Narrative:

Flight was filed msy, V-9 grw, with a 'format' WX briefing (telephone) from FSS. Before takeoff, I called twice more, to check current radar for the progress of thunderstorms that extended from hundreds of mi west of our route to 'maybe 50 or 60 mi' east of V-9, between mcb and jan. My calls painted a picture of thunderstorms closer to btr than mcb, moving slowly nne and not likely to cross V-9 before I got there. If they got too close, I would deviate east. My last call was immediately after the passenger arrived and shortly before our takeoff. That's when I was told 'maybe 50-60 mi.' I would deviate farther east. In retrospect, I should have refiled V-455 mei, thence northwest to a suitable airport in the mem area. I filed for 4000 ft to stay below the thunderstorm bases, where possible. Aircraft has an early stormscope -- the model that lights up like a christmas tree, whenever there is a strong lightning strike anywhere within 200 NM, and a post-korean war monochrome radar with multiple radome patches. First vector from msy was northwest, straight toward the death angel, so I asked for the first of a long series of vectors to the nne, then northeast, then ene. Roughly 35 southeast of mcb and 35 southwest of lby, ZHU's frequency was far too busy, and the controller was impatient to know when I would go northwest toward mcb or V-9. I said something to the effect that I needed to go farther northeast around the line of cells, but he kept pressuring me to give him an exact route. At that point, I should've said something like: 'look, I need infinite left and right deviations, as my radar picture is constantly changing, and, as soon as I can give you a for sure route, I'll tell you about it.' being far too intimidated by the god of the fed's, I gave in to the pressure and asked for direct mei, as I needed to go in a generally northeast direction, and I said something to the effect that I'd figure out a new further route and destination in a min or two. Then, he cleared me direct lby, mei. Once lby locked on, I found that I had to go somewhat west of there, as a cell was straddling V-455 at lby. Each deviation required that I first get a word through all the voices on the frequency, and I made a couple of those turns before being cleared to do so, to stay out of some angry-looking air. Wnw of lby, I passed southeast of a large cell and began painting more of the same toward mei. Just as it occurred to me that I might have to harass ZHU again, turn south to a point about 20 NM south of lby, go east to the atlantic ocean, then go north, I saw a big gap in the line that had been attenuated by the cell I had just passed. I turned to point the radar at what I saw: radar, stormscope and eyeballs all said I had a 30 mi wide gap between me and jan. I told ZHU I needed to go direct jan, grw, and I thought he cleared that. He later said he had said that he'd get back to me on that. We got to gwo with a very smooth ride. Throughout the whole deal, my passenger never got so much as light chop. Somewhere northwest of PCU, I called flight watch for yet another look ahead at their composite radar picture. It would be great if all FSS's had an overlay superimposed on that radar picture, enabling them to say, with at least semi- accuracy, where the edges of radar returns lie, relative to vors. If the radar site is nowhere near a VOR, saying that the east edge of a cluster or line of cells lies 'oh, maybe 100 mi northeast of the radar site' gives me information that is hard to use in the cockpit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT CHARTER FLT DEVIATES TSTMS THINKING HE IS CLRED TO DO SO.

