occupants were thoroughly briefed with emphasis on the sterile cockpit concept. The agents boarding the flight ensured their presence in the jump seats was reflected in the load closeout information and included in the takeoff weight computations. In an emergency, we have the authority to deviate from these guidelines, but in non-emergency sits does that authority still exist? In my 19 yrs as a professional pilot I have read a great number of accident reports. Every one expressed a common theme, that a chain of events can be established leading up to the accident, any one of which, if altered, might have prevented the accident. That evening in baton rouge, I observed a chain of events taking place that if allowed to continue could have resulted in a distraction for 2 of my crew. To prevent that distraction, I exercised my 'final authority' as PIC, intervened, and made an exception to normal procedure. The cockpit was business as usual and highly professional, the flight to dallas ft worth uneventful. With their family members safely home, our subsequent flts were also uneventful.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT CREW CARRIED 2 CREW MEMBERS' SPOUSES IN THE COCKPIT AS THE CABIN WAS FULL.

Narrative: THE SIT INVOLVES MY DECISION TO PLACE FAMILY MEMBERS OF MY CREW IN THE COCKPIT JUMP SEATS ON A FLT FROM BATON ROUGE TO DALLAS FT WORTH FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF GETTING THEM HOME THE EVENING OF MAR/SUN/93. THE FAMILY MEMBERS WERE THE HUSBAND OF A FLT ATTENDANT AND THE WIFE OF THE FE. BOTH HAD USED THEIR STANDBY DEPENDENT TRAVEL PRIVILEGES TO COME WITH US ON THE FLT TO BATON ROUGE THE EVENING BEFORE AND WERE TO TURN HOME THE SAME WAY. ANOTHER CARRIER CANCELLED A SCHEDULED FLT FROM BATON ROUGE TO DALLAS FT WORTH, AND AS MANY OF THOSE PAX AS POSSIBLE WERE PLACED ON OUR FLT. MY DECISION TO PLACE THE HUSBAND AND WIFE OF THE RESPECTIVE CREW MEMBERS IN THE COCKPIT WAS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: FIRST, THERE WERE NO SEATS AVAILABLE TO THEM IN THE CABIN. SECOND, BOTH SPOUSES WERE PROFESSIONAL WORKING PEOPLE WHO NEEDED TO BE HOME THAT EVENING IN ORDER TO BE AT THEIR JOBS THE FOLLOWING DAY, AND IT APPEARED THERE WOULD BE NO OTHER WAY FOR THEM TO GET TO DALLAS FT WORTH THAT SAME EVENING. FINALLY AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, I FELT TO LEAVE THEM BEHIND COULD BECOME A SOURCE OF WORRY AND DISTR FOR 2 OF MY CREW. A CONFLICT ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE PROPER WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY POLICY AND THE FAA TO OCCUPY THE JUMP SEATS. THE AUTHORIZATION WOULD HAVE TO BE DERIVED FROM MY 'FINAL AUTHORITY' AS PIC OVER OP OF THAT ACFT. THE JUMP SEAT OCCUPANTS WERE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED WITH EMPHASIS ON THE STERILE COCKPIT CONCEPT. THE AGENTS BOARDING THE FLT ENSURED THEIR PRESENCE IN THE JUMP SEATS WAS REFLECTED IN THE LOAD CLOSEOUT INFO AND INCLUDED IN THE TKOF WT COMPUTATIONS. IN AN EMER, WE HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DEVIATE FROM THESE GUIDELINES, BUT IN NON-EMER SITS DOES THAT AUTHORITY STILL EXIST? IN MY 19 YRS AS A PROFESSIONAL PLT I HAVE READ A GREAT NUMBER OF ACCIDENT RPTS. EVERY ONE EXPRESSED A COMMON THEME, THAT A CHAIN OF EVENTS CAN BE ESTABLISHED LEADING UP TO THE ACCIDENT, ANY ONE OF WHICH, IF ALTERED, MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THE ACCIDENT. THAT EVENING IN BATON ROUGE, I OBSERVED A CHAIN OF EVENTS TAKING PLACE THAT IF ALLOWED TO CONTINUE COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A DISTR FOR 2 OF MY CREW. TO PREVENT THAT DISTR, I EXERCISED MY 'FINAL AUTHORITY' AS PIC, INTERVENED, AND MADE AN EXCEPTION TO NORMAL PROC. THE COCKPIT WAS BUSINESS AS USUAL AND HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL, THE FLT TO DALLAS FT WORTH UNEVENTFUL. WITH THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS SAFELY HOME, OUR SUBSEQUENT FLTS WERE ALSO UNEVENTFUL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.