Narrative:

This problem started on the turn towards canarsi VOR. The first officer was flying the aircraft. He began an immediate turn with excessive bank angle for the indicated airspeed. I reminded him to watch his bank angle. This seemed to make him even more determined. In addition to this, during the turn the instrument comparator heading light illuminated with a variation in the compasses. I wasn't sure which of the compasses were right. My RMI needles were not pointing in the same direction as his. Mine were pointing to the right about 25-30 degrees and his were pointing straight ahead. A quick check revealed that the compasses on both sides were now on the same heading as we rolled out of the turn at somewhere around 180 degrees. The first officer next called for flap retraction. As we were retracting the flaps I stated 'where are you going. Turn right to the VOR.' he became very assertive that he was going to the VOR and pointed to his RMI. I checked the VOR frequencys compared to the departure plate and they were correct. I then noticed that the switches on his RMI were in the ADF position. I said, 'if you'll put your RMI switches to the VOR position, you will see where it is.' again he said 'I'm going to the VOR!' simultaneously, the departure controller asks, 'air carrier X what departure were you assigned?' the first officer has now started a turn toward the VOR. I went to answer the transmission and covered his next query. He then came back again, I believe, and said 'air carrier X what departure were you assigned -- turn right heading 250 degrees.' I answered by apologizing for covering the transmission and stated 'breezy point climb, heading 250.' the controller's next radio call was a frequency change. On the human performance side I see 2 factors. The evening prior to the flight I was unable to get any meaningful rest. We had a very early get-up flown from sdf to jfk but for an hour and a half. Now, I'm starting to get tired, and my thought processes just seem slow. I value this lesson to me on inaction. I should have been more active by taking the aircraft and asked for a correct direction heading as soon as I was uncertain as to which compass was right or wrong, even though it was momentary. There is 1 final thing I can think of that may have contributed to the first officer's aggressiveness: out of sdf, company had provided the crew with meals. The first officer had gotten into his and found a toothpick in his fruit. Thinking that it might have been a used toothpick, he immediately gets on the radio to company and demands another meal. We were getting very close to departure time when someone from the company arrived at the aircraft to check out the problem. I asked the first officer if it would be all right if the company delivered him a meal at jfk, and if the other parts of his meal were ok. To make a long story short, the meal didn't show at jfk and he is on the radio again. I told him he was welcome to mine or possibly try again in atl. He did seem upset that I would not delay the flight for his meal unless he refueled to go without it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CARGO ACFT HAS EQUIP PROB RESULTING IN HDG DEV.

Narrative: THIS PROB STARTED ON THE TURN TOWARDS CANARSI VOR. THE FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT. HE BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE TURN WITH EXCESSIVE BANK ANGLE FOR THE INDICATED AIRSPD. I REMINDED HIM TO WATCH HIS BANK ANGLE. THIS SEEMED TO MAKE HIM EVEN MORE DETERMINED. IN ADDITION TO THIS, DURING THE TURN THE INST COMPARATOR HDG LIGHT ILLUMINATED WITH A VARIATION IN THE COMPASSES. I WASN'T SURE WHICH OF THE COMPASSES WERE RIGHT. MY RMI NEEDLES WERE NOT POINTING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS HIS. MINE WERE POINTING TO THE R ABOUT 25-30 DEGS AND HIS WERE POINTING STRAIGHT AHEAD. A QUICK CHK REVEALED THAT THE COMPASSES ON BOTH SIDES WERE NOW ON THE SAME HDG AS WE ROLLED OUT OF THE TURN AT SOMEWHERE AROUND 180 DEGS. THE FO NEXT CALLED FOR FLAP RETRACTION. AS WE WERE RETRACTING THE FLAPS I STATED 'WHERE ARE YOU GOING. TURN R TO THE VOR.' HE BECAME VERY ASSERTIVE THAT HE WAS GOING TO THE VOR AND POINTED TO HIS RMI. I CHKED THE VOR FREQS COMPARED TO THE DEP PLATE AND THEY WERE CORRECT. I THEN NOTICED THAT THE SWITCHES ON HIS RMI WERE IN THE ADF POS. I SAID, 'IF YOU'LL PUT YOUR RMI SWITCHES TO THE VOR POS, YOU WILL SEE WHERE IT IS.' AGAIN HE SAID 'I'M GOING TO THE VOR!' SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE DEP CTLR ASKS, 'ACR X WHAT DEP WERE YOU ASSIGNED?' THE FO HAS NOW STARTED A TURN TOWARD THE VOR. I WENT TO ANSWER THE XMISSION AND COVERED HIS NEXT QUERY. HE THEN CAME BACK AGAIN, I BELIEVE, AND SAID 'ACR X WHAT DEP WERE YOU ASSIGNED -- TURN R HDG 250 DEGS.' I ANSWERED BY APOLOGIZING FOR COVERING THE XMISSION AND STATED 'BREEZY POINT CLB, HDG 250.' THE CTLR'S NEXT RADIO CALL WAS A FREQ CHANGE. ON THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE SIDE I SEE 2 FACTORS. THE EVENING PRIOR TO THE FLT I WAS UNABLE TO GET ANY MEANINGFUL REST. WE HAD A VERY EARLY GET-UP FLOWN FROM SDF TO JFK BUT FOR AN HR AND A HALF. NOW, I'M STARTING TO GET TIRED, AND MY THOUGHT PROCESSES JUST SEEM SLOW. I VALUE THIS LESSON TO ME ON INACTION. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ACTIVE BY TAKING THE ACFT AND ASKED FOR A CORRECT DIRECTION HDG AS SOON AS I WAS UNCERTAIN AS TO WHICH COMPASS WAS RIGHT OR WRONG, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS MOMENTARY. THERE IS 1 FINAL THING I CAN THINK OF THAT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE FO'S AGGRESSIVENESS: OUT OF SDF, COMPANY HAD PROVIDED THE CREW WITH MEALS. THE FO HAD GOTTEN INTO HIS AND FOUND A TOOTHPICK IN HIS FRUIT. THINKING THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A USED TOOTHPICK, HE IMMEDIATELY GETS ON THE RADIO TO COMPANY AND DEMANDS ANOTHER MEAL. WE WERE GETTING VERY CLOSE TO DEP TIME WHEN SOMEONE FROM THE COMPANY ARRIVED AT THE ACFT TO CHK OUT THE PROB. I ASKED THE FO IF IT WOULD BE ALL RIGHT IF THE COMPANY DELIVERED HIM A MEAL AT JFK, AND IF THE OTHER PARTS OF HIS MEAL WERE OK. TO MAKE A LONG STORY SHORT, THE MEAL DIDN'T SHOW AT JFK AND HE IS ON THE RADIO AGAIN. I TOLD HIM HE WAS WELCOME TO MINE OR POSSIBLY TRY AGAIN IN ATL. HE DID SEEM UPSET THAT I WOULD NOT DELAY THE FLT FOR HIS MEAL UNLESS HE REFUELED TO GO WITHOUT IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.