Narrative: FLT WAS FILED MSY, V-9 GRW, WITH A 'FORMAT' WX BRIEFING (TELEPHONE) FROM FSS. BEFORE TKOF, I CALLED TWICE MORE, TO CHK CURRENT RADAR FOR THE PROGRESS OF TSTMS THAT EXTENDED FROM HUNDREDS OF MI W OF OUR RTE TO 'MAYBE 50 OR 60 MI' E OF V-9, BTWN MCB AND JAN. MY CALLS PAINTED A PICTURE OF TSTMS CLOSER TO BTR THAN MCB, MOVING SLOWLY NNE AND NOT LIKELY TO CROSS V-9 BEFORE I GOT THERE. IF THEY GOT TOO CLOSE, I WOULD DEVIATE E. MY LAST CALL WAS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PAX ARRIVED AND SHORTLY BEFORE OUR TKOF. THAT'S WHEN I WAS TOLD 'MAYBE 50-60 MI.' I WOULD DEVIATE FARTHER E. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE REFILED V-455 MEI, THENCE NW TO A SUITABLE ARPT IN THE MEM AREA. I FILED FOR 4000 FT TO STAY BELOW THE TSTM BASES, WHERE POSSIBLE. ACFT HAS AN EARLY STORMSCOPE -- THE MODEL THAT LIGHTS UP LIKE A CHRISTMAS TREE, WHENEVER THERE IS A STRONG LIGHTNING STRIKE ANYWHERE WITHIN 200 NM, AND A POST-KOREAN WAR MONOCHROME RADAR WITH MULTIPLE RADOME PATCHES. FIRST VECTOR FROM MSY WAS NW, STRAIGHT TOWARD THE DEATH ANGEL, SO I ASKED FOR THE FIRST OF A LONG SERIES OF VECTORS TO THE NNE, THEN NE, THEN ENE. ROUGHLY 35 SE OF MCB AND 35 SW OF LBY, ZHU'S FREQ WAS FAR TOO BUSY, AND THE CTLR WAS IMPATIENT TO KNOW WHEN I WOULD GO NW TOWARD MCB OR V-9. I SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT I NEEDED TO GO FARTHER NE AROUND THE LINE OF CELLS, BUT HE KEPT PRESSURING ME TO GIVE HIM AN EXACT RTE. AT THAT POINT, I SHOULD'VE SAID SOMETHING LIKE: 'LOOK, I NEED INFINITE L AND R DEVS, AS MY RADAR PICTURE IS CONSTANTLY CHANGING, AND, AS SOON AS I CAN GIVE YOU A FOR SURE RTE, I'LL TELL YOU ABOUT IT.' BEING FAR TOO INTIMIDATED BY THE GOD OF THE FED'S, I GAVE IN TO THE PRESSURE AND ASKED FOR DIRECT MEI, AS I NEEDED TO GO IN A GENERALLY NE DIRECTION, AND I SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT I'D FIGURE OUT A NEW FURTHER RTE AND DEST IN A MIN OR TWO. THEN, HE CLRED ME DIRECT LBY, MEI. ONCE LBY LOCKED ON, I FOUND THAT I HAD TO GO SOMEWHAT W OF THERE, AS A CELL WAS STRADDLING V-455 AT LBY. EACH DEV REQUIRED THAT I FIRST GET A WORD THROUGH ALL THE VOICES ON THE FREQ, AND I MADE A COUPLE OF THOSE TURNS BEFORE BEING CLRED TO DO SO, TO STAY OUT OF SOME ANGRY-LOOKING AIR. WNW OF LBY, I PASSED SE OF A LARGE CELL AND BEGAN PAINTING MORE OF THE SAME TOWARD MEI. JUST AS IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT I MIGHT HAVE TO HARASS ZHU AGAIN, TURN S TO A POINT ABOUT 20 NM S OF LBY, GO E TO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, THEN GO N, I SAW A BIG GAP IN THE LINE THAT HAD BEEN ATTENUATED BY THE CELL I HAD JUST PASSED. I TURNED TO POINT THE RADAR AT WHAT I SAW: RADAR, STORMSCOPE AND EYEBALLS ALL SAID I HAD A 30 MI WIDE GAP BTWN ME AND JAN. I TOLD ZHU I NEEDED TO GO DIRECT JAN, GRW, AND I THOUGHT HE CLRED THAT. HE LATER SAID HE HAD SAID THAT HE'D GET BACK TO ME ON THAT. WE GOT TO GWO WITH A VERY SMOOTH RIDE. THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE DEAL, MY PAX NEVER GOT SO MUCH AS LIGHT CHOP. SOMEWHERE NW OF PCU, I CALLED FLT WATCH FOR YET ANOTHER LOOK AHEAD AT THEIR COMPOSITE RADAR PICTURE. IT WOULD BE GREAT IF ALL FSS'S HAD AN OVERLAY SUPERIMPOSED ON THAT RADAR PICTURE, ENABLING THEM TO SAY, WITH AT LEAST SEMI- ACCURACY, WHERE THE EDGES OF RADAR RETURNS LIE, RELATIVE TO VORS. IF THE RADAR SITE IS NOWHERE NEAR A VOR, SAYING THAT THE E EDGE OF A CLUSTER OR LINE OF CELLS LIES 'OH, MAYBE 100 MI NE OF THE RADAR SITE' GIVES ME INFO THAT IS HARD TO USE IN THE COCKPIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.